Der Gedanke der Authentizität oder authentisches Denken?

Spätestens seit den Demonstrationen in Teheran im Sommer 2009 haben so genannte Social Media Applikationen (Facebook und Twitter) die westliche Berichterstattung über ganze Weltregionen – und damit auch die allgemeine Wahrnehmung derselben – wesentlich beeinflusst. Ganz besonders trifft dies für die arabische Welt und das westliche und vor allem muslimische Asien zu, das vermehrt im geopolitischen Medienfokus steht[i]. Der Wert dieser Quellen ist begrenzt. Erstens handelt es sich meist um keinen repräsentativen Teil der Bevölkerung. Zweitens schränkt die Notwendigkeit einen Internetzugang zu haben und sich darüber hinaus eloquent auf Englisch ausdrücken zu können, um auch wahrgenommen zu werden, die Auswahl auf die urbane Oberschicht ein, die oft noch im Westen, der Zielregion ihrer Information, ausgebildet wurde oder sogar teilweise dort lebt. Auch wenn diese Einschränkung anerkannt wird, geht man aber oft davon aus, dass durch eine Berichterstattung über diese Quellen aus der Oberschicht, die Diskussionsthemen der gebildeten Bevölkerung adäquat wiedergegeben werden kann.

Im Falle der arabischen Welt meinte der tunesische Soziologe al-Taher Labib in einem Interview mit der Zeitung al-Hayat[ii] , dass die Denker und Kommentatoren, die die zweite Nahda hervorbrachte, kritisch betrachtet werden müssten – es gäbe den ernsthaften/seriösen Denker und den sogenannten ‚Intellektuellen’, der damit beschäftigt ist, sich als ‚Experte’ zu positionieren. Labib meint, dass die Fähigkeit, aber auch die Verantwortung des seriösen Denkers es wäre, Aussagen mit Bedeutung hervorzubringen. Die ‚Denker’, die über das Internet auch im Westen schnell Gehör finden, gehören nach Labib’s Darstellung meist eher zu ‚Experten-Intellektuellen’. Um eine Vorstellung davon zu bekommen, welche Gedanken die Gesellschaft wirklich bewegen, bzw. welche als essentiell betrachtet von der intellektuellen Elite des Landes intensiv diskutiert werden, sind diese Quellen mehr als unzureichend, im schlechtesten Fall zeichnen sie sogar ein komplett verzerrtes Bild. Diese Diskussionen in der arabischen Welt sind außerhalb ihrer Grenzen fast unbekannt, das heißt sie spielen z.B. in europäischen Überlegungen zu aktuellen Entwicklungen im arabischen Raum keine Rolle. Die arabische Welt (wo auch immer man diese schlussendlich lokalisiert) wird als eine statische Menschenmasse porträtiert. Ihre Beweggründe werden im Westen oft schnell mit einfachen materiellen Konzepten wie ‚steigende Nahrungsmittelpreise’ erklärt. Was sie auf intellektueller Ebene bewegt bleibt meist unbeachtet.

Der Hinweis auf Labib’s Kommentare bezieht sich auf Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab’s Buch ‚Contemporary Arab Thought – Culture Critique in Comparative Perspective’, eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Diskussionen in der arabischen Welt zu Identität. Ihre Übersetzungen der al-Hayat Interviews aus den Jahren 2006 und 2007 setzen den Schlusspunkt unter einen Überblick mit viel kritischer Auseinandersetzung der intellektuellen Debatten zur arabischen Kultur seit 1967.

Kassab beleuchtet verschiedene Aspekte – von der ersten Nahda über die Phase nach 1967, die Diskussion von Kultur, Islam und Säkularismus bis zu den postkolonialen Diskussionen. Indem sie zu jedem Kapitel die Kommentare eines Intellektuellen genauer beleuchtet, vermag sie, über das ganze Buch gesehen, einen Einblick in viele verschiedene Narrativen von Marokko (Abdallah Laroui) bis Syrien (Sadeq al-Azm), von im deutschsprachigen Raum bekannteren Namen wie Bassam Tibi zu unbekannteren Stimmen, wie derjenigen der christlichen Araber in Israel und Palästina (Naim Ateek), zu geben. Im Folgenden möchte ich auf zwei Konzepte eingehen, die bei vielen von Kassab beleuchteten Denkern eine Rolle spielen und daher in unzähligen Debatten immer wieder im Mittelpunkt stehen.

Nach innen gerichtete Kritik

Im Gegensatz zur (ersten)[iii] Nahda, für die exemplarisch Muhammad Abduh’ und Jalal ud-din al-Afghani immer wieder von verschiedenen Autoren herangezogen werden, richtet sich die Kritik arabischer Denker nach der Niederlage gegen Israel im Sechstagekrieg nicht mehr in erster Linie nach außen (‚against the Other’) sondern zusehends nach innen. „The shock of the 1967 defeat provoked the bitter realization that fundamental mistakes were made in carrying out these postcolonial projects [welche in der ersten Nahda diskutiert wurden, Anm.]. Some Arabs continued to view their governments and fellow nationals as faultless victims, but for many a fundamental questioning of ideas and policies had become necessary.“ Um diese (Selbst-)Kritik möglich zu machen, müssen wichtige Voraussetzungen geschaffen werden, die, nach Ansicht vieler der von Kassab beleuchteten Denker, gerade auch heute noch zu den wichtigsten zählen und gerade im Falle Syriens auch ausserhalb der arabischen Welt verstanden werden sollten. Kritik ist nur in Freiheit, also in einer Demokratie, möglich. Exemplarisch dafür stehen Saadallah Wannous’ Werke. In ‚Ana al-Janaza wa al-Mushayyi’un’[iv] schreibt er von seinem Bedürfnis ‚Nein’ zu sagen zur politischen und gesellschaftlichen Unterdrückung. Kritik ist nur möglich wenn der Araber sich von ideologischen Termini löst und nicht einfach die eigene Identität durch die Sprache oder Religion oder arabische Kultur, die ihn mit anderen arabischen Ländern verbindet als Argument anführt, sondern die eigene Geschichte als passierte Geschichte und nicht al Tradition betrachtet (Traditionalism vs. Historicism, Laroui). Weiters kommen immer wieder Frauen zu Wort, die, wie Kassab kritisch bemerkt, auch in den sich selbst aufgeklärt gebenden Kreisen arabischer Intellektueller selten eine Stimme bekommen. Leila Ahmad oder Nawal el-Saadawi weisen darauf hin, dass Frauen (auch exemplarisch für andere Minderheiten) durch ihren doppelten Kampf gegen die Unterdrückung (gegen die Macht im Staat aber auch die eigene Gesellschaft) besonders betroffen sind. Nicht nur in diesem Thema vermag es Kassab, obwohl ihr Buch mehr ein Einblick als eine explizite Kritik jedes einzelnen Denkers ist, immer wieder die Argumente zu hinterfragen und gegeneinander zu stellen.

