While the US has now announced to stop military aid to Pakistan and the common narrative is still “those Pakistanis are so ungrateful for all the Aid”, while the fact that the Aid referred to goes to the Army which is not really the agent of Pakistani society making sure the people is empowered, Wright looks at it in a more nuanced way.

Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class.

Part I looks at the disappearance of Uzbek presence in the city and how fault always lies with the other.

The violence and its aftermath have steadily erased most traces of the Uzbek presence in the city’s shared spaces, the Uzbek language has disappeared from shops signs, newsstands, the airwaves. While the mayor’s office supposedly promotes tolerance and ethnic harmony, over the past year vigilante groups of mostly older Kyrgyz women freely harass and sometimes even physically abuse ethnic Uzbeks who dare to appear in public, ride on city transport, attempt to interface with the city administration, or even show up to work in shops that still employ a multi-ethnic staff. Even the city’s much heralded new monument to victims of last year’s violence quickly became a site for screaming protests by these groups, denying the ethnic Uzbek half of the city access even to what was supposed to be a sacred space for common grief.

[...]

While the destruction of homes overwhelmingly occurred in ethnic Uzbek mahallas, the human and sexual violence itself and the destruction of commercial spaces, restaurants, and businesses was shared among all communities of Osh—although alarmingly, many on both ethnic sides seem to believe that only “we” were the true victims and “they” were wholly at fault. In the interviews I’ve conducted here so far, one of the most unsettling things that I’ve heard repeatedly (aside from the terrible stories of suffering and loss themselves) are statements that negate or dismiss suffering on the other side, the suffering of the “other.” Each ethnic group employs—with alarming frequency–narratives of homeland and defensive violence in order to cast the other group as usurpers or invaders.

Part II elaborates on the latter paragraph. Part III looks at how it may be too easy to just boil it down to ethnicity. Part IV looks at personal narratives of one man and the routinely disorder that causes frustration.

Twice this week I saw expensive SUVs driving the wrong way down Lenin street downtown, with no regard for the direction traffic moves both legally and practically on the crowded one-way street. Small incidents like these are used by Osh residents to punctuate and illustrate a story of disorder that—with people that I have gotten to know over a longer period—often becomes a long running narrative. A driver that ignores a traffic light suddenly becomes a symbol of the same unpredictability that comes from revolutions that occur “every five years,” of why banks cannot be trusted, why schools are perceived to be failing, why corruption is corroding the institutions of society, of why—for Uzbeks anyway—the next generation needs to leave.

I expect he will be providing more insights in near future. Currently reading Oskar Verkaaik’s Migrants and Militants (which I will review soon) which looks at violence in Southern Sindh and how that is embedded in narratives while being overlty and poorly explained with ethnicity (Muhajir vs. Pashtoon vs. Sindhi) in the general media and scholarly writing, Tucker’s explanations do make a lot of sense to me with reference to another urban-ethnic-violence example that is reported but little understood.

I have never been to Kyrgyzstan but to Tajikistan last year, just after the riots in Osh, and have experienced a trans-border effect with somewhat less personal but more geopolitical-decision implications. Not only did many travellers who planned a Europe-China(-South East Asia) tour by car, bike or public transport see themselves at a dead end in the High Pamirs (afraid of Afghanistan and with a closed border-crossing Tajikistan-China for foreigners going to Osh from Mughab would have been their only option). Also Chinese hauliers who, especially with the KKH to Pakistan currenly blocked (see below), use the Kashi-Osh-Dushanbe-East/South route to trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran were facing a serious problem. Many truckers detoured via the Pamir Highway, a road that is only tarmaced for a couple of kilometers once and gain. The extra burden of dozens of heavy weight freighters each day caused the road to deteriorate quickly – for locals who are used to travel in cheap (Chinese) Tangems this means a great extra number of stops because of technical failures between Khorog and Murghab.

As highlighted earlier, the Chinese acquired a piece of the Pamir Plateau – I do suspect that this move is at least somewhat linked to the worries about Kyrgyzstan and those about Pakistan. Rumours exist since years that China wants to build a direct connection to the Afghan and the Tajik Wakhan either via Sost (Pakistan) or maybe directly via their (now augmented?) border towards Afghanistan.

