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The McChrystal Report – a summary

40.000 – from Kabul to Washington this number achieved media attention a number gets not that often (except maybe the Down Jones: 10.000 break through). 40.000 this is the speculated number of troops the new ISAF Commander General McChrystal wants to finally win the war in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s report on the situation in Afghanistan is widely discussed, but is mostly reduced to the very number. Since there are just few numbers in the report, and 40.000 is certainly not one of them, it is time to take a closer look.

Short summary

McChrystal stresses a fundental new approach to strategy in Afghanistan, as he identifies two main threats: the insurgency and the crisis of popular confidence. Therefore the main aim is to improve effectiveness, gain a wider understanding of the needs and choice of the Afghan people and effectively protect them. McChrystal is calling for a “properly resourced” mission to regain the momentum and to achieve a stage of consolidated stability from where Afghan government institutions slowly take over sole responsibility. The main task is to prevent the Taliban to return to Afghanistan and providing a safe haven forterrorism.

The Report – Extended summary

Written on behalf of Central Command and the NATO General Secretary McChrystal sets out to answer three initial questions:

1. Can ISAF achieve the mission?

2. If so, how should ISAF go about achieving the mission?

3. What is required to achieve the mission?

The situation

The situation in Afghanistan is critical, in McChrystal’s words “deteriorating” and a crisis of confidence among the Afghans imminent. The Taliban have the advantage and the momentum of their campaign leaves the US led coalition troops on the fallback. But (!), McChrystal says, there should be no doubt that this war can be won, the Taliban will be erradicated from the face of the Earth and with them Al Qaida. This, according to the general, is the main task: to prevent Afghanistan becoming a base for international terrorism ever again, and therefor the Taliban must be destroyed.

So how does McChrystal wants to win the war? More troops? Yes, but (!) this is not the crux. More troops will not make any difference if a troop surge is not coming with a fundamental change in strategy. The US have to leave there well protected bases, from where they set out to hunt Al Qaida terrorists and start to protect the population. More than that, the war can only be won if the coalition is able to win the hearts of the Afghan people.

All of this can be read on the very first page of the report, and this seems to be the content media around the world founds “headline-worthy”. Reading further really makes sense, because McChrystal’s report shows the fundamental way the US are likely to view the war in Afghanistan over the next 3 years and for the first time in 8 years there really seems to be a revolutionary spirit in the air of Army headquarters.

New strategy

The main target of the US campaign is not fighting terrorism any longer, from now on the new task is winning over the population, which “represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system.” And further, “gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs.” Progress to achieve this goal is hindered on two froniers: First a resilient insurgency which treatens the people with violence and intimidation. Second a crisis in confidency in both the Afghan government and the coalition force.

McChrystal admits. “ISAF is a conventional force [...], inexperienced in local languages and culture, [...] and preoccupied with protection of its own forces. We have operated in a manner that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect.” The coalition needs to improve effectiveness through greater partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which means that more Afghan troops should be incorporated into ISAF troop units. Responsive and accountable governance is to be prioritized by improving formal and traditional mechanisms. According to McChrystal, the way the coalition operates must be dramatically different, even “uncomfortably” different. GIs will move into the villages and maintain a presence that keeps the Taliban away. ISAF troops so gain an understand of the Afghan people and their needs and can be of assistence in delivering basic services and the provision of justice. The ISAF personnel, McChrystal writes, “must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not as an occupying army.”

The main advantage McChrystal identifies on the side of ISAF troops, is the possibility to aid local economy by creating economic opportunity and jobs for the population. Along comes a program that offers “eligible unsurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection.” Also local commanders need more flexibility to allocate resources where they are needed, which should lay the groundwork for a later government run maintenance.

Military campaign and exit strategy

The military campaign accompanying is focused on gaining the initiative and concentrating resources where they are needed the most. In an initial stage the ISAF will take a new approach and integrate fully with the ANSF through extensive partnering. Over the next 12-24 months the insurgency diminishes in critical areas, while at the same time a second stages, strategic consolidation, becomes the main focus. With more civilian and military capacitiy available, security operations will expand to a wider area and increase the space in which the population feels protected and served by their government. When finally the insurgent groups no longer pose a vital threat to Afghanistan, a third stage of sustained security will ensure durable success. While ISAF troops begin to draw down and transition to train, advise and assist, the ANSF will eventually become solely responsible.

Resources

The term “properly resourced” ,McChrystal uses, remains the big questionmark. In the meanwhile he has publicly said that 40.ooo more troops is a required minimum, but policy makers already feel the dilema between enough troops to get the job done and an army overstretched in times of financial crisis when it takes 250.000 US-Dollar to keep a soldier in Afghanistan for one year. The generals new strategy requires not only more troops to show presence but also comes with much higher risk. On few occasions  in the report McChrystal points out, that the US public will be confrontated with more images and reports of dead US soldiers.

But this is not everyting Afghanistan’s commander wants. The ANA, the Afghan army, is to be stocked up significantly toward a new target ceiling of 240.000, almost double as much as the current strength of 137.000 troops. While the strength of the ANP, the Afghan National Police must be raised to 160.000.

Still, the main effort, McChrystal formulates, has to be made on a governance base, with a built-up of fundamental services such as electricity, water supply, infrastructure, education and the creation of jobs, while at the same time fighting corruption, providing fair jurisdiction and integrating traditional government structures.

Else:

There are a few very interesting parts in McChrystal’s report which have been widely neglegted by the media. For example, McChrystal identifies three main networks of Taliban insurgency: the Quetta Shura, mainly working in Kandahar province, the Haqqani Network in Kwost, Paktia and Paktika neighbouring the Tribal Areas in Pakistan, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin. All of these networks maintain operational bases in Pakistan, allthough McChrystal admits that the insurgency is “clearly supported from Pakistan, its senior leaders are based there and are linked with both, Al Qaida and elements of the ISI”, McChrystal insists that most fighters are Afghans.

Another interesting point is McChrystal’s suggestion to hand over responsibility for prisoners of war to the Afghan government to “evolve to a more holistic model centered on an Afghan-run system.” Allthough McChrystal insists that information obtained from prisoners are critical to effective protection, he admits that it is important to create a legal framework and support the rule of law.

Overall McChrystal displays a greater understanding of the complex relations between the different players in Afghanistan and acknowledges the diverging interests of the surrounding areas. While Iran, Russia and India are all of some importance China’s possible interests and its role in the conflict is entirly left out. McChrystal’s imperative is to learn to understand the “bigger picture” and that ISAF becomes a player itself rathern than trying enforce a new order.

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