Turath

Einer der immer wiederkehrenden Begriffe ist der des turath. Kritiker wie Fouad Zakkariya und Ali Ahmad Sa’id sehen die dauernde Berufung auf die glorreiche Geschichte der arabischen Welt zur Schaffung einer aktuellen Identität als Hindernis an. Zakkariya meint, dass diese Rückbesinnung zwar auch in Europa existierte (das sich ständige Beziehen auf den Westen zieht sich einerseits wie ein roter Faden durch alle Kommentare, ist gleichzeitig aber auch ein Kritikpunkt einiger Denker), Europa aber nicht daran gehindert habe zu wachsen und seine Macht auszubauen. Zwar können aus Tradition wichtige Werte gewonnen werden, sie sei aber nicht Teil der ‚living mind of the contemporary Arab’ und daher entkoppelt von seiner wirklichen (und nicht nur ideologisch konstruierten) Identität.

Konzepte in der jungen Internetszene

Um zurück auf die ‚Experten’ der modernen Internetlandschaft zu kommen – auch diese, wenn auch manchmal nur unterschwellig kommuniziert, werden von den Diskussion zur innen-gerichteten Kritik und der Diskussion zur Bedeutung der turath sehr beeinflusst. Wie Kassab in der Einleitung zu ihrem Buch meint: ‚Growing up in Lebanon in the second half of the twentienth century, I could not imagine the Arab world without anguished debates on culture. The Arab mind was for me invariably associated with questions of cultural crisis, […]. [The] Arab debates were […] on the fringes of my awareness. [This neglect] applies to almost any student graduating in the Arab world, […].’ Für viele Quellen, auf die sich westlicher Journalismus zur Befindlichkeit der arabischen Welt bezieht (und das ist nun mal eher der junge al-Jazeera Korresepondent und nicht ein Sadeq al-Azm oder Abdallah Laroui), spielen diese Diskussion zu Kultur eine grosse Rolle, werden aber als Diskussion selten nach aussen getragen und erscheinen damit nicht am Radar der westlichen Aufmerksamkeit. Es ist gerade dieser Konflikt der Kritikfähigkeit an der eigenen Kultur mit dem Selbstverständnis der Kritik am Westen, um den sich unzählige Debatten drehen. Kassab’s Buch zeigt eindrücklich, dass obwohl (oder gerade weil) sich die Suche nach einer arabischen Identität auch 45 Jahre nach 1967 noch immer in einer Krise befindet, die Diskussionen dazu äusserst lebendig sind und nicht nur existieren, wenn der Westen den arabischen Frühling verkündet.

Caroline Brothers has an article in the Guardian on Afghan boys who ended up in Paris after an Odysee over land. It’s not a story that is limited to Afghanistan, stranded in my hometown they hail just as likely from Pakistan, and of course African countries. And those stories are old – it is just that they have been ignored largely and are continued to be treated with far to little sincerity by European governments. Let me recount such a story, that takes Brothers’ line further – where such an Odysee can end, and after Paris and Calais London is often not where it ends up.

When I worked for an international humanitarian organisation in Pakistan, I was issued the responsibility of a young Afghan man (I’ll call him Farhad) who had suddenly emerged in Peshawar. He had been deported from Germany many days earlier, where he had earned his education at the same organisation where I was employed now. A decade earlier, in the early 90s, his uncle advised him to take the 5000$ trip in a truck’s container to Europe, where he ended up having scarse contact to other family members who were already in Germany, but largely made his own way. He was repeatedly granted the right to stay but never with a full permit. When the German province he lived in passed a stricter law on asylum seekers, prompting all above 18 who had no close family members in the country to be deported at earliest – his parents had been killed in conflict back home – he was put on a plane to Kabul with two police accompanying him – the salary for these he had to come up for himself at a later stage. In Kabul he was released on the tarmac with a fat ‘Deported’ stamped into his Afghan passport. Ground staff in Kabul devalidated his passport and he was a persona non grata – no family and being a returnee from Europe made him suspicious and an easy target to be exploited. Together with a boy with a similar fate he met in Kabul – he had just been deported from England where his family did live, on charges of marihuana posession – they made their way to Peshawar. Here the guy from England assured, the chances to find someone to get them immediately back to Europe would be bigger.

On Kabul River

At this point, the organisation in Germany, who was in constant contact with Farhad, contacted their branch in Pakistan to take care of him. They refused. They had a point, where would they get to if they had to take care of all Afghan men coming illegaly to Pakistan, wishing to go to Europe. The international head office warned us to take the matter up as well, an issue too politically sensitive with little chance to cut a tear wrenching story out of it. He was to be forgotten, were it not for his care takers in Germany who felt it their responsibility to get him back to Germany. I ended up shuttling between Peshawar, Islamabad and Lahore trying to get to a solution, at constant threat of being seized with an illegal Afghan. His care takers were portraying Pakistan as a dangerous place in hell back home from which Farhad needed to be saved, while he was living in a mosque in Peshawar begging in the street to be granted a place to sleep, being constantly harrased by Pakistanis for being an unwelcome foreigner. The antipathy was large from Pashtuns like him in Peshawar to Punjabi clerks in Islamabad to International Staff at the Embassy and the UNHCR. But the naivity concerning the situation in Afghanistan or Pakistan itself of the international donors who only want the best (which is what?) back home in Germany (is it his home?) was the most troubling aspect for me. In their eyes, Afghanistan and Pakistan are exciting, oriental, dangerous, dirty and unwelcoming places from where you can only flee or go to if you want to help people or dip you finger into a spice bowl in a bazaar.

Not enough such stories as by Brothers’ are written to bring this topic, which has been growing bigger and bigger in recent years, to the attention of the public. But these are not incredible stories one should be marveling with sorrow about, only to rush to the next book shop and buy Khaled Hosseini. Our responsibility is to make sure that our governments deal with the issue sensibly.

I figured it was not for me to judge whether he should be helped to get back to Germany, or try to figure out a future in Afghanistan. That was for him to do, I would help him to get to where he thought going fit his realistic dreams.

The Tractors

Conrad Schetter from the German Crossroads Asia Project, has an excellent short write up on patterns of migration in Afghnaistan out.

Waves of refugees and labour migrants determine the social reality of life in Afghanistan ‐ perhaps more so than anywhere else. The intervention which has been on‐going since 2001 has barely considered this high spatial mobility in its conceptual planning. Where it has been noted, it tends to be perceived as disruptive. This article intends to demonstrate the extent to which forms of migration affect the lives of Afghans and should be taken account of in plans for the future of the country that go beyond the dominant state‐building model.

