[Article] Karachi water mafia by Alex Rodriguez in LA Times

[Article] Fishermen pay for the political hickhack by Alex Rodriguez in LA Times

These are stories by all means not new. But they are rather what the journalists now again increasingly posted in Pakistan seem to churn out when there is no Taliban-head capture controversy to report about. Or when they simply realize, that the country has many other issues apart from the Taliban threat.

[Blog] Hunza landslide at PamirTimes.

A natural disaster still relatively unnoticed by foreign media has occured in Hunza and is threatening to become an ever bigger problem. The landslide took a whole village north of Aliabad and Karimabad into the Hunza river in January, until now the earth masses are holding back the water which is now reaching back nearly all the way to Passu. The first of the famous foot bridges is already under water. The lake already has a length of 12 km.

[Interview] Recent interview with the Indus Water Comissioner for Pakistan Jamaat Ali Shah in Dawn. Talks about the water issues between the two countries began today in Lahore (see Dawn article).

But I fail to see, why this conclusion allows us to immediately jump to the assumption, that US presence (and probably the whole NATO presence as well, since when the US would leave, countries like Germany and Britain will hardly be made to stay) should be stopped in the region. Is our only target to make sure we are not attacked from a make-shift camp by bearded men? Are we only worried about having blood in our own streets? What about the countries of the region? Afghanistan is economically and educationally speaking in a dire situation, major areas in Pakistan are not doing any better and countries like Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan are neither sporting promising records. While other nations like Japan and Norway have long understood, that making a difference in this region takes patience, time and skilled labour we are only discussing money, arms and our own casualties.

As Ahmed Rashid recently pointed out to one of the few Americans who were venturing Pakistan outside their Islamabad embassy recently “You want to win over the people? Show me one school the Americans have built. Show me a road, a hospital, a railway.” . Other European countries (with a few exceptions) have an equally poor record. Some NGOs pull in after major disasters but leave soon after. There is seldom a long term commitment. As Rashid has pointed out in his recent book , the opportunity for Nation Building may have already passed, and other writers have argued that the US should not linger around anymore with this argument, since its record was poor enough in this respect . But an effort to bring a lasting peace to the region and aim for an economic development including surrounding regions (Iran, Xinjiang, Balochistan, Ferghana) should be made and attempted now. This does at the moment still include army presence, the Afghan army and police are far away from managing the situation themselves and the Pakistanis can in this regard unfortunately still not be trusted (especially the ISI). But while dismembering al-Qaeda should still be a good reason to stay and even enlarge CIA presence , there are other issues apart from our homeland security, that should make us aware of our responsibilities abroad.

Further Reading

Who’s Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?; Washington Post, 16th of September 2009

Rashid, Ahmed; Descent into Chaos – The United States and the failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; Allan Lane 2009

http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2009/09/coalition_issue.php

http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-09/afghanistan-cia-ausbau

[originally posted on 20/09/2009 on here-ware]

Think Tanks like the Foreign Policy AfPak channel, a source I generally trust generates news on the area faster than the truth can run. Tiedemann writes that the FATA is a “lawless region” – just because it doesn’t obey American law doesn’t mean its without any of it. The way many experts shape our image of this area is dangerous – the wrong perception we get leads us inevitably to wrong decisions.

Information that we is just as disheartening but at least not manipulated by opinion-shapers are the newest opinion polls of the Pakistani public by IRI.

An interesting discussion highlighting what the people in Pakistan think of it all is currently raging at LUMS, already discussed in the national media. As far as I understand the issue, these discussions are on the one side reason for optimism (ultimately these people (Pakistanis and Afghanis, Central Asians) will find a solution to the whole mess of the area, not the “experts” around the US and Europe), on the other side, they do still point in an ideologic direction which I find worrisome.

[originally posted on 1/10/2009 at here-ware]

“People in the West think we live on some barren land and ride camels. We never traveled on camels. We had horses. Our history is not properly represented.”