The worry concerning Pakistan comes mainly because of the Attabad lake, a natural catastrophe that is hardly reported in the West – it’s more popular to churn out speculative writing on the Sino-Pak relations that no one really understands (see our Sino-Pak ‘Series’ on that – it’s in German, and currently only one post long).

Shujaat Ali at Pamir Times (which is generally following this issue extensively) looks at the implications of this disaster for locals’ transport.

On the other end, it shows what the opportunities for many Pakistanis are to get a wider grasp of political backgrounds (be it in a case like Davis’ or in general actions like the drone war).

Karachi: Yes! Karachi is back again with the bloodshed. This time, Weekly Pulse has an informative piece on the past and present of MQM who has been terrorizing the cosmopolitan about 3 decades now. It’s alleged involvement with foreign intelligence agencies, import of foreign terrorists and the latest victimization of Sindh’s interior minister as he moved forward to control MQM-backed target killings in the city.

That he portrays his hosts as kidnappers is grave, and should be dealt with, but apparently Mahsud has already attempted that. The wasteful spending of his organisation may be harsh for those who contributed hard earned money, but is unfortunately a problem haunting many other ventures of that scale as well.

Also smart observers to debates, like zunguzungu, seem to be most and foremost focused on how everyone seems to have known from the start and now the practice of CAI is proven wrong by speculations of people who made no comment before the CBS show. Until now, I have not found commentary from someone who really knows CAI’s work on the ground.

The problem lies in an (adapted) observation by Alanna Shaikh, in an otherwise horrific piece of commentary, has made about why Mortenson became popular. “We let the debate spin us because we want to be spun.” We are not after answers to general misconceptions, we want to shred him and his work to pieces to start afresh with no progress made in basic – complex, they go further than “School building good or bad?” – debates.

The few sane voices are hardly making it to the centre of the debate (and I am not giving endorsements to writers who need it, apart from that two of those I often disagree with, one I hardly know).

Ali (again) in the Express Tribune:

While these are critical concerns that demand further inquiry, the real scandal is far more insidious and goes beyond Mortenson. Three Cups of Tea is not merely about Mortenson’s humanitarianism. It is the quintessential text through which Americans are seeing one of the longest wars in US history. [...] The saviour rhetoric of humanitarianism constitutes a powerful force that often claims unquestionable moral certainty and superiority, and therein lies its danger. [...] Perhaps the lesson to draw is not about sharing tea; it’s about sincerity. It’s also about self-interrogation of American interventions abroad, humanitarian or otherwise.

Her finger pointing straight at the Americans (and additionally, the urban Pakistanis) makes her probably not too popular – but she manages to phrase the criticism into well argued statements and from how I see the situation points to the core of the Mortenson-problem. Attacking the unquestionable moral certainty and superiority of humanitarian work is the second aspect, one which I reiterate again and when talking about the work I do in Pakistan. It’s a hindrance really to explain here (in Europe) what there (in Pakistan) looks like. People want to understand the work I do (which is in the Aid field among others) as basically great, even with all the word of caution and self reflecting criticism I fodder them with – hence the situation on the ground must basically be fucked. A difficult start to portray the country realistically.

Zaidi at ForeignPolicy:

Still, by any stretch of the imagination, the idea that anyone can save a country or the world is an emotional appeal, not a reasonable or rational one. There is nothing, of course, inherently wrong with tugging at people’s heart strings while relating serious problems and the possible solutions that brave innovators are coming up with to solve them. But just because there’s nothing morally or ethically wrong with this kind of narrative doesn’t mean it is the right way to deal with complex and multilayered problems like HIV/AIDS in South Africa, malaria in Tanzania, female infanticide in India, or education in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Foust at PBS:

But maybe that’s not the point. Just because you can’t help everyone doesn’t mean you should help no one. Sadly, Mortenson’s good work is going to be overshadowed — possibly destroyed — by this scandal (albeit one that looks like it was largely of his own making). And the losers, besides wide-eyed Americans who’ve lost an unassailable hero, will ultimately be the people his schools were helping.