He shows how spatial mobility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a common nearly unrestricted fact and a central tenet of many families. His story of a family from Lower Dir is especially interesting, as it could have been told by Babur (Zahir ud din Muhammad, 1483 – 1530), who like his forefathers and other realtives, when danger loomed, always shifted the women from his family to the safe havens of Badakhshan.

Another example, that of a family from Lower Dir in north Pakistan, shows the migration strategy of a family that can be reckoned to the educated middle classes. Part of the family moved from Lower Dir to the neighbouring district of Bajaur at the beginning of the 20th century. Several members of the family subsequently moved from there to Kunar in east Afghanistan. In the late 1940s, part of the family moved to Archi, on the Afghan‐Tajik border, when they were offered land there. [...] All the women in this extended family live in Lower Dir. When violence escalated in the Swat valley in the spring 2009, the female members of the family were all brought to Kunduz, but they are now already back in Lower Dir; this shows, yet again, that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not seen as a barrier to spatial mobility. This case, moreover, illustrates nicely the concept of the competence network Crossroads Asia.

I have pointed at one phenomenon of the porous Durand Line earlier, stemming from my experience with patients from our hospital close to the refugee camp Shamshatoo. Here I want to briefly look at another aspect of migration of Afghans into Pakistan and beyond.

In Pakistan administered Kashmir

While it is popular to write of the alleged presence of the Chinese in Pakistani administered Kashmir, it is Afghans who really have a say in business there. After the earthquake in 2005, the complete tractor business (that is transport of building material) was in the hands of Afghans who had lived here since long ago – one can imagine why they originally came. Organised according to the places they hail from in Afghanistan, they today control many garments, carpets and utilities shops, linked up to warehouses all over the country in the hands of other family members (just as Schetter portrays). When the construction after the earthquake quickly subsided, they were a lot more flexible than local Kashmiris to adapt to new jobs. When demand decreased significantly in their field, they would move back to Afghanistan for a few weeks or months and drive tractors there or follow up on another job. In the Afghan’s carpet shops letters and photos of female Swedish NGO workers are passed around while a family member just returned from Waziristan talks about his experiences with a Mehsud lashkar which he left to take some days off in cooler Kashmir.

Just as Bernd Glatzer explains in his War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries (which one should read in combination with Schetter’s article), the Afghans here ‘consider Pashtuns from beyond the Durand Line as first and foremost Pakistanis.’ Even though their counterparts in construction would often be Pashtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the daily wages construction business is in the hands of Pakistani Pashtuns who lived in tents for the weeks they would work, only to move on or return home when they had earned enough), they had little to do with them. The place in Afghanistan (sometimes down to the village) would matter most, after that Afghanistan. After that Pashtun identity, much later somewhere the fact that they are Muslims just like the Kashmiris.

While the debates on drones and talks to Taliban in Qatar may be important to lead and are essential to the area’s future, the fact that they are detached from the place (one up in thin air, the other on the other side of the street of Hormuz) they are symptomatic for what goes so wrong here. To be so far away from the Know and the stories that are happening just outside our doors as Brothers shows, and so in love with the grandiose speculative theories.

I am looking forward to this book.

The terms “Water War” and “Water Wars” are media darlings. The famous quote apocryphally attributed to US humorist Mark Twain “[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over” is so overused that many water professionals are pleading to ban its use. To get a feel as to when the hysteria over water wars began, we explored Google labs tool Books Ngram Viewer which revealed that geographers were using the terms to describe water situations in the US and Middle East as early as the late 1800s with an exponential increase in the use of these terms starting in 1988.

The experts they mention – Gleick, Yoffe, Giordano, Susskind – are the main sources earlier mentioned reviews draw on. They close with a very valid conclusion:

Much of the hype about water wars is good business for conflict beneficiaries and book sales, but in reality conflicts over transboundary waters are normal, and managing that conflict offers constant opportunities for dialogue and cooperation.

I have just reviewed such an attempt to cash in on the ‘water war’ hypothesis for DAWN.

Brahma Chellaney’s Water: Asia’s New Battleground sums up the arguments for why South Asia may go to war over water in the near future (and how that could be averted). It is representative of a number of recent publications along these lines — and serves as a good example of where they may be going lost in the thicket of hyperbole that lushly grows when policy experts muddle in sensitive engineering or natural science topics (or equally when engineers have an urge to develop political arguments on such).

The arguments for and against the threat of near future war over water resources are at loggerheads. For South Asia examples for a dire future situation are ample, and since many countries are extremely dependent on huge water courses originating in a neighbouring country (with which it often has other disputes ongoing), the argument for violent conflict seems close to come by. The counter argument observes that while there is and will be conflict over water resources, countries have not gone to war over it in the past, and because of effects explained with Pareto optimality, both parties would be loosers in an outbreak of such, and are therefore inclided to solve the problems via cooperation.

What makes the topic very interesting on the Subcontinent and in Asia in general, is the fact that the debate is being carried out very actively (3). For the case of the Indus Basin, conflict between India and Pakistan, one should read on the recent history of water resources in the two countries (4), what the current challenges are (5) and what kind of solutions may already be around and need not be introduced by ‘international experts’ – see MS Gopal’s great photographs of the Barefoot Geologists in Kutch.

For Central Asia, the research reaches from Climate Change, via the stand off between the rather poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have all power over the water sources Amu and Syr and are excerting it, and the richer downstream Uzbekistan, to the effects of water overuse on the common property Aral Sea (6).

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¹ Two good and rather recent overviews can be found here: Thomas Bernauer and Anna Kalbhenn. 2010. The Politics of International Freshwater Resources The International Studies Encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell.; Dinar, A., and Dinar, S. (2003) Recent Developments in the Literature on Conflict and Cooperation in International Shared Water. Natural Resources Journal (43) (4), 1217–87 (a revised form of this paper can be downloaded here)
² Most notably the Databases on the Transboundary Waters Website
³ See for example Briscoe’s comment in EPW India on the Indus and India-Pakistan and Iyer’s response.
⁴ John Briscoe et. al. on Pakistan (Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry) and India (India’s Water Economy – Bracing for a Turbulent Future)
⁵ On Pakistan the Wilson Centre’s Report Pani ki Kahani is excellent, for India, the papers from the IWMI’s NSRLP project are a take, as an introduction the first chapter from a series.
⁶ On Climate change, see Bernauer, T., Siegfried, T. Climate Change and International Water Conflict in Central Asia., on the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by the same authors (2007) Estimating the performance of international regulatory regimes: Methodology and empirical application to international water management in the Naryn/Syr Darya basin.

6. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I Teil II Teil III Teil IV Teil V

Die Diskussion zur Rolle China’s in Zentralasien und auch Pakistan wird auf Registan weitergeführt. Alexandros Petersen hat auf Steve LeVine’s ForeignPolicy Blog einen kurzen Bericht zu seinen Beobachtungen zu Geschäften zwischen China und Turkmenistan veröffentlicht. Er zieht dabei auch Folgerungen zu den Beziehungen zu Russland und der EU, Punkte, die wir bis jetzt noch wenig beachtet haben, weil sie im Falle Pakistan auch eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle spielen.

