Caroline Brothers has an article in the Guardian on Afghan boys who ended up in Paris after an Odysee over land. It’s not a story that is limited to Afghanistan, stranded in my hometown they hail just as likely from Pakistan, and of course African countries. And those stories are old – it is just that they have been ignored largely and are continued to be treated with far to little sincerity by European governments. Let me recount such a story, that takes Brothers’ line further – where such an Odysee can end, and after Paris and Calais London is often not where it ends up.

When I worked for an international humanitarian organisation in Pakistan, I was issued the responsibility of a young Afghan man (I’ll call him Farhad) who had suddenly emerged in Peshawar. He had been deported from Germany many days earlier, where he had earned his education at the same organisation where I was employed now. A decade earlier, in the early 90s, his uncle advised him to take the 5000$ trip in a truck’s container to Europe, where he ended up having scarse contact to other family members who were already in Germany, but largely made his own way. He was repeatedly granted the right to stay but never with a full permit. When the German province he lived in passed a stricter law on asylum seekers, prompting all above 18 who had no close family members in the country to be deported at earliest – his parents had been killed in conflict back home – he was put on a plane to Kabul with two police accompanying him – the salary for these he had to come up for himself at a later stage. In Kabul he was released on the tarmac with a fat ‘Deported’ stamped into his Afghan passport. Ground staff in Kabul devalidated his passport and he was a persona non grata – no family and being a returnee from Europe made him suspicious and an easy target to be exploited. Together with a boy with a similar fate he met in Kabul – he had just been deported from England where his family did live, on charges of marihuana posession – they made their way to Peshawar. Here the guy from England assured, the chances to find someone to get them immediately back to Europe would be bigger.

On Kabul River

At this point, the organisation in Germany, who was in constant contact with Farhad, contacted their branch in Pakistan to take care of him. They refused. They had a point, where would they get to if they had to take care of all Afghan men coming illegaly to Pakistan, wishing to go to Europe. The international head office warned us to take the matter up as well, an issue too politically sensitive with little chance to cut a tear wrenching story out of it. He was to be forgotten, were it not for his care takers in Germany who felt it their responsibility to get him back to Germany. I ended up shuttling between Peshawar, Islamabad and Lahore trying to get to a solution, at constant threat of being seized with an illegal Afghan. His care takers were portraying Pakistan as a dangerous place in hell back home from which Farhad needed to be saved, while he was living in a mosque in Peshawar begging in the street to be granted a place to sleep, being constantly harrased by Pakistanis for being an unwelcome foreigner. The antipathy was large from Pashtuns like him in Peshawar to Punjabi clerks in Islamabad to International Staff at the Embassy and the UNHCR. But the naivity concerning the situation in Afghanistan or Pakistan itself of the international donors who only want the best (which is what?) back home in Germany (is it his home?) was the most troubling aspect for me. In their eyes, Afghanistan and Pakistan are exciting, oriental, dangerous, dirty and unwelcoming places from where you can only flee or go to if you want to help people or dip you finger into a spice bowl in a bazaar.

Not enough such stories as by Brothers’ are written to bring this topic, which has been growing bigger and bigger in recent years, to the attention of the public. But these are not incredible stories one should be marveling with sorrow about, only to rush to the next book shop and buy Khaled Hosseini. Our responsibility is to make sure that our governments deal with the issue sensibly.

I figured it was not for me to judge whether he should be helped to get back to Germany, or try to figure out a future in Afghanistan. That was for him to do, I would help him to get to where he thought going fit his realistic dreams.

The Tractors

Conrad Schetter from the German Crossroads Asia Project, has an excellent short write up on patterns of migration in Afghnaistan out.

Waves of refugees and labour migrants determine the social reality of life in Afghanistan ‐ perhaps more so than anywhere else. The intervention which has been on‐going since 2001 has barely considered this high spatial mobility in its conceptual planning. Where it has been noted, it tends to be perceived as disruptive. This article intends to demonstrate the extent to which forms of migration affect the lives of Afghans and should be taken account of in plans for the future of the country that go beyond the dominant state‐building model.

He shows how spatial mobility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a common nearly unrestricted fact and a central tenet of many families. His story of a family from Lower Dir is especially interesting, as it could have been told by Babur (Zahir ud din Muhammad, 1483 – 1530), who like his forefathers and other realtives, when danger loomed, always shifted the women from his family to the safe havens of Badakhshan.

Another example, that of a family from Lower Dir in north Pakistan, shows the migration strategy of a family that can be reckoned to the educated middle classes. Part of the family moved from Lower Dir to the neighbouring district of Bajaur at the beginning of the 20th century. Several members of the family subsequently moved from there to Kunar in east Afghanistan. In the late 1940s, part of the family moved to Archi, on the Afghan‐Tajik border, when they were offered land there. [...] All the women in this extended family live in Lower Dir. When violence escalated in the Swat valley in the spring 2009, the female members of the family were all brought to Kunduz, but they are now already back in Lower Dir; this shows, yet again, that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not seen as a barrier to spatial mobility. This case, moreover, illustrates nicely the concept of the competence network Crossroads Asia.

I have pointed at one phenomenon of the porous Durand Line earlier, stemming from my experience with patients from our hospital close to the refugee camp Shamshatoo. Here I want to briefly look at another aspect of migration of Afghans into Pakistan and beyond.

In Pakistan administered Kashmir

While it is popular to write of the alleged presence of the Chinese in Pakistani administered Kashmir, it is Afghans who really have a say in business there. After the earthquake in 2005, the complete tractor business (that is transport of building material) was in the hands of Afghans who had lived here since long ago – one can imagine why they originally came. Organised according to the places they hail from in Afghanistan, they today control many garments, carpets and utilities shops, linked up to warehouses all over the country in the hands of other family members (just as Schetter portrays). When the construction after the earthquake quickly subsided, they were a lot more flexible than local Kashmiris to adapt to new jobs. When demand decreased significantly in their field, they would move back to Afghanistan for a few weeks or months and drive tractors there or follow up on another job. In the Afghan’s carpet shops letters and photos of female Swedish NGO workers are passed around while a family member just returned from Waziristan talks about his experiences with a Mehsud lashkar which he left to take some days off in cooler Kashmir.