approach to advance

All three focus not on the problematic approach Mortenson has taken and why he crashed, but what are concepts behind our conceptions that make such approaches possible and popular even though they come out as a complete failure in the end. Not surprisingly they are written by people who don’t only know how to be smart when it comes to bringing their ideas into concise posts, but also have experience in the geographic and thematic area and manage to span a bridge between the three worlds that are otherwise also quite distinct in the blogosphere – the aid experts, the policy/politics experts and the local experts (be that locals, or scholars who deal with the area/culture that poses as the recipient of aid/policy).

Examples of how gravely you fail, when you stay stuck in your field are …

… from the Policy side R. Winthrop at Brookings: What Ali has tried to make clear and warned of – that Mortenson played his humanitarian card along the national security line – she is underlining from the researcher level.

“On the other hand, his story captured the hearts of millions, bringing needed attention to the very real educational needs of Pakistan’s children and articulating the very important role good quality education can play in reducing conflict risk.”

She did not really get it, did she?

… from the Aid side A. Shaikh in Foreign Policy: Not only is she taking the (US) blogosphere’s uproar as the measure for such debates – in Europe, still, this issue isn’t dealt with at all – when she starts “The world was shocked by a report …”. She also manages to conclude, after two paragraphs and watching the CBS show that “The whole CAI model was wrong. But here’s the truly awful thing: Looking back, it’s clear that everyone knew that CAI’s approach didn’t work.” Her observation that it’s teachers and curriculum that matter, is definitely true and important. Unfortunately many NGOs in Pakistan who are involved in school construction in Pakistan pay little heed to that fact and are satisfied with their work once the metal plaque with their website is placed on the building. But that does not equate to school construction being useless. We don’t really know how CAI worked, some of their work may be flawed – but to trash it, and leave it all to the USAID “experts” (whose work in school realted matters especially in this area is catastrophic from what I have seen during the last 5 years) is hardly the only solution.

The Aid Blogosphere has been quite active in similar discussions, and while I agree that aid blogs matter, I think they would do more so if they looked at the issues they deal with more often through eyes of receptors of their solutions. Smart Aid Curriculums make sense after you had the History, Language and Culture Curriculums for the area the smart aid is intended for. Aid and development University Courses in Austria are hugely popular, with little basics in history, anthropology or literature. Many of the Aid workers, be it from UN or private ventures like Mortenson’s, in Pakistan and Central Asia (and I can only tell from this area, but assume it to be similar elsewhere), have little sensibility for that place being an independent self with a history that reaches from early civilizations to Wi-Fi. They rather see themselves working in a medical operating theatre that needs instant solutions with no time to ask for the patients’ record. Mortenson is a stark example.

… from the local side the bad example is, that local voices are giving a number of shout-outs to ventures they think are great, but it hardly becomes clear how they are so greatly different. And hence simplistic orientalist narratives, which Mortenson most probably did not come up with for deliberate malignant imperialistic intents but because he really saw it that way, are not challenged. But it’s the opportunities that I hope to find here. Umair Javed has pointed this direction along a project that Ahmed brought up earlier, but so far this has also rather ‘only’ been endorsement, no critical approach. It’s really in a very different area geographically and in terms of aid approach (flood relief vs. educational measures in a non-catastrophe-area) and one really has to bring up the larger scheme to make a point. But this larger scheme, exemplified on a number of projects could help to bring some understanding to the clash between Aid, Narrative and Culture. Endorsement is fine, projects need such support. But it would help the aid discussion, if some projects would be less viewed through the glasses of aid-from-outside-with-a-backlash-intention but with Ali’s warning in mind (do question moral certainty and superiority!) and from a local standpoint.

[As time permits I will try to make my point clearer in future and contribute myself. Apart from trying to be smart here, I did work in reconstruction efforts in AJK between 2006 and 2010, also working as an external consultant for UNICEF. At the moment we are active in AJK and KP with community based long term projects, all with our own NGO. I worked full time at SOS Children's Villages in Lahore, and freelance as a journalist for Dawn. While asleep I was doing the Event and Media part of www.danka.tv (which has just been relaunched!), playing Tabla and obeying traffic rules.]