In erster Linie argumentiert er, dass China aktiv seinen Einfluss in der Region ausbaut und macht das an einigen wenigen Bemerkungen, ja sogar Deutungen von gegenteiligen Aussagen fest.

A CNPC representative put it in these terms: “Some regional partners like to use our presence as a foreign policy tool.” He was quick to add, “Chinese companies are not involved in politics.”  I heard the terms “non-interference” and “harmonious relations” more times than I could count. But, addressing the Turkmen deal directly, a senior policymaker with the Chinese energy ministry said, “Energy is the basis for a wider relationship with Turkmenistan, which we see as a major, long-term partner in the region.” Kazakhstan has far more oil, in addition to much natural gas, but Turkmenistan appears to be at least equivalent and perhaps more consequential to China. When I asked whether the relationship with Turkmenistan was important in diversifying China’s energy import options in light of recent civil unrest in Kazakhstan, he answered simply, “Yes.”

Dass chinesische Firmen den zentralasiatischen Raum infiltrieren und ein wirtschaftliches Interesse haben hier Bindungen zu stärken ist unbetsritten und gilt gleichermassen für Pakistan. Das sofort an die geopolitische Machtglocke (‘geopolitical thrust’, ‘regional strategy’) zu hängen fällt einem aber nur ein wenn man eine Berechtigung sucht, auf FP genügend Click zu bekommen. Das ‘Yes’ auf die Frage, ob China seine Ölimporte diversifizieren will ist nicht überraschend, aber auch nicht besonders aussagekräftig um auf die These, dass sich China Zentralasien unter den Nagel reissen will.

Joshua Foust weist in seiner Kritik des Artikels auf einen (scheinbar) wichtigen Unterschied zu den Beziehungen mit Pakistan hin:

It makes for a marked contrast to China’s relationship with Pakistan. Especially on issues of terrorism, China has been less than shy about openly exerting pressure on Islamabad to gain concessions, going so far as to spark the Lal Masjid crisis in 2007. That’s in part because Chinese investment in Pakistan is not just a matter of some Chinese companies either investing or building local subsidiaries, but the result of large, politically significant projects like the Gwadar port and large military sales. In contrast, pressuring a Central Asian government to, for example, round up some Uighur activists it doesn’t like anyway is barely worth mentioning, especially because it imposes no cost on the leaders who do it.

Es ist nicht ganz klar wie stark China hinter dem diplomatischen ‘good-will’ Vorhang auf Pakistan Druck ausübt. Während die kürzliche Geschichte um Stationierung von PLA Truppen aber ziemlich sicher Unsinn sind, und die Besorgnis der ganze Norden Pakistan’s sei schon mit chinesischen Soldaten besetzt eine beliebte aber ebenfalls aufgebauschte Geschichte ist, ist es aber doch offensichtlich, das China nach aussen weit weniger Druck auf Pakistan als auf zentralasiatische Staaten ausübt. Warum?

Schlussendlich weist Foust auf einen wichtigen Punkt hin, der auch mein Hauptargument in der Debatte zu Konflikten über Wasser darstellt (forthcoming):

And that’s the big problem I have with this formulation: it is a deductive analysis of what China might be doing, but there just aren’t enough data to conclusively say that this is what China intends to do. And more important, there’s no sense of whether it’s a good thing, a bad thing, — and if the U.S. should respond, much less care about it.

Gulping a refreshing fruit juice close to qainchi-Flyover on Ferozepur Road some years ago, a member of the Punjab Elite Force (a unit which is employed for Special Ops as well as VIP transfer, and rose to some fame abroad last year as well, when one of them killed Salman Taseer) enjoying the same refreshment asked me where I was from. My experience told me that telling him I was from Austria was not going to get us far. While in Central Asian countries, people, thanks to their Soviet past, would tell me how they know Rapid Wien (a formerly internationally succesful Austrian soccer club) and an Engineer immediately retorted Alpenglühenwhen I mentioned Austria and Switzerland, in Pakistan my homecountry mostly evokes images of Kangurus and Cricket. While I then try to explain the difference, interest has most often waned (I can not blame them). This Police man however, with a proud smile pointed at his chest, where the logo of the Elite Force, comprising of bullets and two Glock pistols, is prominently placed. He was well aware, that the Glock pistol is an Austrian product.

Army Trucks

A somewhat similar encounter happened in Rawalpindi, this time with an older man from the Upper Class, who I talked to at the SOS Children’s Village. He was perfectly aware where Austria was, I would have expected a different relation though. He would not go on about Classical Music or Salzburg and Schoenbrunn (what I normally get from people who know Austria as tourists) or the fact, that SOS was founded in Austria. Again with a proud smile, in his position as an Pakistan Army member, he told me how he had just finalized a deal on Steyr Army Trucks, which are especially suitable for offroad terrain (Steyr guns are apart from that in use in the Pakistan Army as well).

Austria, thus, is known for it’s weapons in Pakistan.

(I had the idea to put that down today, when I stumbled over a project of two Austrian journalists, who attempt to track Austrian Weapon Deals/Stories around the world. We are officially a neutral country, but big in business …)

Money

There are similar exports from Switzerland (the country I live in when I am not in Austria or Pakistan), Oerlikon being the most prominent, but I have no such encounters to recount and apart from that Switzerland is more known. Kashmiri friends always ask me whether their country really deserves that ‘Kashmir is the Switzerland of Asia’ label (which I found for Northern Xinjiang as well and probably in a couple of other mountainous places in Asia). But while being at it, looking for links between the three countries the authors of this blog write from, it is interesting to make note of the topic that currently shakes the country and is top headline since nearly a week (it would be worth an analysis in itself, the essentials of the issue are not really grasped in the foreign media yet). Today, the president of the Swiss National Bank had to step down. Not because he covered Asif Zardari’s murky deals (which are also set in Zuerich), but because his wife made a small fortune with a foreign exchange dealing, while he was just stabilizing the Swiss Franc against the Euro last year. His wife, born Kashya Mehmood, is from Rawalpindi.

If you know German (Swiss German on top), watch today’s discussion on ‘Moral, Power and the Media’, it just finished. Both the media in Austria and Pakistan could learn from the quality of such TV debates (this strayed off the path somehwhere half, but is still worth watching, when you have read on the whole debacle of the last days).