A young lady designer, apparently Feeha Noor Jamshed, has announced that we never traveled on camels.  This we included all her designer friends, and staff of family-owned brand TeeJays, perhaps. Staff, I’m no so sure of, sorry. But if this we means Pakistanis then sorry to disappoint you lady, we’ve been riding camels since millennia and are not going to give away the experience of riding this wonderful animal. Not until, they start designing clothes!

“I consider this a criminal attack by a lone individual.”

They testified this after proclaiming that it was indeed a suicide attack. Indeed, an ‘interesting’ definition. A man hits a building, housing numerous offices with alive people, knowing it might kill them all and he’s not a terrorist. Some Muslim groups have protested that on the statement and said, that for US (and West in general) one has to be a Muslim to be a terrorist. ‘No, you can’t be a terrorist because you’re not Muslim. No!’, they could have said.

Stay with me on this. What if Joseph Andrew Stack was Muslim? It would have added to Pakistan’s woes because in a few minutes after the attack, they would have found a link to Al-Qaeda and Taliban. How? You would have been told that he lived in a street same as a Nepalese. This Nepalese belongs to a city from where a small number of Muslims are settled in UK, and of which, one is a cook. Two years back this cook was employed in a restaurant where an Arab Sheikh from Egypt used to come for dinner. That Sheikh has married his son in Yemen in a family whose one member runs a business in Iraq. The business is of trucks, and one driver is a native of Ramadi. Ramadi is Al-Qaeda’s headquarter where Afghan and Pakistani Taliban come for training. Hence, it is proved that that suicide pilot has links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. And Pakistan should launch an operation in North Waziristan to capture these non-state actors. Duh!

[Report] Mathematics of War by Bohorquez et.al.

You can find the report on the page to download including additional material.

[Blog] Criticism of it at Sriks6711

[Blog] Zero Intelligence Agents by Drew Conway

… with the, to me, most obvious and understandable observation:

The role of the media is central to the decision model proposed by the authors, which is illustrated in the figure above. Again, however, this presents a logical disconnect. As the figure describes, the authors claim that insurgents are updating their beliefs and strategies based on the information and signals they receive from broadcast news, then deciding whether to execute an attack. For lack of a better term, this is clearly putting the cart before the horse. The media is reporting attacks, as the authors’ data clearly proves; therefore, the insurgents’ decision to attack is creating news, and as such insurgents are gaining no new information from media reports on attacks that they themselves have perpetrated. Rather, the insurgents retain a critical element of private information, and are updating based on the counter-insurgency policies of the state—information they are very likely not receiving from the media.

Who dares to make a Pakistani movie that does not have to claim to be made “60 miles away from the Taliban” to gain attention? A movie that’s worth watching because it’s simply a good movie without having to associate Pakistan with Terror, Taliban or Totay. A movie that can be shown in Trannum cinema in Androon Sheher and people will leave being touched by the story rather than one that is just screened in a living room in DHA before it immediately leaves to European/US film festivals where people are moved because they associate veiled women with Videos from Swat and bearded men with Videos from as-Sahab.

While discussions over what European soldiers should be allowed to shoot at and what not are raging, another one that is linked to the attached petrol trucks is seldom present. The trucks originally came from Tajikistan. Especially since the term AfPak came up, Afghanistan is less and less seen linked to it’s northern neighbors. What are the threats coming from that side, what are the opportunities?

[Article] Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, World Policy Journal, Spring 2003

“Regional cooperation is likely only when states value the opportunities that openness can create more than the need for control.”

[Article] A Partnership for Central Asia, S. Frederick Starr, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

The article is based on situations that has since then changed considerably and have made his conclusions in some cases void.

[Article] The Afghanization of Central Asia, Examining the Implications of a Central Asian Supply Line for Afghanistan, Northern Distribution Network Grappels with Security Threat, EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight, different dates

Brief insights in how Afghanistan and the Central Asians states are linked and what that implies for future actions in Afghanistan.