I have equally little respect for the media that now challenge his work. 60 Minutes covers the area with Lara Logan in reports that are not only poor but outright propaganda gibberish. Checking on schools, finding them to store spinach and thus declaring them disfunctional is adressing the issue with no understanding of ground realities. Jon Krakauer’s Into thin Air was somewhat exciting to read, but written in the same style of trying to get attention by exagerating that he is accusing Mortenson of now and he is now trying to cash in on Mortenson’s sell out. Nevertheless Mortenson will need to adress the criticism. One side are the finances and practices of his organisation, an issue adressed once by the organisation itself here and already discussed extensively among Aid-Bloggers (most notably at Good Intentions are not enough). The other side are his made up stories, which are not so interesting as such, but do point out how he perceives the environment he works in. He has adressed that in written statements which can be read here and here. By trying to counter criticism with explanations of the “Balti notion of time” or his admiration for “proud Pathan people of Wazisristan” he is rather revealing his own simplistic understanding of the area he is working in than dispelling the doubts over his accounts. The organisation declaring, that it is unaware of any organization qualified to undertake such a study, that is to assess the effectiveness of their schools, points at their ignorance of local structures that have existed long before they pushed into their perceived void. The AKF is just the most obvious name that comes to mind, and they are not the only ones around.

It will be difficult to keep all the different sets of criticism’s mashed up in the CBS show apart, adress them separately and get to the core which may be relevant apart from whether Mortenson is a person with a bad memory or a passion for portraying himself as a ‘real life Indiana Jones’. Bergen is trying hard with a CNN anchor, which I think reveals the major problem of the whole issue – the way perceptions are shaped by narratives as not only Mortenson provides them. For me this is most aptly portrayed by the extensive use of remote in the context of referring to anything virtually in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is just outside Kabul or Islamabad. This has led to considering the whole Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remote, a province that lies along one of the major water ways of the planet and however you define the term, Attock, Peshawar or DI Khan are only remote in our understanding of the place. Nosheen Ali has adressed this issue in an excellent paper already last year (Books vs Bombs? Humanitarian development and the narrative of terror in Northern Pakistan, PDF), Ahmed points out (and will keep doing so) the consequences for policy.

Today Peter Bergen and friends discussed drones at NewAmerica. One important point raised is that the response to drones we have, mainly stems from people who are not directly exposed to their effects (that is Isloo’s/Lahore’s/Pesh’s population). The argument goes, that people from the Tribal Areas, exposed to the drones are more in favor of them than, say, the Punjabi population who knows nothing about their direct impact (Being highly skeptical of means where we have very little clue about their success, even its short range implications, relying on hear-say from some people who know the Tribals from friends in Peshawar, apart from the sovereignty infringement caused that is a damage caused even to people who are not killed as a consequence, leaves me a stout opposer of drones. But yes, that’s a different story for another time …). A similar finding was made by Jishnu Das and Tahir Andrabi on perceptions of foreigners in earthquake affected areas, a study Graeme Smith builds his story on and which I have pointed out earlier here. While for the drones, we are having discussions about impacts on people who are seldom (if ever) asked themselves, hence we are basically just guessing around without any real clue, Kashmir is a great chance to have people to ask and evaluate their beliefs. While it’s unfortunate that the we are doing guess work in the hearts and mind debate in terms of actual war (not “just” the cultural one) where we would have the opportunity to learn, it’s even more unfortunate that the Aid sector has given such important findings as Das/Andrabi’s little awareness, and is just starting the whole experience anew after the floods. I find the problem to be basic but simple.

Post-Earthquake Construction - the "good old times" haven't changed for most people

The frames are made by men, the mud filling is often women’s work.

The frames are still often loosely attached to ground, fixed by stones and later filled with mud. The structures are what people were used to before the earthquake, only tin-sheets are now more widely available.