Expats

I could, and should at some point, voice my expat concerns on my homecountry (how to lead a political debate is a great starter). But that is a complex topic. And I think this article by Franz Stefan Gady for the Huffington Post makes it a bit too easy too. As expats we could be a lot more interested (and that sincerely) in what goes on at home, and not just look down on it – easier said than done. But since he states, fittingly for our blog, I’ll have to include it:

Where are Austria’s grand strategists and statesmen? For example, it is a sheer impossibility to devise a daring new foreign policy for the Balkans or Eastern Europe (which was hijacked by the Austrian private sector more than 20 years ago) or dispatch the best and brightest of Austria to Brussels, the true ‘great uncle’ of small European powers, to push Austrian ‘interests’. (When did anyone ever hear any Austrian politician mention the word ‘Austrian interests’?) I am not even mentioning the rise of China, nuclear Iran, the war in Afghanistan, terrorism in Pakistan, the power transition in North Korea, or the current upheaval in Russia. “Such outward things dwell not in Austrian desires,” to paraphrase Shakespeare’s Henry V, and never seems to be a concern for any party.

5. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Teil IV

Der Mangel an ernstzunehmenden Analysen zur bilateralen Beziehung zwischen Pakistan und China wurde wiederholt dargelegt. Auseinandersetzung mit China’s Zentralasien Politik ist dagegen schon fast zu populär. Niklas Swanström hat als Teil der Silk Road Studies Program Serie ein weiteres Paper in diese Richtung vorgelegt (China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers? Silk Road Paper, Dezember 2011). Nichts weiter neues oder besonders lesenswertes, manchmal auch etwas zu viel der Starr’schen New Silk Road Gebete (Zuglinie zwischen Tajikistan und Pakistan, whatever…), aber er richtet seinen Blick auf Greater Central Asia (GCA), zählt dazu auch Pakistan und macht einige wichtige Bemerkungen.

China’s Intentionen – ‘more than the sum of its parts’

Contrary to the widely held simplified view of China, there is no single strategy towards the region. There are significant differences between the central government in Beijing, local governments and private business, differences that could spoil or complicate relations with different actors in GCA. For example, the government in Beijing has one strategy of engagement, Xinjiang has another strategy, which is not always but often, interlinked with the one from Beijing, while other regions also have different policies. This is complicated by the very fact that companies in China are increasingly, and to a great extent, conducting their own business oriented towards economic returns rather than towards increasing China’s soft security.

Swanstroem basiert diese Aussagen auf eigene Interviews in Xinjiang, leider werden solche Quellen selten offengelegt. Aber es reflektiert doch einen Punkt, der in einem Grossteil der ‚China und seine Nachbarn’ Analysen nicht erwähnt wird – China praktiziert seine Außenpolitik nicht als ein Hegemon, sondern ein Staat mit vielen Akteuren und Interessen. Das ist auch für Pakistan der Fall, die Beziehung China – Pakistan auf PLA – FWO zu reduzieren erfasst nur einen Bruchteil der Thematik.

Swanstroem dehnt diese Kritik konkret auf die bekanntesten Narrativen aus, und zweifelt selbst an, ob eine ‚konkrete Strategie’ überhaupt besteht.

John J. Mearsheimer’s call for containment of China in his Tragedy of Great Power Politics was one of the most influential contributions to this debate, while others, such as Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross have argued that China is best integrated into the international community. What has been missed out on to a certain extent is that China has for long been implementing integration policies in the GCA region, as well as in other regions. Certainly the extreme sides that debate frequently among U.S. policymaking and academic circles have failed to capture the nuances in between these polarized views. In fact, a recent Congressional Report points out that the grand strategy behind Beijing’s new use of “soft power,” such as trade and investment, remains largely uncertain even to insiders, if such a grand strategy exists at all. This is something that becomes more evident when looking at the division within China itself and the policy confusion between the three layers and other actors. Regardless of intentions or lack thereof, trade, infrastructure and investments will unavoidably bring a great amount of influence that could be used in whatever way Beijing considers to be in its national interests.

China und Zentralasien – keine neuen Nachbarn

Sich vor allem auf Perdue’s China marches West beziehend (das im letzten Teil vorgestellt wurde), bemerkt Swanström, dass China und seine westlichen Nachbarstaaten fließend ineinander übergehen. Beziehungen die hier heute ‚aufgebaut’ werden, sind meist schon einige Jahrhunderte alt bzw. die zwei Parteien beziehen sich teils sogar auf eine gemeinsame Geschichte.

In fact, it could be argued that the tribes and empires that today form the states in GCA have been heavily involved in the very formation of China and its current political, military and economic outlook. It could even be argued that modern China was built on the very existence of the GCA peoples’ engagement, both negative and positive.

 China vs. der Westen – Zeit und Uhren

China does not rule out a democratic development in the region, on the contrary it is often assumed that such development will happen but Beijing has a more realistic and long-term perspective. Even in the case of the April 2010 “revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, there are more obstacles than positive steps if true democracy is to be established, the Russian involvement being one of the negative factors.

[...]

Even if the United States is perceived as having negative goals, the European policy is at best perceived as confusing and at worst aggressive (in terms of regime change, human rights demands, etc.). It is possible that the Lisbon Treaty will change this over time, but in the short-term the EU policy will continue to be fragmented and uncoordinated. Moreover, the European post-modern attitudes do not impress the GCA states, which are still in a very realist environment and have problems relating to the European lack of understanding.

Sino-Russische  Beziehungen – noch eine diffuse Angstquelle

Er geht auch auf ein Thema ein, das in mehreren Posts in letzter Zeit auf Registan diskutiert wurde – China oder Russland als großer Bruder (das betrifft natürlich nur die zentralasiatischen Staaten, Pakistan-Russische Beziehungen sind nicht wirklich vorhanden)?

Increased but weak multilateralism in the region, including Russia, was the preferred strategy, as it would give Beijing increased leverage without being too offensive. Criticism has been made, especially in the West, of the SCO and the reluctance of

Russia to engage in true multilateralism. In the eyes of Beijing, this is not an issue and in many ways China has accepted the idea that Russia views SCO as simply a control mechanism regarding China’s expansion into the region. This is not something entirely negative. Zhao Huasheng, one of China’s foremost analysts of Russia and Central Asia, has on the contrary claimed that this is something positive, as it reduces Russian fears and could even prevent more problematic conflicts.

[...]

What is striking in all this cooperation, with the possible exception of Pakistan, is that they are all open for interpretation. This has been a conscious strategy on the part of Beijing, since by keeping all of these agreements open-ended and leaving them intentionally vague, China has managed to keep relations with the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran on a fairly good footing. This will continue to be the Chinese policy, but it will be increasingly hard as some issues, primarily Iran and Pakistan, are difficult to handle in a neutral way. This does not indicate that China is ready to surpass Russia in the GCA in the short-term, on the contrary, China finds Russia both more powerful in the GCA (excluding Pakistan) and more ready to act, as we have seen in Kyrgyzstan.

Der Artikel stützt die These, dass man nicht viel weiss, oder zumindest versteht. Aber deswegen auch nicht einfach viel erfinden sollte.