Just as Bernd Glatzer explains in his War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries (which one should read in combination with Schetter’s article), the Afghans here ‘consider Pashtuns from beyond the Durand Line as first and foremost Pakistanis.’ Even though their counterparts in construction would often be Pashtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the daily wages construction business is in the hands of Pakistani Pashtuns who lived in tents for the weeks they would work, only to move on or return home when they had earned enough), they had little to do with them. The place in Afghanistan (sometimes down to the village) would matter most, after that Afghanistan. After that Pashtun identity, much later somewhere the fact that they are Muslims just like the Kashmiris.

While the debates on drones and talks to Taliban in Qatar may be important to lead and are essential to the area’s future, the fact that they are detached from the place (one up in thin air, the other on the other side of the street of Hormuz) they are symptomatic for what goes so wrong here. To be so far away from the Know and the stories that are happening just outside our doors as Brothers shows, and so in love with the grandiose speculative theories.

I am looking forward to this book.

The terms “Water War” and “Water Wars” are media darlings. The famous quote apocryphally attributed to US humorist Mark Twain “[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over” is so overused that many water professionals are pleading to ban its use. To get a feel as to when the hysteria over water wars began, we explored Google labs tool Books Ngram Viewer which revealed that geographers were using the terms to describe water situations in the US and Middle East as early as the late 1800s with an exponential increase in the use of these terms starting in 1988.

The experts they mention – Gleick, Yoffe, Giordano, Susskind – are the main sources earlier mentioned reviews draw on. They close with a very valid conclusion:

Much of the hype about water wars is good business for conflict beneficiaries and book sales, but in reality conflicts over transboundary waters are normal, and managing that conflict offers constant opportunities for dialogue and cooperation.

I have just reviewed such an attempt to cash in on the ‘water war’ hypothesis for DAWN.

Brahma Chellaney’s Water: Asia’s New Battleground sums up the arguments for why South Asia may go to war over water in the near future (and how that could be averted). It is representative of a number of recent publications along these lines — and serves as a good example of where they may be going lost in the thicket of hyperbole that lushly grows when policy experts muddle in sensitive engineering or natural science topics (or equally when engineers have an urge to develop political arguments on such).

The arguments for and against the threat of near future war over water resources are at loggerheads. For South Asia examples for a dire future situation are ample, and since many countries are extremely dependent on huge water courses originating in a neighbouring country (with which it often has other disputes ongoing), the argument for violent conflict seems close to come by. The counter argument observes that while there is and will be conflict over water resources, countries have not gone to war over it in the past, and because of effects explained with Pareto optimality, both parties would be loosers in an outbreak of such, and are therefore inclided to solve the problems via cooperation.

What makes the topic very interesting on the Subcontinent and in Asia in general, is the fact that the debate is being carried out very actively (3). For the case of the Indus Basin, conflict between India and Pakistan, one should read on the recent history of water resources in the two countries (4), what the current challenges are (5) and what kind of solutions may already be around and need not be introduced by ‘international experts’ – see MS Gopal’s great photographs of the Barefoot Geologists in Kutch.

For Central Asia, the research reaches from Climate Change, via the stand off between the rather poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have all power over the water sources Amu and Syr and are excerting it, and the richer downstream Uzbekistan, to the effects of water overuse on the common property Aral Sea (6).

————-
¹ Two good and rather recent overviews can be found here: Thomas Bernauer and Anna Kalbhenn. 2010. The Politics of International Freshwater Resources The International Studies Encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell.; Dinar, A., and Dinar, S. (2003) Recent Developments in the Literature on Conflict and Cooperation in International Shared Water. Natural Resources Journal (43) (4), 1217–87 (a revised form of this paper can be downloaded here)
² Most notably the Databases on the Transboundary Waters Website
³ See for example Briscoe’s comment in EPW India on the Indus and India-Pakistan and Iyer’s response.
⁴ John Briscoe et. al. on Pakistan (Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry) and India (India’s Water Economy – Bracing for a Turbulent Future)
⁵ On Pakistan the Wilson Centre’s Report Pani ki Kahani is excellent, for India, the papers from the IWMI’s NSRLP project are a take, as an introduction the first chapter from a series.
⁶ On Climate change, see Bernauer, T., Siegfried, T. Climate Change and International Water Conflict in Central Asia., on the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by the same authors (2007) Estimating the performance of international regulatory regimes: Methodology and empirical application to international water management in the Naryn/Syr Darya basin.

6. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I Teil II Teil III Teil IV Teil V

Die Diskussion zur Rolle China’s in Zentralasien und auch Pakistan wird auf Registan weitergeführt. Alexandros Petersen hat auf Steve LeVine’s ForeignPolicy Blog einen kurzen Bericht zu seinen Beobachtungen zu Geschäften zwischen China und Turkmenistan veröffentlicht. Er zieht dabei auch Folgerungen zu den Beziehungen zu Russland und der EU, Punkte, die wir bis jetzt noch wenig beachtet haben, weil sie im Falle Pakistan auch eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle spielen.

In erster Linie argumentiert er, dass China aktiv seinen Einfluss in der Region ausbaut und macht das an einigen wenigen Bemerkungen, ja sogar Deutungen von gegenteiligen Aussagen fest.

A CNPC representative put it in these terms: “Some regional partners like to use our presence as a foreign policy tool.” He was quick to add, “Chinese companies are not involved in politics.”  I heard the terms “non-interference” and “harmonious relations” more times than I could count. But, addressing the Turkmen deal directly, a senior policymaker with the Chinese energy ministry said, “Energy is the basis for a wider relationship with Turkmenistan, which we see as a major, long-term partner in the region.” Kazakhstan has far more oil, in addition to much natural gas, but Turkmenistan appears to be at least equivalent and perhaps more consequential to China. When I asked whether the relationship with Turkmenistan was important in diversifying China’s energy import options in light of recent civil unrest in Kazakhstan, he answered simply, “Yes.”