While for one, mobile phones and earthquake proof houses are not a consequence of foreign involvement in Kashmir (SCOM was forced to open the market after the earthquake to other Pakistani providers, the housing standards are from ERRA) and people in the area are well aware of that, they are hardly opposed to values as democracy or human rights nor do they understand them to be something Western or foreign. They understand and fight for such rights, they have done so before the earthquake and are doing so still. The biggest masses of people in one place in Kashmir I have experienced where never demonstrations against women issues in NGOs, but political events that concerned upcoming elections (see pictures below from the elections in June 2006). The discussions about all aspects, from the crazy mullah trying to influence voters, to involvement of the Pakistani government in election rigging went on every night. If there was criticism of foreign involvement in those matters, than that it was none of our business, they know themselves what they want and they hold their political leaders accountable. NGO workers trying to sell values are hardly taken serious. Women issues are of course more sensitive. The victims of the local’s anger were seldom foreigners though. The NGO workers from other areas of Pakistan (many national NGOs) were seen as the bringers of vice. The problem with the answers Smith gets lies, I suspect, in his questions. He does not let the people speak what’s on their mind, but specifically addresses the issue of foreigners. And for a villager from a remote village in Kaghan, a foreigner, just like everything else coming from outside his perimeter of a couple of villages in whistle-blowing distance, is an example for the other that destroys his good old times. He (the foreigner) is not the seen as the bringer of that destruction, that potential already is inside the country, inside the younger people even without foreigners around but simply with increased electricity and media coverage. While talking, it may seem (especially if we want him to say it) that Saber conflates foreigners and foreign aid with his fading culture, but he very well understands that it is not just that simple. I find that Kashmiris in general (apart from populistic Mullahs and politicians trying to gain attention with short sighted stories) very well understand that that is not the only direct link. That is why such Mullah’s and politicians have very little respect among the population.

Pre-Election Demonstration - no hate Speech, no gory posters, just political discourse. Sorry.

A PPP Supporter (Qamar Zaman)

Cheering changes in suppressing traditions especially for women after disasters and understanding it as a cultural byproduct of their work as Smith puts it rightly is problematic in two ways. For every success story seemingly a result from aid for e.g. women empowerment, I can find you a fail. Women suffered extremely after the earthquake from increased workloads because men refused to move a finger on account of their psychological distress. They and their daughters had to leave their villages after their only male family members died because they were completely exposed to the will of male family members of other households. The Earthquake undoubtedly opened opportunities, but it still has to be up to the population to take these. We have shown that they are willing to do this, and if you let them decide themselves, support them in their work were you are able and willing to, they create changes themselves, some of which we think are part of “our values” (see our study on a Women Training Centre in Kashmir). Kashmiris find it laughable when all we accept as success are increased rights for women – is that all your western society is based upon?

More often we should just be prepared to listen to people and try to understand their hearts and minds from what they have to say, and not discuss it among ourselves in countless seminars with people who have little insight themselves (and, yes, blogs as well) to shape our perception, craft it into stone and only then approach the subjects we talk about. I do wish that people in FATA do get a voice soon, and those in Kashmir manage to get something coherent like PamirTimes up at some point. But I also hope that we are prepared to listen to those views, and do not only acknowledge them once the NYT picks them up. I will try again to move friends in Kashmir to write their views in near future, starting with this issue (if they feel that’s what they want to talk about).

If ever there was a doubt about President Asif Ali Zardari’s love for horses over his people, he established another stable in President house with horses supplied by Pak Army – raised on taxpayers’ money. This time, though, Army gave a hush call to political parties and popular media to neglect the incident. And like always, they did oblige.

In another incident, Pakistan Army conquered their own country’s land (again!) by illegally occupying 1000 acres of land in Lahore.  Earlier, Army was also found on the wrong side of the law for illegally using a Fortress Stadium for commercial purposes without Government’s knowledge and triumphantly cheating the Government of Rs. 120 billions in taxes over many years.