Some months back I visited a rural support program in a Central Asian country, executed by one of the world’s biggest development organizations with an excellent repute here and in similar areas in Pakistan. A European consultant, with ample experience in the area and his field – sustainable construction solutions – had recently visited the project. The outcome of this visit, a number of manuals as guidelines for the local execution, had just been printed and handed over to the local engineers. Among them seismic proof housing, and split latrines. These toilets are currently a very fancy topic in sanitary engineering for developing countries when discussed among experts in the West. They are very easy to construct, turn human excrements safely and without special treatment into fertilizer and are hence theoretically a sustainable and environmentally friendly solution. But the link between smart and fancy ideas in the donors’ offices in Europe and sustainable solutions on the ground seem to be a hindrance that few want to deal with.

In default of pre-constructed toilet seats for this system in the respective country, the technical expert thought of a solution. Food bowls in two different sizes were acquired at cheap prices in the local market and assembled to a locally made split toilet. That sounds awfully convincing in a report, “using locally acquired material”, “supporting local merchants”, “easy to assemble”. The local program manager and a village engineer have already assembled the first sample. Sure, a smart idea from their friend the expert. They acknowledge his input and technical expertise, and are convinced that his intentions are the best. “But what will the people say when we propose to them to use food bowls to shit in?” They both laugh heartily. No, that won’t work, but they’ll do it anyway. Results need to be shown, reports are due and they are already behind schedule. It’s a comical situation, if it wouldn’t be frustrating to see so much effort, and money, brought to waste. A new book on similar encounters in Pakistan shows how this phenomenon may be an essential part of failures in international development initiatives.

Samia Waheed Altaf, former senior advisor of the Office of Health in the USAID Mission in Islamabad, has collected such comically frustrating episodes from her participation in the Social Action Plan (SAP) in the 90s in her So Much Aid, So Little Development – Stories from Pakistan (Wilson Woodrow Center Press, May 2011). The SAP was developed by the Pakistani Government and funded by the World Bank from 1993 to 2003 and targeted health supply services amongst others in Pakistan with a multi billion $ budget. It’s probably the most famous failure of aid and development in Pakistan. A number of papers have already been published on this issue, most notably from the CGDEV, which also Altaf refers to time and again. These papers are looking at why that could happen and how it could be avoided in future, providing mainly the dry figures of wasted inputs and unintended outcomes. They are essential reading to grasp how so much money could be invested in the country in recent decades with so little progress and conclude with definite policy recommendations. But they seldom go beyond the gross calculations of a development economist. Altaf portrays how these figures of failure are produced by the “human factor”.

“I speak the local languages and understand their cultures. […] I can speak the language of the international experts as well, so I form a bridge between these two groups.” Attached to the project as the local technical expert for the health and population sectors, standing in between, she is the perfect narrator for scenes that straddle between comedy and tragedy. Enter the foreign expert, who ‘didn’t even know where Pakistan was until she’d bought her tickets, […]. She had thought it was somewhere in India …”, who more than once finds that “[this] takes us nowhere.”, on which a government’s representative retorts: “Where would you like to go, madam?” Numerous accounts of meetings leave you laughing in disbelief, only to have your laugh choked by a story that portrays those suffering from a health system, which these projects fail to advance. By trying to find a basal flaw rather than a singular culprit, Altaf turns ridiculous meetings into stage play sketches and turns a dreadful issue in an enjoyable read, coming to a conclusion, which should receive attention and comprehension among the development community in Pakistan.

It’s the expert – local relationship that Altaf portrays as a main cause for failure. Western consultants proclaim in their office among themselves: “Honestly speaking, we do not know much about it. We are learning as we go along. And anyway we shall find out in a couple of years if we are right or wrong …” On the project they are understood to be the provider of solutions – for what other reason could they be paid such exorbitant salaries relative to their local counterparts and flown in to take all the most senior positions? “You give expert advice to national governments on a sensitive and crucial technical issue that has far reaching economic consequences. You know that your advice will be taken seriously, and you know very well that it is half-baked. You know you are “learning” as you go along. However the people in the country you are assisting do not know that you are only learning – at their expense – because you are sold as an expert.”
The tragic comedy is complete, when Lucymemsahib, a real figure posing as the proxy for the western expert in the book, exits the Pakistan stage after some weeks, now already being understood as an insider to this culture. With the newly acquired local dress and bangles, a dozen Urdu words she has mastered, she can now happily pass that ‘expertise’ on to her replacement in the post – ‘such a primitive place, I tell you’. Here, Altaf leaves little room for the illusion that the experts may acknowledge their problematic role themselves and hence bring a reasonable solution to the problem. If that is not happening – and from my own experience I see little progress in this regard – it may be up to local staff to shed some of the unquestioned belief in international expertise and press for accountability. It’s an unrewarding experience as Altaf shows – but if the failing international involvement in development in Pakistan has a potential for positive change, it is here where individuals can contribute to a change in mindset. This book is eye opening required reading for all who are about to join the development muddle in Pakistan, and an entertaining look at the scene for those who have already experienced it.

————-

Addendum:

There are other reviews out on the book.

In Dawn, by Sakuntala Narasimhan (you may go to the SouthAsianIdea to comment and discuss it with other critical minds) and in Regional Studies, Volume 45 by Claudia R. Williamson.

They are interesting to read together, since they are written from the two perspectives, the Western ‘Expert’ (in this case a researcher) and the Eastern Intellectual (in this case a journalist). Those two which Altaf manages to include in a single narrative. And they are more or less stuck in precast conceptions of the problem. Williamson wants to read more on where failure is to locate in the local institutions, Narasimhan criticises the Western Experts decadence and ignorance. They are both not wrong in their criticisms, their understanding of where failures may be located. But they are both looking for where they are convinced failure emanates from and seem not to be too receptive to an alternative explanation – a change in mindset and acknowledging responsibility. This is which I think both parties – the International (Western) Expert and the Local Expert – should take from the book. If everyone just understands it as a confirmation of ones own best intentions, brought to no avail because of the failure of the Other, we stay stuck in the dilemma. Question expertise – of others and your own – and be prepared to reassess opinions.

Manan Ahmed has been writing on the ‘Expert’ problem on a wider and more political/historical scale. I think his thesis in this aid example so well documented by Altaf is backed up on the local scale and just confirms how this is an issue that should be studied with more depth in future.

… reduced to an Army

What Pakistan is most often used for as a synonym in reporting and most importantely opinioning on the country is the Pakistan Army (often including the secret service ISI as well). Manan Ahmed, reviewing most recent books on Pakistan that have gathered wide attention, looked at this issue in a National article this August.