Dass chinesische Firmen den zentralasiatischen Raum infiltrieren und ein wirtschaftliches Interesse haben hier Bindungen zu stärken ist unbetsritten und gilt gleichermassen für Pakistan. Das sofort an die geopolitische Machtglocke (‘geopolitical thrust’, ‘regional strategy’) zu hängen fällt einem aber nur ein wenn man eine Berechtigung sucht, auf FP genügend Click zu bekommen. Das ‘Yes’ auf die Frage, ob China seine Ölimporte diversifizieren will ist nicht überraschend, aber auch nicht besonders aussagekräftig um auf die These, dass sich China Zentralasien unter den Nagel reissen will.

Joshua Foust weist in seiner Kritik des Artikels auf einen (scheinbar) wichtigen Unterschied zu den Beziehungen mit Pakistan hin:

It makes for a marked contrast to China’s relationship with Pakistan. Especially on issues of terrorism, China has been less than shy about openly exerting pressure on Islamabad to gain concessions, going so far as to spark the Lal Masjid crisis in 2007. That’s in part because Chinese investment in Pakistan is not just a matter of some Chinese companies either investing or building local subsidiaries, but the result of large, politically significant projects like the Gwadar port and large military sales. In contrast, pressuring a Central Asian government to, for example, round up some Uighur activists it doesn’t like anyway is barely worth mentioning, especially because it imposes no cost on the leaders who do it.

Es ist nicht ganz klar wie stark China hinter dem diplomatischen ‘good-will’ Vorhang auf Pakistan Druck ausübt. Während die kürzliche Geschichte um Stationierung von PLA Truppen aber ziemlich sicher Unsinn sind, und die Besorgnis der ganze Norden Pakistan’s sei schon mit chinesischen Soldaten besetzt eine beliebte aber ebenfalls aufgebauschte Geschichte ist, ist es aber doch offensichtlich, das China nach aussen weit weniger Druck auf Pakistan als auf zentralasiatische Staaten ausübt. Warum?

Schlussendlich weist Foust auf einen wichtigen Punkt hin, der auch mein Hauptargument in der Debatte zu Konflikten über Wasser darstellt (forthcoming):

And that’s the big problem I have with this formulation: it is a deductive analysis of what China might be doing, but there just aren’t enough data to conclusively say that this is what China intends to do. And more important, there’s no sense of whether it’s a good thing, a bad thing, — and if the U.S. should respond, much less care about it.

5. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Teil IV

Der Mangel an ernstzunehmenden Analysen zur bilateralen Beziehung zwischen Pakistan und China wurde wiederholt dargelegt. Auseinandersetzung mit China’s Zentralasien Politik ist dagegen schon fast zu populär. Niklas Swanström hat als Teil der Silk Road Studies Program Serie ein weiteres Paper in diese Richtung vorgelegt (China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers? Silk Road Paper, Dezember 2011). Nichts weiter neues oder besonders lesenswertes, manchmal auch etwas zu viel der Starr’schen New Silk Road Gebete (Zuglinie zwischen Tajikistan und Pakistan, whatever…), aber er richtet seinen Blick auf Greater Central Asia (GCA), zählt dazu auch Pakistan und macht einige wichtige Bemerkungen.

China’s Intentionen – ‘more than the sum of its parts’

Contrary to the widely held simplified view of China, there is no single strategy towards the region. There are significant differences between the central government in Beijing, local governments and private business, differences that could spoil or complicate relations with different actors in GCA. For example, the government in Beijing has one strategy of engagement, Xinjiang has another strategy, which is not always but often, interlinked with the one from Beijing, while other regions also have different policies. This is complicated by the very fact that companies in China are increasingly, and to a great extent, conducting their own business oriented towards economic returns rather than towards increasing China’s soft security.

Swanstroem basiert diese Aussagen auf eigene Interviews in Xinjiang, leider werden solche Quellen selten offengelegt. Aber es reflektiert doch einen Punkt, der in einem Grossteil der ‚China und seine Nachbarn’ Analysen nicht erwähnt wird – China praktiziert seine Außenpolitik nicht als ein Hegemon, sondern ein Staat mit vielen Akteuren und Interessen. Das ist auch für Pakistan der Fall, die Beziehung China – Pakistan auf PLA – FWO zu reduzieren erfasst nur einen Bruchteil der Thematik.

Swanstroem dehnt diese Kritik konkret auf die bekanntesten Narrativen aus, und zweifelt selbst an, ob eine ‚konkrete Strategie’ überhaupt besteht.

John J. Mearsheimer’s call for containment of China in his Tragedy of Great Power Politics was one of the most influential contributions to this debate, while others, such as Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross have argued that China is best integrated into the international community. What has been missed out on to a certain extent is that China has for long been implementing integration policies in the GCA region, as well as in other regions. Certainly the extreme sides that debate frequently among U.S. policymaking and academic circles have failed to capture the nuances in between these polarized views. In fact, a recent Congressional Report points out that the grand strategy behind Beijing’s new use of “soft power,” such as trade and investment, remains largely uncertain even to insiders, if such a grand strategy exists at all. This is something that becomes more evident when looking at the division within China itself and the policy confusion between the three layers and other actors. Regardless of intentions or lack thereof, trade, infrastructure and investments will unavoidably bring a great amount of influence that could be used in whatever way Beijing considers to be in its national interests.

China und Zentralasien – keine neuen Nachbarn

Sich vor allem auf Perdue’s China marches West beziehend (das im letzten Teil vorgestellt wurde), bemerkt Swanström, dass China und seine westlichen Nachbarstaaten fließend ineinander übergehen. Beziehungen die hier heute ‚aufgebaut’ werden, sind meist schon einige Jahrhunderte alt bzw. die zwei Parteien beziehen sich teils sogar auf eine gemeinsame Geschichte.

In fact, it could be argued that the tribes and empires that today form the states in GCA have been heavily involved in the very formation of China and its current political, military and economic outlook. It could even be argued that modern China was built on the very existence of the GCA peoples’ engagement, both negative and positive.

 China vs. der Westen – Zeit und Uhren

China does not rule out a democratic development in the region, on the contrary it is often assumed that such development will happen but Beijing has a more realistic and long-term perspective. Even in the case of the April 2010 “revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, there are more obstacles than positive steps if true democracy is to be established, the Russian involvement being one of the negative factors.

[...]