On the contrary, M.D.Nalapat has an interesting point to share in Pakistan Observer:

“Although the top rungs of the US military regularly appear before the US Senate and the House of Representatives,in India the armed forces have thus far not appeared before committees of Parliament. Dr Murli Manohar Joshi of the BJP,who is Chairman of the powerul Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, has broken this convention by asking the Chief of Army Staff to appear before the PAC to discuss about the functioning of the Canteen Stores Department of the army. There have been several complaints from troops about the supply of dry rations to them,and several have contacted their families,who have in turn got in touch with their MPs about the matter. To the credit of Chief of Army Staff General V K Singh,instead of refusing to appear before the Committee,he immediately agreed,and came before the PAC on January 12,together with the Chief of Air Staff ( Air Marshal P V Naik) and Vice-Chief of Naval Staff V K Deewan.”

Creation of New Provinces
Proposed by Mohammed Ayub Khan Khattak

The administrative map of Pakistan has undergone various changes since 1947. In an effort to improve governance, we are geared towards continuous improvements to the system, the administrative units and provinces of Pakistan.

Over the years these administrative units and provinces have increased and decreased in reaction to internal and external demands and requirements. In 1947 Pakistan had 4 provinces and 14 divisions; there were 4 divisions in East Pakistan and 10 in West Pakistan’s 3 provinces.

In 1955 the princely state of Bahawalpur became a division of the Punjab; Baluchistan got a new division by combining the princely states to form Kalat Division while the area under the Chief Commissioner became Quetta division. A major part of Sind formed Hyderabad division while the capital area along with a small part of previous Hyderabad division and the princely state of Khairpur formed Khairpur division.

In 1960 the 3 provinces of Western Pakistan were merged into one unit and named West Pakistan Province. In 1961 Karachi was merged with the princely state of Lasbela to form Karachi-Bela division.

In 1969 the princely states of Chitral, Swat and Dir were merged into Pakistan and along with Malakand formed Malakand division.

In 1970 Gen Yahya dissolved one unit and reverted to the previous 3 provinces and created the Baluchistan Province giving West Pakistan 4 provinces. During the 70′s divisions were created by carving out areas from various other divisions to create new divisions, such as Gujranwalla division from Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions. In NWFP, Hazara and Kohat were carved out of Peshawar division.

This background proves that provinces changed from 4 to 2 then 5 in 1970. After the fall of East Pakistan we were left with 4 provinces and today with the addition of Gilgit-Baltistan provinces we once again have 5 provinces.

Over time, divisions and districts have become smaller. This makes for efficient administration. Smaller units also makes it easier for citizens to contact their district and division headquarters ensuring that their problems are taken care of locally without wasting time and money by traveling long distances. The same argument holds good for reducing the size of provinces as it will improve administration while putting an end to the hegemony of one or the other province in terms of economics, agriculture etc.

Splitting the provinces into more compact, efficient and effective units will also have the added benefit of reducing the importance of Provincial/Nationalistic parties that interfere in the cohesion of the country as one Nation. Provincial slogans will be replaced by national slogans and everyone will be a Pakistani instead of Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi or Baluch.

Politicians who are afraid of losing their importance and of their provincial sloganeering becoming irrelevant will object to the increase in number and reduction in size of all the provinces. Slogans such as ‘’Greater Baluchistan’’, “ Jaiy Sindh”, “Pashtunistan” and ‘’ jag Punjabi jag teri pug nu laga dagh’’ will lose their charm and power to disintegrate the country into racial blocks. It is unfortunate that Pakistani’s see themselves as racial entities, as Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi and Baluch rather than ‘Pakistani’ with no racial and provincial overtones. Most unfortunate but true!

It has been long overdue settling the tribal areas. They will become a part of the provinces that they are the closest to and convenient to get to the provincial headquarters. The settling of the tribal areas is the demand of the majority of the tribesmen. This will be the opportunity we must not miss of settling them.

Each province will be autonomus and the Federal Government should retain no more than 7 ministries along with the Prime Minister under a Parliamentary Government.