[Article] The SCO: A regional organisation in the making, Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008

Matveeva and Gisutozzi give a brief insight in the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), on which issues it plans to focus and where it may be able and efficient to do so in future. They also put the Organisation’s dealings in perspective to Afghanistan which is neither a memeber nor an observer (like Pakistan, Iran and India).

Stabilisation of Afghanistan may be an issue in which all SCO member states could be interested, but where Russia could have an upper hand, while China could contribute economically, militarily (more in theory than in reality so far) and diplomatically through its close relationship with Pakistan. If neither country has been very active in Afghanistan after 2001 so far, it is probably because they are waiting for Washington’s position to weaken to the point where their diplomatic intervention would have a serious chance of success. Pakistan’s own ambiguous position also contributes to caution, especially for the Chinese.

They manage to highlight the major issue which drives my interest in Central Asia – the neighbor’s interest in the AfPak conflict and their contribution (to the conflict or its solution). Currently the West seems reluctant to involve other stakeholders into its meddling in Afghanistan. It’s the US and European countries involved in ISAF. Russia and China, the last bordering to Afghanistan are seemingly not involved in any decision making or contributions to COIN or diplomacy, although especially China is heavily involved in the private sector in Afghanistan and a patron with major influence on Pakistan.

The authors bring up the possible discrepancies in communication.

The Chinese foreign policy establishment is very cautious and risk-averse, and has difficulty handling unforeseen events and unconventional challenges. It feels more comfortable with everything planned and agreed in advance. This is almost diametrically opposed to the Russian foreign policy culture, which thrives on crisis, feels comfortable with assertive or controversial positions, and has a capacity and inclination to react quickly to unprecedented developments.
[...]
Moreover, the Russian establishment feels that culturally and socially it has more in common with the Americans than with the Chinese.
This perspective is shared by Central Asians. Proficiency in the Russian language and the legacy of Russian education and culture, upon which the Central Asian military and political establishment has been brought up, mean that when it comes to collective action in security sphere, Russian is a lingua franca for the rank-and-file cadre of five of the Shanghai Six. The language and cultural barrier is very real, and is an obstacle for interaction between the Chinese military and the rest.

They also emphasize that in terms of military involvement other organisations could play a more important role.

In the case of a large-scale security threat within Central Asia that requires a military response, the CSTO is most likely to be the one to respond, not least because it has Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. If instability in Afghanistan spins out of control and affects Central Asia, it is more likely that CSTO than SCO troops would be used to hold the border, with the Russian military leading the effort and contributing most troops.

[...]

The record of security engagement of all these [CSTO, CIS, NATO, ISAF] actors is far more prominent than that of the SCO.

Still, an inclusion of other stakeholders with a lot more imminent interest in the AfPak region, stakeholders who can feel the successes and failures in Afghanistan right away on their borders should be a seen as integral part of future decisions made in Afghanistan and also to some respect Pakistan.

[Blog] Registan, … is of course always a good source for discussions on these issues.

Of course the extreme adverse side of critics also does exist – Pakistani writers who continuously blame their own country (often including themselves as it’s citizens) for it’s current situation. Ahmed Rashid often does so, Pervez Hoodbhoy and Nadeem Paracha as well. I respect their assessments and find them constructive, in case of the latter they sometimes do tend to go into the all-destructive though.

Manan Ahmed on chapatimystery showed that coming up with conspiracy theories or offended negations is not necessary to counter the US push into Pakistan. He offers a straight confutation of a NYTimes OpEd by “one of the brains behind President Obama’s Afghanistan policy”, Seth Jones.

He also links to a hottly debated post at Registan which not only bashes Jones but also Michael Semple on the article I recently referred to. It sounds a bit harsh, I would have seen Semple in less critical light but Foust may be more informed (although some commenters disagree). His bashing of Kilcullen I would agree with though.