Even if the United States is perceived as having negative goals, the European policy is at best perceived as confusing and at worst aggressive (in terms of regime change, human rights demands, etc.). It is possible that the Lisbon Treaty will change this over time, but in the short-term the EU policy will continue to be fragmented and uncoordinated. Moreover, the European post-modern attitudes do not impress the GCA states, which are still in a very realist environment and have problems relating to the European lack of understanding.

Sino-Russische  Beziehungen – noch eine diffuse Angstquelle

Er geht auch auf ein Thema ein, das in mehreren Posts in letzter Zeit auf Registan diskutiert wurde – China oder Russland als großer Bruder (das betrifft natürlich nur die zentralasiatischen Staaten, Pakistan-Russische Beziehungen sind nicht wirklich vorhanden)?

Increased but weak multilateralism in the region, including Russia, was the preferred strategy, as it would give Beijing increased leverage without being too offensive. Criticism has been made, especially in the West, of the SCO and the reluctance of

Russia to engage in true multilateralism. In the eyes of Beijing, this is not an issue and in many ways China has accepted the idea that Russia views SCO as simply a control mechanism regarding China’s expansion into the region. This is not something entirely negative. Zhao Huasheng, one of China’s foremost analysts of Russia and Central Asia, has on the contrary claimed that this is something positive, as it reduces Russian fears and could even prevent more problematic conflicts.

[...]

What is striking in all this cooperation, with the possible exception of Pakistan, is that they are all open for interpretation. This has been a conscious strategy on the part of Beijing, since by keeping all of these agreements open-ended and leaving them intentionally vague, China has managed to keep relations with the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran on a fairly good footing. This will continue to be the Chinese policy, but it will be increasingly hard as some issues, primarily Iran and Pakistan, are difficult to handle in a neutral way. This does not indicate that China is ready to surpass Russia in the GCA in the short-term, on the contrary, China finds Russia both more powerful in the GCA (excluding Pakistan) and more ready to act, as we have seen in Kyrgyzstan.

Der Artikel stützt die These, dass man nicht viel weiss, oder zumindest versteht. Aber deswegen auch nicht einfach viel erfinden sollte.

… reduced to an Army

What Pakistan is most often used for as a synonym in reporting and most importantely opinioning on the country is the Pakistan Army (often including the secret service ISI as well). Manan Ahmed, reviewing most recent books on Pakistan that have gathered wide attention, looked at this issue in a National article this August.

One cannot help but note that helicopters are of little use to a Pakistani civilian and not much help in what Riedel himself identifies as the three central problems facing Pakistan – rampant population growth, a diminishing water supply and a curtailed democracy. But they do solve a military problem – and the US-Pakistan relationship over the past 64 years is all about military solutions being offered as an answer to every problem. At least, that is the view from the mahogany conference tables in and around Washington.

Ahmed of course, has written a whole book going in the direction of this issue, and is a critical observer of the voices from within as well.

… reduced to a country without people

Myra MacDonald has recently penned very insightful observations of narratives on the country. She does so without playing the advocate for millions of inhabitants, which many commenters far away do, and is laudably wary of jumping to absolute statements but rather unravels these in the writing of others, while being well aware of local situations and their histories. One piece looked at how reporting on the country can be void of people.

Whether, and however much, we might disagree with them, we should however, know what they are. For me as a reader (and less as a journalist since there is always a value in telling a story from different perspectives and rarely room to fit them all into one piece), I personally am troubled most by one aspect of the New Yorker reconstruction. There appear to be no people in Pakistan.

Like Ahmed, she also critically reflects on the view from within, which can be very much from outside, within the same country – something foreign reporting of the country is still very far from grasping. It’s a critical reflection of how the educated urban upper class projects the voices of the people who are actually directly affected by the drone strikes in the border regions to Afghanistan. I would not call it the ‘Punjabi imagination’, but rather that of the urban class. There may be upper class citizens of Peshawar who write op eds about the WOT impact on Pakistan, very much unaware of what the rural Punjabi population really thinks, although it may be much more affected by price hikes and insufficent health and water supplies induced by the instability. Nevertheless, as MacDonald manages to point out, this is something the Pakistani opinionators and foreign correspondents who buy their comments as ‘local insight’ need to reflect critically on.

Now reread Hamid’s piece and consider the gap between the characters imagined in his short story, and a people with full citizenship rights and political representation. As Fazia S. Khan said, judge it as a work of fiction. But as a window into the Punjabi imagination, it may also have its uses as a political document.

… reduced to a religion

In a longer essay on Gender, Sexuality, and Islam under the Shadow of Empire, Saadia Toor, by elaborating the Saima Waheed case, portrays how the popular Western narrative of condensing of issues of freedom rights to religion in Muslim countries (in this case specifically women’s rights in Pakistan), is not only simplistic and flawed, but deliberately brushes aside other problematic issues (also caused by the colonial and neo-colonial involvement), which are really at the core of the issue here.

Ultimately, the Saima case was not simply about ‘secular liberals’ versus ‘religious conservatives,’ or even ‘fundamentalists.’ [...] Saima’s case was argued, and ultimately judged, not within the terms of existing Muslim family laws in the Pakistan Penal Code [...] but on the undesirability of filial disobedience [...]. [...] Daughters of the Ropri family were also not denied access to other accoutrements of wealth [...] associated with the Westernized upper classes. [...T]hey wore jeans and t-shirts at home and, even when outside, continued to wear them under the hijab. Thus the ‘fundamentalist’ (if there is such a monolithic figure) does not unequivocally despise the West or ‘modernity,’ understood as commodities—cultural and otherwise. But all these accoutrements were given to Saima to enhance her father’s social status [...].

These narratives become exercises like Chaudhry Rahmat Ali’s attempt to explain the acronym of Pakistan through it’s letters. It misses out on a lot deliberately suitable to the viewpoint of the writer and creates fiction for people who are not given a voice as Hamid did. To use Ahmed’s argument, ‘the country [is more than] all its military [religious/ethnic...] parts’. And it’s Now, not Never you should follow @salmaan_H, @myramacdonald and @sepoy to make sure you don’t miss out.

4. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Single Most Important Friend

Die USA brauchen neben ihrem schwächlichen Freund Afghanistan, den sie mal fördern und mal zusammenstauchen einen Partner für’s Grobe – ein lokaler ‘watch dog’ über die terroritischen Gefahren, die von verschiedenen Gruppen aus der Region ausgehen und verlässlicher Partner für die Versorgung des internationalen Eingreifens in Afghanistan. Sowohl Pakistan als auch Usbekistan vereinen Eigenschaften, die sie für diese Rolle qualifizieren. Beide Staaten haben Elemente, die es ihnen relativ leicht macht, auf Geheis in einer bestimmten Region durchzugreifen ohne der eigenen Bevölkerung Rechenschaft abliefern zu müssen (in Pakistan die Armee und der Geheimdienst, in Uzbekistan ein autokratisches Regime) – beide sind in diesem Punkt aber nicht über alle Zweifel von Seiten des Westens erhaben. Pakistan spielt ein doppeltes Spiel und hält sich alle Möglichkeiten offen indem es Kontakte zu verschiedenen Organisationen (u.a. den Taliban) aufrecht erhält, die Rolle der Menschanrechte ist in der Beziehung zu Uzbekistan immer ein Streitpunkt (spätestens seit den Vorfällen in Andijan). Sowohl Pakistan als auch Uzbekistan stellen neben arabischen Ländern einen bedeutenden Anteil an Kämpfern in den Reihen der Taliban und al-Qaeda nahen Organisationen, und sind selbst Heimat von indigenen islamistischen Organisationen. Beide Länder stellen einen direkten Transportweg zu Afghanistan dar – Pakistan vom Arabischen Meer über den Hafen von Karachi, den Khyber oder den Bolan Pass und Chaman, Uzbekistan von den zentralasiatischen Flughäfen über Termez als Teil des NDN (Northern Distribution Network). Pakistan hatte bis jetzt die wichtigere Rolle in diesem Kampf um Aufmerksamkeit, verliert diese aber zusehends. Als singuläres Beispiel für eine beliebte Narrative argumentiert Joshua Foust auf Registan für Uzbekistan und einer Lösung von Pakistan, mit dem simplen Argument, dass Uzbekistan zwar keine gute Lösung ist, aber immerhin besser als Pakistan (vor allem in diesem ersten Post dazu, aber auch hier und hier. Während er mit dem Argument, ‘auf Pakistan sei einfach kein Verlass’ sicher Recht hat, ist das Festhalten auf der Vorgabe, einen ‘single most important (strong) friend’ zu fördern und alle anderen Nachbarstaaten als ‘adversaries’ anzusehen oder einfach zu ignorieren sehr einfach gestrickt und nicht nachhaltig. Gleichwertige bilaterale Partnerschaften zu allen Nachbarstaaten zu suchen, gleichzeitig aber auch die Bedeutung von Pakistan herabzusetzen und die einseitige Unterstützung des Landes (insbesondere seiner Armee) zu beenden wäre ein sinnvollerer Schritt.

Baumwolltransport aus Pakistan nach Afghanistan am Khyber Pass kurz vor der Grenze [2007, Photo vom Autor

New Silk Road

Die ‘most fancy’ Strategie der USA zur Zukunft Afghanistan’s und seiner Nachbarstaaten hat einen Namen – ‘the New Silk Road’. Es beruht unter anderem auf den Argumenten S. Frederick Starr’s (PDF, Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance, January 2011, mehr Unterlagen zu seinen Überlegungen finden sich auf der Seite seiner Silk Road Studies):

The World Bank, in an important but neglected 2010 study, provides a concise and authoritative explanation: Afghanistan’s single greatest comparative advantage is its geostrategic location. [...] It was not always thus. Over two millennia Afghanistan was the place where trade routes to India, China, the Middle East and Europe all converged. This is why Marco Polo crossed the country en route to China, and why Arab travelers like Ibn Battuta crossed it on their way to India. Such trade along the misnamed “Silk Road” (in fact, every conceivable product was transported over it) produced immense wealth. Balkh, near Mazar-e-Sharif, was once among the largest and richest cities on earth. Medieval Arabs, who knew something about urban life, called it “the Mother of Cities.” Bagram, where the major U.S. base is situated, once maintained lucrative ties simultaneously with ancient Greece and India, enabling it to flourish in opulent splendor. All this occurred with nothing more than camels for transport. Imagine, then, what might be possible when camels are replaced by eighteen wheelers, railroads, modern pipelines, and hydroelectric lines? This prospect has already engaged the attention of every country along the continental routes that cross Afghanistan. With or without American support, they are all moving fast to claim the benefits which they consider their historical birthright.

Ein Fussballfeld in Langar (Teil unseres Fussballprojektes Canchas), dem letzten Ort im Tajikischen Wakhan - von hier aus geht es über den High Pamir nach China, einer der vielen Seidenstrassenarme. 'Langar' bedeutet 'Verpflegunsstation für Reisende' [2010, Photo vom Autor

The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium. [...] Because these processes are rooted in the self-interest of governments, business communities, and whole societies in each of the many countries involved, they will continue to unfold with or without the United States’ port or involvement. But because of the unique position of the U.S. vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and also the extent and depth of its relations with most of the other countries involved, decisions and actions in Washington will decisively influence the pace at which the process takes place, and also the character of the vast commercial network that is coming into being. For the time being, the U.S. possesses immense potential leverage over what is arguably the most transformative development taking place on the Eurasian land mass today.

Wie John Kucera meint, übertreibt Starr gerne und masslos. In vielen Punkten hat er aber sicher Recht. Ich glaube jedoch auch, dass das Konzept der ‘neuen Seidenstrasse’ sinnlos ist, allerdings aus ganz anderen Gründen wie Joshua Foust, der wieder einmal alles etwas einfach zeichnet.

Drei Gründe, warum die ‘neue Seidenstrasse’ ein Hirngespinnst ist:

Als die alte Seidenstrasse florierte, tat sie das ganz ohne zentralisierte Organisation. Es bestand Angebot und Nachfrage über unzählige Grenzen hinweg. Wenn heute Starr behauptet, lange Grenzkontrollen wären das grosse Hinderniss für zentralaiatischen Wirtschaftsaustausch hat er damit nur teilweise Recht. Sicher müssen Länder wie Uzbekistan und Tajikistan wie auch Kyrgyzstan, die sich auf wirtschaftlicher Ebene dauern bekriegen, zu definitiven Lösungen kommen. Korrupte Zollbeamte hat es aber an der Seidenstrasse sicher in gleichem Ausmass gegeben wie sie heute zu finden sind. Und jeder hat mehr oder wenioger gut daran verdient.