The federal government should be in charge of:-
1. Finances & Currency
2. Foreign affairs
3. Defense
4. Wapda
5. Oil, Gas & Alternate Energy
6. Interior
7. Inter provincial co- ordination & Inter provincial communication

Provinces should control all other departments of the Government. Each province would have a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 8 ministers & a Chief Minister. The basic departments would be:-

1. Health
2. Education
3. Agriculture, Irrigation & Forests
4. Industries & Mineral Resource Development
5. Home
6. Local Government & Development
7. Inter Provincial Coordination & Communications

All other departments would be given as additional charge to these 8 ministers.

Constituency Delimitation

Constituencies for the Provincial Assemblies should be of 60000 to 100000 voters in the areas comprising present day Khyber PashtunKhwa, Baluchistan and Sindh, while in the areas comprising present day punjab Punjab it should be 100000 to 125000 voters. The strength of each provincial assembly should be between 50 and 100 MPA’s. ( The exact number of voters would be decided after getting the latest census figures so that the assemblies do not have more than 100 Members in the provincial assemblies.

The constituencies for elections to the National Assembly should be the same as at present. The reserved seats should be done away with. Women & minorities should come into parliament by getting elected in a general election. The developed countries gave the right of vote to women, in most countries, in the 20th century and gave them the right to contest elections at a later stage. The democracy we are following never had reserved seats.

The Senate would comprise of 6 members elected by each provincial Assembly while the technocrat seats should be done away with. Political parties should get their technocrats elected on the general seats. Thus making the senate a body of 114 members.

My idea is open for discussion and there is an intention of holding seminars in the headquarters of each of the proposed provinces. There we might reach a solution to make Pakistan stronger, reduce if not do away with corruption and improve the lot of the people of this great country called Pakistan. This topic of creating new provinces will definately be the decider for people to get elected in the next elections. The next elections will be a referendum for new provinces Insha Allah.
Below are given details of the 18 provinces that are proposed with area it will cover and the population as per the 1998 census.

The dye is cast, hopefully we decide in the best interest of PAKISTAN.

Khyber Pashtun Khwa to be divided into:

Province A
Name of district area sq km Population
Peshawar 1,257 2,019,118
Nowshera 1,748 874,373
Charsadda 996 1,022,364
Mardan 1,632 1,460,100
Swabi
1,543 1,026,804
Khyber Agency
2,576 546,730
Mohmand Agency
2,296 334,453
12,048 7,283,942

Province B
Name of district area sq km Population
Karak
3,372 430,796
Kohat
2,545 562,644
Bannu
1,227 675,667
Dera Ismail Khan
7,326 852,995
Hangu
1,097 314,529
Tank
1,679 238,216
Lakki Marwat
3,164 490,025
Kurram Agency
3,380 448,310
N.Waziristan Agency
4,707 361,246
Orakzai Agency
1,538 225,441
S.Waziristan Agency
6,620 429,841
36,655 5,029,710

Province C
Name of district area sq.km. Population
Bajaur Agency
1,290 595,227
Buner
1,865 506,048
Malakand 952 452,291
Chitral
14,850 318,689
Lower Dir 1,582 717,649
Upper Dir
3,699 575,858
Swat
5,337 1,257,602
Shangla
1,586 434,563
31,161 4,857,927

Province D
Name of district area sq km Population
Abbottabad
1,967 880,666
Batagram
1,301 307,278
Haripur
1,725 692,228
Kohistan
7,492 472,570
Mansehra
4,579 1,152,839
17,064 3,505,581

Punjab is proposed to be divided into:

Province E
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
4 Bhakkar 8,153 1,051,456
10 Gujrat 3,192 2,048,008
1 Attock 6,857 1,274,935
5 Chakwal 6,524 1,083,725
30 Rawalpindi 5,286 3,363,911
13 Jhelum 3,587 936,957
21 Mianwali 5,840 1,056,620
39,439 10,815,612

Province F
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
33 Sheikhupura 5,960 3,321,029
34 Sialkot 3,016 2,723,481
24 Narowal 2,337 1,265,097
9 Gujranwala 3,622 3,400,940
14,935 10,710,547

Province G
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
17 Lahore 1,772 6,318,745
14 Kasur 3,995 2,375,875
25 Nankana Sahib 2,960 1,410,000
8,727 10,104,620