One cannot help but note that helicopters are of little use to a Pakistani civilian and not much help in what Riedel himself identifies as the three central problems facing Pakistan – rampant population growth, a diminishing water supply and a curtailed democracy. But they do solve a military problem – and the US-Pakistan relationship over the past 64 years is all about military solutions being offered as an answer to every problem. At least, that is the view from the mahogany conference tables in and around Washington.

Ahmed of course, has written a whole book going in the direction of this issue, and is a critical observer of the voices from within as well.

… reduced to a country without people

Myra MacDonald has recently penned very insightful observations of narratives on the country. She does so without playing the advocate for millions of inhabitants, which many commenters far away do, and is laudably wary of jumping to absolute statements but rather unravels these in the writing of others, while being well aware of local situations and their histories. One piece looked at how reporting on the country can be void of people.

Whether, and however much, we might disagree with them, we should however, know what they are. For me as a reader (and less as a journalist since there is always a value in telling a story from different perspectives and rarely room to fit them all into one piece), I personally am troubled most by one aspect of the New Yorker reconstruction. There appear to be no people in Pakistan.

Like Ahmed, she also critically reflects on the view from within, which can be very much from outside, within the same country – something foreign reporting of the country is still very far from grasping. It’s a critical reflection of how the educated urban upper class projects the voices of the people who are actually directly affected by the drone strikes in the border regions to Afghanistan. I would not call it the ‘Punjabi imagination’, but rather that of the urban class. There may be upper class citizens of Peshawar who write op eds about the WOT impact on Pakistan, very much unaware of what the rural Punjabi population really thinks, although it may be much more affected by price hikes and insufficent health and water supplies induced by the instability. Nevertheless, as MacDonald manages to point out, this is something the Pakistani opinionators and foreign correspondents who buy their comments as ‘local insight’ need to reflect critically on.

Now reread Hamid’s piece and consider the gap between the characters imagined in his short story, and a people with full citizenship rights and political representation. As Fazia S. Khan said, judge it as a work of fiction. But as a window into the Punjabi imagination, it may also have its uses as a political document.

… reduced to a religion

In a longer essay on Gender, Sexuality, and Islam under the Shadow of Empire, Saadia Toor, by elaborating the Saima Waheed case, portrays how the popular Western narrative of condensing of issues of freedom rights to religion in Muslim countries (in this case specifically women’s rights in Pakistan), is not only simplistic and flawed, but deliberately brushes aside other problematic issues (also caused by the colonial and neo-colonial involvement), which are really at the core of the issue here.

Ultimately, the Saima case was not simply about ‘secular liberals’ versus ‘religious conservatives,’ or even ‘fundamentalists.’ [...] Saima’s case was argued, and ultimately judged, not within the terms of existing Muslim family laws in the Pakistan Penal Code [...] but on the undesirability of filial disobedience [...]. [...] Daughters of the Ropri family were also not denied access to other accoutrements of wealth [...] associated with the Westernized upper classes. [...T]hey wore jeans and t-shirts at home and, even when outside, continued to wear them under the hijab. Thus the ‘fundamentalist’ (if there is such a monolithic figure) does not unequivocally despise the West or ‘modernity,’ understood as commodities—cultural and otherwise. But all these accoutrements were given to Saima to enhance her father’s social status [...].

These narratives become exercises like Chaudhry Rahmat Ali’s attempt to explain the acronym of Pakistan through it’s letters. It misses out on a lot deliberately suitable to the viewpoint of the writer and creates fiction for people who are not given a voice as Hamid did. To use Ahmed’s argument, ‘the country [is more than] all its military [religious/ethnic...] parts’. And it’s Now, not Never you should follow @salmaan_H, @myramacdonald and @sepoy to make sure you don’t miss out.

4. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Single Most Important Friend

Die USA brauchen neben ihrem schwächlichen Freund Afghanistan, den sie mal fördern und mal zusammenstauchen einen Partner für’s Grobe – ein lokaler ‘watch dog’ über die terroritischen Gefahren, die von verschiedenen Gruppen aus der Region ausgehen und verlässlicher Partner für die Versorgung des internationalen Eingreifens in Afghanistan. Sowohl Pakistan als auch Usbekistan vereinen Eigenschaften, die sie für diese Rolle qualifizieren. Beide Staaten haben Elemente, die es ihnen relativ leicht macht, auf Geheis in einer bestimmten Region durchzugreifen ohne der eigenen Bevölkerung Rechenschaft abliefern zu müssen (in Pakistan die Armee und der Geheimdienst, in Uzbekistan ein autokratisches Regime) – beide sind in diesem Punkt aber nicht über alle Zweifel von Seiten des Westens erhaben. Pakistan spielt ein doppeltes Spiel und hält sich alle Möglichkeiten offen indem es Kontakte zu verschiedenen Organisationen (u.a. den Taliban) aufrecht erhält, die Rolle der Menschanrechte ist in der Beziehung zu Uzbekistan immer ein Streitpunkt (spätestens seit den Vorfällen in Andijan). Sowohl Pakistan als auch Uzbekistan stellen neben arabischen Ländern einen bedeutenden Anteil an Kämpfern in den Reihen der Taliban und al-Qaeda nahen Organisationen, und sind selbst Heimat von indigenen islamistischen Organisationen. Beide Länder stellen einen direkten Transportweg zu Afghanistan dar – Pakistan vom Arabischen Meer über den Hafen von Karachi, den Khyber oder den Bolan Pass und Chaman, Uzbekistan von den zentralasiatischen Flughäfen über Termez als Teil des NDN (Northern Distribution Network). Pakistan hatte bis jetzt die wichtigere Rolle in diesem Kampf um Aufmerksamkeit, verliert diese aber zusehends. Als singuläres Beispiel für eine beliebte Narrative argumentiert Joshua Foust auf Registan für Uzbekistan und einer Lösung von Pakistan, mit dem simplen Argument, dass Uzbekistan zwar keine gute Lösung ist, aber immerhin besser als Pakistan (vor allem in diesem ersten Post dazu, aber auch hier und hier. Während er mit dem Argument, ‘auf Pakistan sei einfach kein Verlass’ sicher Recht hat, ist das Festhalten auf der Vorgabe, einen ‘single most important (strong) friend’ zu fördern und alle anderen Nachbarstaaten als ‘adversaries’ anzusehen oder einfach zu ignorieren sehr einfach gestrickt und nicht nachhaltig. Gleichwertige bilaterale Partnerschaften zu allen Nachbarstaaten zu suchen, gleichzeitig aber auch die Bedeutung von Pakistan herabzusetzen und die einseitige Unterstützung des Landes (insbesondere seiner Armee) zu beenden wäre ein sinnvollerer Schritt.