Die letzte Armee Baracke der Tajikischen Armee vor Afghanistan im High Pamir [2010, Photo vom Autor

Zuletzt betreibt China diese ‘neue Seidenstrassen-Politik’ schon lange, mehr oder weniger erfolgreich aber in erster Linie weitaus weniger ambitioniert, dafür um einiges effizienter.

Hasan H. Karrar beschreibt in seinem ‘The New Silk Road Diplomacy’ (2009, UBC Press) die Zentralasienpolitik Chinas seit dem kalten Krieg.

Zwar betrachtet Karrar das Handlen und Planen China’s in der Region nur anhand von Literatur und Medien (was es zu einer recht kurzen politikwissenschaftlichen Lektüre werden lässt), er bezieht sich aber sowohl auch westliche als auch chinesische Quellen und vermag die Intentionen und Strategien in einigen Aspekten sehr gut zu umreissen. In erster Linie geht es ihm um die Feststellung, dass China an bilateralen wie auch an multilateralen Netzwerken in der Region interessiert ist, diese aber nicht agressiv vorantreibt. Sein Buch ist auch eine schnelle Quelle für wirkliche Wirtschaftszahlen, und zeigt, dass der Handel in der Region, wenn auch zögerlich so doch kontinuierlich wächst.

Tomatenernte im Yanqi Becken, Xinjiang. [2010, Bild vom Autor

Schlussendlich hat Aaron L. Friedberg in seinem neuen ‘A Contest for Supremacy’ (September 2011, Norton) ohne Fokus auf Zentralasien aus Sichtweise eines US Political Advisors mit umfassender Einsicht in chinesische Quellen noch einen Blick auf den Wettbewerb zwischen den USA und China um Asien geworfen. Er kommt was Zentralasien betrifft auf ähnliche Schlüsse wie Karrar und elaboriert das Konzept der ‘propensity of things’ des französischen Philosophen Francois Jullien auf politikwissenschaftlicher Ebene.

Pakistan-China Beziehung nur Teil einer regionalen Entwicklung

Während Annäherung auf Seiten Pakistan’s und China’s oft als ein rein bilaterales Vorgehen reduziert wird, stimmt viel eher, dass beide Projekten vernetzt sind, die sie aneinander binden und in denen sich unterscheidliche Interessen überschneiden. Pakistan wollte wiederholt in die von China dominierte SCO (wie Indien wurde ihm nur Beobachterstatus zugestanden), China will Teil von ASEA sein, bekommt aber auch hier nur einen teilweisen Zugang. Im neuen Silk Road Program des Westens spielen beide Länder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle (obwohl das Gebiet des heutigen China einst einen Grossteil der Seidenstrasse ausmachte). Zardari versucht ein bisschen Geschichte umzudichten (das heutige Pakistan war nie wirklich Bestandteil der Seidenstrasse, wenn auch über den Karakorum, nach Kabul und Durch Balochistan Lahore immer schon ein Angelpunkt war), ist inerster Linie aber an wirtschaftlichen Austausch und Kooperation im Falle Xinjiang interessiert. Gleiche Kooperationen bestehen mit allen zentralasiatischen Ländern zu im Westen unbedeutenden Themen (Passübergänge im Hindukush, Stromnetz, Studentenaustausch, Handel vor allem im Baubereich …), die aber Teil von ‘Seidenstrassen’ sind, die nie aufgehört haben zu existieren und daher auch nicht neu aufgebaut werden müssen.

Some of the criticism by fellow Muslims brought against them is sure valid. Often it is though exactly the opposite of what the West fears them to be – their lack of want to participate in the public sphere. In a German state it is considered an organisation with a tendency for political Islamism, in Pakistan liberals would accuse them of not giving a damn what happens around them but just waste time in the mosque. Waseem Altaf in Viepointonline:

And finally as long as there is no consonance between our attitudes and our behavior or what we say and what we do, we cannot influence anybody.

But this is true for many in society – musicians who preach rebellion in their music but are conformist in real life, leftists who get heated up about inequality online but contribute nothing against it in their actions.

A Tablighi Group 'occupied' one of our school buildings while still under cosntruction in AJK.

Every time I took public transport from Lahore to AJK or the other way round, I was in the bus with Tablighis. And while working in the villages we had numerous encounters. Kashmir is probably deemed very reqarding after having been struck by desaster. I would be interested though if there is political interest behind it – not so much from the Tablighis themselves but from the officials who approve of their activities there. The locals would always accomomodate them somehow (like in our schools) but were mostly indifferent to their preaching and presence.

Yoginder Sikand has done some writing on them (The Origins and Development of the Tablighi-Jama’at (1920-2000): A Cross-Country Comparative Study), some of his arguments lined up here.

My basic argument is that the TJ, as a movement, is not involved in promoting ‘terrorism’ or militancy, although this does not rule out individuals using it for certain militant purposes in some isolated cases, probably without the knowledge of top TJ authorities. What this, therefore, means is that it would be grossly unfair, and also counterproductive, to target the TJ as such for the alleged misdeeds of some individuals who claim to be associated with it in some way or the other.

Barbara Metcalf looks at the Tablighi in comparison to other groups (Taliban and JI) in a longer essay and with a focus on women.

All of this is, however, speculation. What is clear is that the formally a-political missionary tours, gatherings in local mosques and homes, and annual gatherings continue to be the routine of the movement, one that clearly offers meaning and dignity to many who participate. In themany goals fostered by these movements – social, psychological, moral, and spiritual – as well as in the political strategies adopted with such virtuosity, movements, in the end, turn out to be less distinctive than either they or outsiders often assume they are.

Interestingly, in Kyrgyzstan it is rooting under a different name (davaati) – Nate Schenkkan at Eurasianet.

When one talks about the Left in Pakistan (also when it talks about itself) one is pretty quick quite far on the left, with comrades and worker’s struggle. (To follow what the very active Leftists are currently up to, the SPN Network is a great source). That is a bit bewildering to a Central European who understands the Political Left to be more heterogenuous than just Socialist. There could be the Greens, the Liberals, and other swaths of the population who would be left leaning but has little understanding of peasant’s uprsie in the rural areas or reminescences of a Socialist state.