`
Province H
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998 census
11 Hafizabad 2,367 832,980
20 Mandi B’din 2,673 1,160,552
32 Sargodha 5,854 2,665,979
6 Chiniot 965,124
12 Jhang 8,809 2,834,545
16 Khushab 6,511 905,711
26,214 9,364,891

Province I
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
8 Faisalabad 5,856 5,429,547
35 Toba Tek Singh 3,252 1,621,593
31 Sahiwal 3,201 1,843,194
26 Okara 4,377 2,232,992
16,686 11,127,326

Province J
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
2 Bahawalnagar 8,878 2,061,447
3 Bahawalpur 24,830 2,433,091
27 Pakpattan 24,830 1,286,680
28 Rahim yar khan 11,880 3,141,053
36 Vehari 4,364 2,090,416
74,782 11,012,687

Province K
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
15 Khanewal 4,349 2,068,490
19 Lodhran 2,778 1,171,800
22 Multan 3,720 3,116,851
23 Muzaffargarh 8,249 2,635,903
18 Layyah 6,291 1,120,951
7 D.G/ Khan 11,922 1,643,118
29 Rajanpur 12,319 1,103,618
49,628 12,860,731

Sindh Province is proposed to be divided into:

Province L
District Area
Sq Km. Population 1998
1. Karachi Central, 3,527 9,856,318
Karachi East,
Karachi South,
Karachi West,
Malir
Total: 3,527 9,856,318

Province M
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
19 Ghotki
6,083 970,549
23 Sukkur (+Kashmoor)
7,757 1,570,835
21 Jacobabad
5,278 1,425,572
22 Matiari
1,417 515,331
20 Shikarpur
2,512 880,438
13 Khairpur
15,910 1,546,587
17 Larkana
7,423 1,927,066
16 West Larkana 0 0
14 Nawabshah
4,502 1,071,533
9 Qamber &Shahdad Kot

15 Dadu
19,070 1,688,811
Total: 69,952 11,596,722

Province N
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
12 Sanghar
10,728 1,453,028
18 Naushahro Firoz
2,945 1,087,571
2 Jamshoro
6 Umerkot 663,100
7 Mirpurkhas
2,925 1,569,030
8 Tando Allahyar

11 Hyderabad
5,519 2,891,488
2 Jamshoro
5 Tharparkar
19,638 914,291
4 Badin
6,726 1,136,044
10 Tando Muhammad Khan
1,733 447,215
3 Thatta
17,355 1,113,194
Total: 67,569 11,274,961

Baluchistan Provinces proposed to be divided into:

Province: O
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
26 Zhob
20,297 275,142
23 Qilla Saifullah
6,831 193,553
17 Musakhel
5,728 134,056
15 Loralai
9,830 295,555
27 Ziarat
1,489 33,340
21 Pishin
7,819 367,183
13 Kohlu
7,610 99,846
22 Qilla Abdullah
3,293 370,269
25 Sibi
7,796 180,398
5 Dera Bugti
10,160 181,310
24 Quetta
2,653 744,802
2 Barkhan
3,514 103,545
3 Bolan
7,499 288,056
16 Mastung
5,896 179,784
Total: 100,415 3,446,839

Province: P
District Area Sq Km. Population 1998
4 Chagai[6] 50,545 202,564
9 Kalat
6,622 237,834
11 Kharan
48,051 206,909
12 Khuzdar
35,380 417,466
8 Jhal Magsi
3,615 109,941
18 Naseerabad
3,387 245,894
7 Jafarabad
2,445 432,817
1 Awaran
29,510 118,173
6 Gwadar
12,637 185,498
20 Panjgur
16,891 234,051
14 Lasbela
15,153 312,695
10 Kech (Turbat)
22,539 413,204
Total: 246,775 3,117,046

Singh means to critizice Indians on their admiration for the Gora’s writing on their homeland – Dalrymple is pissed – Singh accepts the challenge.

UPDATE I: A very similar haggle, Patrick French and Pankaj Mishra take on here and here.

What’s a foreigner allowed to understand on the sub-continent?

UPDATE II Or differently put by Salil Tripathi at Mint here…