Baumwolltransport aus Pakistan nach Afghanistan am Khyber Pass kurz vor der Grenze [2007, Photo vom Autor

New Silk Road

Die ‘most fancy’ Strategie der USA zur Zukunft Afghanistan’s und seiner Nachbarstaaten hat einen Namen – ‘the New Silk Road’. Es beruht unter anderem auf den Argumenten S. Frederick Starr’s (PDF, Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance, January 2011, mehr Unterlagen zu seinen Überlegungen finden sich auf der Seite seiner Silk Road Studies):

The World Bank, in an important but neglected 2010 study, provides a concise and authoritative explanation: Afghanistan’s single greatest comparative advantage is its geostrategic location. [...] It was not always thus. Over two millennia Afghanistan was the place where trade routes to India, China, the Middle East and Europe all converged. This is why Marco Polo crossed the country en route to China, and why Arab travelers like Ibn Battuta crossed it on their way to India. Such trade along the misnamed “Silk Road” (in fact, every conceivable product was transported over it) produced immense wealth. Balkh, near Mazar-e-Sharif, was once among the largest and richest cities on earth. Medieval Arabs, who knew something about urban life, called it “the Mother of Cities.” Bagram, where the major U.S. base is situated, once maintained lucrative ties simultaneously with ancient Greece and India, enabling it to flourish in opulent splendor. All this occurred with nothing more than camels for transport. Imagine, then, what might be possible when camels are replaced by eighteen wheelers, railroads, modern pipelines, and hydroelectric lines? This prospect has already engaged the attention of every country along the continental routes that cross Afghanistan. With or without American support, they are all moving fast to claim the benefits which they consider their historical birthright.

Ein Fussballfeld in Langar (Teil unseres Fussballprojektes Canchas), dem letzten Ort im Tajikischen Wakhan - von hier aus geht es über den High Pamir nach China, einer der vielen Seidenstrassenarme. 'Langar' bedeutet 'Verpflegunsstation für Reisende' [2010, Photo vom Autor

The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium. [...] Because these processes are rooted in the self-interest of governments, business communities, and whole societies in each of the many countries involved, they will continue to unfold with or without the United States’ port or involvement. But because of the unique position of the U.S. vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and also the extent and depth of its relations with most of the other countries involved, decisions and actions in Washington will decisively influence the pace at which the process takes place, and also the character of the vast commercial network that is coming into being. For the time being, the U.S. possesses immense potential leverage over what is arguably the most transformative development taking place on the Eurasian land mass today.

Wie John Kucera meint, übertreibt Starr gerne und masslos. In vielen Punkten hat er aber sicher Recht. Ich glaube jedoch auch, dass das Konzept der ‘neuen Seidenstrasse’ sinnlos ist, allerdings aus ganz anderen Gründen wie Joshua Foust, der wieder einmal alles etwas einfach zeichnet.

Drei Gründe, warum die ‘neue Seidenstrasse’ ein Hirngespinnst ist:

Als die alte Seidenstrasse florierte, tat sie das ganz ohne zentralisierte Organisation. Es bestand Angebot und Nachfrage über unzählige Grenzen hinweg. Wenn heute Starr behauptet, lange Grenzkontrollen wären das grosse Hinderniss für zentralaiatischen Wirtschaftsaustausch hat er damit nur teilweise Recht. Sicher müssen Länder wie Uzbekistan und Tajikistan wie auch Kyrgyzstan, die sich auf wirtschaftlicher Ebene dauern bekriegen, zu definitiven Lösungen kommen. Korrupte Zollbeamte hat es aber an der Seidenstrasse sicher in gleichem Ausmass gegeben wie sie heute zu finden sind. Und jeder hat mehr oder wenioger gut daran verdient.

Die letzte Armee Baracke der Tajikischen Armee vor Afghanistan im High Pamir [2010, Photo vom Autor

Zuletzt betreibt China diese ‘neue Seidenstrassen-Politik’ schon lange, mehr oder weniger erfolgreich aber in erster Linie weitaus weniger ambitioniert, dafür um einiges effizienter.

Hasan H. Karrar beschreibt in seinem ‘The New Silk Road Diplomacy’ (2009, UBC Press) die Zentralasienpolitik Chinas seit dem kalten Krieg.

Zwar betrachtet Karrar das Handlen und Planen China’s in der Region nur anhand von Literatur und Medien (was es zu einer recht kurzen politikwissenschaftlichen Lektüre werden lässt), er bezieht sich aber sowohl auch westliche als auch chinesische Quellen und vermag die Intentionen und Strategien in einigen Aspekten sehr gut zu umreissen. In erster Linie geht es ihm um die Feststellung, dass China an bilateralen wie auch an multilateralen Netzwerken in der Region interessiert ist, diese aber nicht agressiv vorantreibt. Sein Buch ist auch eine schnelle Quelle für wirkliche Wirtschaftszahlen, und zeigt, dass der Handel in der Region, wenn auch zögerlich so doch kontinuierlich wächst.

Tomatenernte im Yanqi Becken, Xinjiang. [2010, Bild vom Autor

Schlussendlich hat Aaron L. Friedberg in seinem neuen ‘A Contest for Supremacy’ (September 2011, Norton) ohne Fokus auf Zentralasien aus Sichtweise eines US Political Advisors mit umfassender Einsicht in chinesische Quellen noch einen Blick auf den Wettbewerb zwischen den USA und China um Asien geworfen. Er kommt was Zentralasien betrifft auf ähnliche Schlüsse wie Karrar und elaboriert das Konzept der ‘propensity of things’ des französischen Philosophen Francois Jullien auf politikwissenschaftlicher Ebene.

Pakistan-China Beziehung nur Teil einer regionalen Entwicklung

Während Annäherung auf Seiten Pakistan’s und China’s oft als ein rein bilaterales Vorgehen reduziert wird, stimmt viel eher, dass beide Projekten vernetzt sind, die sie aneinander binden und in denen sich unterscheidliche Interessen überschneiden. Pakistan wollte wiederholt in die von China dominierte SCO (wie Indien wurde ihm nur Beobachterstatus zugestanden), China will Teil von ASEA sein, bekommt aber auch hier nur einen teilweisen Zugang. Im neuen Silk Road Program des Westens spielen beide Länder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle (obwohl das Gebiet des heutigen China einst einen Grossteil der Seidenstrasse ausmachte). Zardari versucht ein bisschen Geschichte umzudichten (das heutige Pakistan war nie wirklich Bestandteil der Seidenstrasse, wenn auch über den Karakorum, nach Kabul und Durch Balochistan Lahore immer schon ein Angelpunkt war), ist inerster Linie aber an wirtschaftlichen Austausch und Kooperation im Falle Xinjiang interessiert. Gleiche Kooperationen bestehen mit allen zentralasiatischen Ländern zu im Westen unbedeutenden Themen (Passübergänge im Hindukush, Stromnetz, Studentenaustausch, Handel vor allem im Baubereich …), die aber Teil von ‘Seidenstrassen’ sind, die nie aufgehört haben zu existieren und daher auch nicht neu aufgebaut werden müssen.