Farooq Sulehria provides a brief history in a global context.

Masood Ashraf Raja even has to emphasize, that he is not talking about the Communist Party when talking about the left:

When I invoke the term left, I do not mean left in the classical sense: a centralized communist party. I rather mean a loose coalition of like-minded Pakistanis with a socialistic outlook who believe in a secular public sphere and do not treat class, gender, and other identities as fixed but as fluid constructs within a national space. Most of all, the left signifies for me a strong commitment to a liberatory and redemptive politics that builds lateral solidarities—within and without the nation—against the forces of neoliberal capital.

Pervez Hoodbhoy has last year looked at the potential of the Left in Pakistan – he drifts away into a lot of repetitive stuff that has really little to do with the Left and is just what he writes about again and again, but gets to a final point:

To become relevant to the real needs of Pakistan’s peoples, Pakistan’s leftists need to reaffirm their allegiance to what truly matters. Instead of chasing demons and indulging in meaningless sloganeering, they must squarely face religious militancy as the most immediate problem. Left-wing ideals lie in the great ideals of economic justice, secularism, universalistic ideas of human rights, good governance, women’s rights, and rationality in human affairs. Washington must be firmly resisted, but only when it seeks to drag Pakistan away from these goals. It is futile to frame every debate in pro- or anti-America terms; the key point is to be pro-people.

A recent short article on where the Pakistani Left could go, which sees a lot of positive potential, was recently published by Qalandar Bux Memon and Ali Mohsin. Like the other articles it dwells a lot in the past, but gives current examples where the Left is active and achieving.

From these foundations, the Left desires to push on to economic and social transformation. It’s a difficult, perilous task. But the Pakistani Left has never been more prepared.

This rooting in the present gives this piece some more realistic outlook what the Pakistani Left could be about today (no doubt, the different organisations are very active and do achieve a lot good – it would be laudable if interantional ‘nation builders’/'failed state theorizers’ would acknowledge these aspects of the Pakistani landscape). Nevertheless I think the Left would be well advised if they would further their spectrum from staunch comrades, anti-imperialists and the working class to for example the neo-liberals in Raja’s definition. Memon and others are reaching out to bring different people together via great initiatives in locations like Cafe Bol – I guess there could be more of it, also outside of the universities’ domain.

3. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Im zweiten Teil bin ich kurz auf die Tatsache eingegangen, dass die pakistanisch-chinesische Beziehung in erster Linie überhaupt nicht verstanden wird. Nicht nur nicht von Aussenstehenden, auch Pakistan und China, sowohl die Regierungen als auch die Bevölkerung, haben keine klare und kohärente Vorstellung wenn es um diese bilaterale Beziehung geht. Die zunehmende Krise in der US-Pakistan Allianz, von bin Laden’s Exekution in Pakistan durch US SEALS bis zur derzeitigen Auseinandersetzung über das Haqqani Netzwerk, hat auch Pakistan’s Verbindung mit China wieder in den Fokus gerückt. In den USA (und Europa) gefürchtet, in Pakistan selbst immer wieder beschworen, lautet das einfache Szenario, überall wo sich die USA aus einer Kooperation mit Pakistan zurückziehen oder ganz einfach scheitern, übernimmt China dankend. Bei den einen nährt das die zunehmende Besorgnis vor einem rising China, für die anderen ist es die Sicherheit, dass man auch ohne die USA einen starken Partner im Rücken hat – noch dazu einen der keine moralischen Fragen stellt. Während die USA ihr Bündnis mit Pakistan immer mehr vom Untergang bedroht sieht, versucht man zumindest noch vom sinkenden Schiff jeden Bericht gescheiterter chinesischer Vorstösse als Indiz darzustellen, dass China nicht anstelle der USA vor Karachi (Gwadar oder am Kabul Fluss) Anker legen wird. Pakistanische Medien nehmen ähnlich singuläre Vorkomnisse der erfolgreichen Sorte zum Anlass, genau das zu bewiesen.

Sparta’s Angst

Diese Darstellung ist einerseits schon problematisch, weil sie suggeriert, dass Pakistan als Staat in jedem Fall auf amerikanische oder chinesische finanzielle Unterstützung angewiesen ist. Wright und Page verstehen das als given fact:

But China’s response has been lukewarm so far, suggesting that Islamabad may remain dependent on billions of dollars in military and civilian aid from Washington for some time to come.

Auch Rodriguez und Demick in der LATimes sieht die ganze Thematik nur als Rechenbeispiel an:

Analysts say such a move is highly unlikely. With nearly $9 billion in annual trade with Pakistan, China is Islamabad’s biggest trading partner, as well as its leading arms supplier. But it could never replace the billions of dollars in economic and military aid that Pakistan gets from the United States, experts say, as well as billions more in loans from international lenders heavily influenced by the U.S., including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Ein Grossteil der Investments beider Staaten, ganz besonders von Seiten der USA, kommt in erster Linie der pakistanischen Armee und damit nicht dem Staat oder der Zivilbevölkerung zu Gute – im Gegenteil, die leidet eher unter der zunehmenden Förderung des Militärs. Die Annahme, dass Pakistan seine aussenpolitischen Partner allein über die Buchhaltung entscheidet ist naiv und unterschätzt ideologische und politische Faktoren.

Andererseits ist diese Angst vor der rising power ein altes Phänomen, auf das Aaron L. Friedberg im US-China Kontext eingeht:

As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

Pakistan’s Wunschdenken

Dass sich Pakistan womöglich eine ganz andere Beziehung vorstellt als tatsächlich im Entstehen ist und China zulassen wird, beleuchtet Myra Macdonald in der wohl soweit besten Darstellung dieses Themas. Sie argumentiert, dass Pakistan die mögliche Unterstützung von Seiten China’s heillos überschätzt, gleichzeitig aber im Westen die Bedeutung dieser Beziehung unverhältnismässig dargestellt wird:

First of all Pakistan is not the centre of the world even though those of us who cover it tend to think it is. And China is a big country, setting itself on a trajectory to outstrip the United States. It pays far less attention to India than India does to China, let alone becoming as obsessed with Pakistan’s problems as Pakistan is with casting China in the role of saviour.

[...]

The visit by China’s Meng probably told us more than we realise. It did not tell us very much about what China will do – if past history is anything to go by it will do very little and try to keep itself out of the fray. But it did tell us rather a lot about Pakistan – and the likelihood of the country’s civilian and military leaders closing ranks in the face of American pressure.

In den USA und Europa wird zu oft angenommen, dass China’s Rolle in Pakistan ähnlichen Interessen und Motiven folgen müsste wie es die des Westens sind – das ist höchstwahrscheinlich nicht zutreffend. Wie Macdonald anmerkt, wird sich China in politischen täglichen Agenden weitesgehend heraushalten, dagegen sind sie an wirtschaftlichen und ideologischen Verknüpfungen sehr wohl interessiert. Damit ist ihr Intersse an Pakistan genau gegenläufig zu dem des Westens, der Pakistan in erster Linie als gefährlichen geopolitischen Spielball sieht aber relativ wenig Interesse an wirtschaftlichem und kulturellem Austausch zeigt. Dazu noch einmal Friedberg – er versteht es, im Gegensatz zu den meisten Autoren westlicher Artikel zum Thema (der WSJ Artikel bezieht sich auf eine einzige chinesische Quelle, die aus Hongkong kommt und bei einem Think Tank in Kooperation mit einer amerikanischen Uni arbeitet), die chinesische Seite zumindest teilweise zu beleuchten:

As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; […]

[...]

Even as it grows stronger and, in certain respects, more self-confident, the CCP continues to dread ideological contamination. Pliant, like-minded states along its borders are far more likely to help Beijing deal with this danger than flourishing liberal democracies with strong ties to the West. The desire to forestall “peaceful evolution” at home gives the regime another compelling reason to want to shape the political development of its neighbors.

Wie so oft wird in dieser Problematik die Stimme einer der wichtigsten Parteien – in dem Fall China – im Westen gar nicht beleuchtet, in erster Linie in Ermangelung der Bereitschaft Chinesisch zu lesen und zu interviewen. Es ist daher nicht sehr überraschend, dass die beiden englischsprachigen Parteien – Pakistan und die USA – planlos Thesen erstellen und von allen drei Stakeholdern am wenigsten abschätzen können wohin sich diese Dreiecksbeziehung entwickeln wird.

Given the brief time that passed between Shahzad’s death and Kashmiri’s, a question inevitably arose: Did the Americans find Kashmiri on their own? Or did they benefit from information obtained by the I.S.I. during its detention of Shahzad? If so, Shahzad’s death would be not just a terrible example of Pakistani state brutality; it would be a terrible example of the collateral damage sustained in America’s war on terror.

If the C.I.A. killed Kashmiri using information extracted from Shahzad, it would not be the first time that the agency had made use of a brutal interrogation. In 2002, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an Al Qaeda operative held by the Egyptian government, made statements, under torture, suggesting links between Saddam Hussein and bin Laden; this information was used to help justify the invasion of Iraq.

The evidence is fragmentary, but it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Pakistani intelligence agents gave the C.I.A. at least some of the information that pinpointed Kashmiri. Likewise, it seems possible that at least some of that information may have come from Shahzad, either during his lethal interrogation or from data taken from his cell phone. In the past, the I.S.I. and the C.I.A. have coöperated extensively on the U.S. drone program.

He also points at the fragility of the US’ intelligence on drone targets, looking at the practice of shoot-first-ask-later:

In the case of Kashmiri, the American official initially told me that he had been killed in a signature strike. “We did the strike, and we found out later that it was him,” the official said. When I pressed him, though, he said, “We sort of thought he would be there.” He declined to elaborate.

Filkins’ criticism of Shahzad’s journalism is based on his closeness to the militants – and although he is not accusing him of empathizing with them (Although Shahzad didn’t support the militants’ aims, his feelings for them ran deep.), he does explain this empathy by trying to find the conservative in Shahzad. To note his affilitation with JI and his use of language makes sense, but Filkin’s proof for ‘conservatism’ is flimsy.

Shahzad was socially conservative: he didn’t drink, and friends and colleagues describe him as pious. But they say that he didn’t support Islamist violence.

The fact that you don’t drink and believe in god already calls for the assertion that one does not support Islamist violence?

On the other side Filkins makes use of the ‘conventional wisdom’ that the Pakistan army and much more so the ISI is espcecially prone to Islamism. Christine Fair, who is continuously working on questioning this ‘conventional wisdom’ in the case of Pakistan – Shahzad said to Filkins, Independent reporting for the alternative media best suits my temperament as it encourages me to seek the truth beyond ‘conventional wisdom.’- , has looked at that in a recent paper, which she abstracted for the FP magzine. The title in the FP magazine suggests that the ‘conventional wisdom’ needs to be refuted (‘Is Pakistan’s Army as Islamist as We Think? New data suggest it may be even more liberal than Pakistani society as a whole.’), while in reality Fair is emphasizing the perhaps in the article and is rather calling for more research than presenting definite results.

She admits herself, that equating an overrepresentation of Pathuns in the army with a heightened prospect for radical Islamism can hardly be based on facts – she should not have elaborated on it (However, if this is true, …).

She is very cautious in deducing from the fact that the army is recruiting rather from liberal areas (I am not entirely convinced by her definition of liberal and conservative areas either) that the army may actually be less conservative then the average population (Our findings, however, suggest the Pakistani Army, at least until 2002, was no more likely to recruit from conservative areas of the country, suggesting in turn that perhaps — perhaps — there is less radicalization than is commonly assumed.). I would argue, that this finding only points at the fact that the army is recruiting from better educated backgrounds which probably correlate more with more liberal areas. If the army staff is indeed more radical than the average population, it becomes so in the time beginning with selection for an army college, during continued exposure to a young solely male crowd and radicals at these colleges and later in the barracks or the respective offices. Whether coming from a liberal or conservative background has little implication for the person’s later ideological outlook – molding in the army is in most cases a lot stronger than ideological roots to a community. If the army is just as radical (or as not radical) as the average population, this may equally just be due to the fact, that the ideological zeal of the army towards religion is far overestimated. Fair is definitely right in asking for more research in this direction.