But I fail to see, why this conclusion allows us to immediately jump to the assumption, that US presence (and probably the whole NATO presence as well, since when the US would leave, countries like Germany and Britain will hardly be made to stay) should be stopped in the region. Is our only target to make sure we are not attacked from a make-shift camp by bearded men? Are we only worried about having blood in our own streets? What about the countries of the region? Afghanistan is economically and educationally speaking in a dire situation, major areas in Pakistan are not doing any better and countries like Turkmenistan and Kirgizstan are neither sporting promising records. While other nations like Japan and Norway have long understood, that making a difference in this region takes patience, time and skilled labour we are only discussing money, arms and our own casualties.

As Ahmed Rashid recently pointed out to one of the few Americans who were venturing Pakistan outside their Islamabad embassy recently “You want to win over the people? Show me one school the Americans have built. Show me a road, a hospital, a railway.” . Other European countries (with a few exceptions) have an equally poor record. Some NGOs pull in after major disasters but leave soon after. There is seldom a long term commitment. As Rashid has pointed out in his recent book , the opportunity for Nation Building may have already passed, and other writers have argued that the US should not linger around anymore with this argument, since its record was poor enough in this respect . But an effort to bring a lasting peace to the region and aim for an economic development including surrounding regions (Iran, Xinjiang, Balochistan, Ferghana) should be made and attempted now. This does at the moment still include army presence, the Afghan army and police are far away from managing the situation themselves and the Pakistanis can in this regard unfortunately still not be trusted (especially the ISI). But while dismembering al-Qaeda should still be a good reason to stay and even enlarge CIA presence , there are other issues apart from our homeland security, that should make us aware of our responsibilities abroad.

Further Reading

Who’s Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?; Washington Post, 16th of September 2009

Rashid, Ahmed; Descent into Chaos – The United States and the failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; Allan Lane 2009

http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2009/09/coalition_issue.php

http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2009-09/afghanistan-cia-ausbau

[originally posted on 20/09/2009 on here-ware]

Which way, Taliban?

[Article] Flipping the Taliban. Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, July/August 2009, Foreign Affairs Volume 88, Number 4.

“For many Taliban fighters, insurgency has nothing to do with Islamic zealotry; it is a way of life.”

[Article] Know Thine Enemy – Why the Taliban Cannot Be Flipped. Barbara Elias, November 2 2009, Foreign Affairs (online).

“And there is little reason not to expect flipped Taliban to flip back when it suits their purposes.”

[Video] Transition to What?. Talk at the Halifax Forum, November 21 2009.

“Stick with it brothers, and we’ll topple the government.”

[Blog] A Study of Martyrs. Blog Thread by Mari Saurgo on www.makingsenseofjihad.com

In January 2008, Al-Fajr Media Center, an al-Qaida affiliated media group, released an extensive issue in its series, “Biographies of the Martyrs in the Land of Khorasan.”

*[Book] My Life with the Taliban. Abdul Salam Zaeef/Alex Strick van Linschoten/Felix Kuehn, to be published on January 31 2010.

“…presents a unique insight into the worldview of the Taliban.”

Michael Semple (is he really wearing Peshawari chappels there?) and Najam Sethi (one of European media’s darlings-trias when it comes to local commenters – Ahmed Rashid, Tariq Ali, Najam Sethi) are bringing in great points on rather (or firstof) increasing confidence than troop-numbers and to keep the Pakistani army in the loop.

John McCain is stable, getting older by the day (don’t watch the video with headphones, he touches his mic all the time, it hurts), but doing good in his arguments. I wish Obama had some of his traits and insights.

Rick Hillier – pale, poor insight.

The first chapter is the typical “Embedded Journalism/Our Boyz in the Danger Zone” stuff, where you wonder sometimes what a respected Village Elder feels when a Texas snotnose is gesticulating at him, blurping something of “missing cooperation” and shouting “take that, motherfucker” when firing a gun (”So that’s their Allah-uh-Akbar perhaps?”).

Further along Martin Smith does not reveal new insights but he, as Walt puts it, “easily [manages to] slant the story by omitting any footage that doesn’t fit the impression [he is] trying to leave and by shaping the story in ways that reinforce a particular conclusion”. I was always a supporter of a continued presence of American and ISAF forces on Afghan soil (although I still haven’t provided my “In or Out” proposal in written form), but while watching I was continuously feeling “Ok, Ok, leave it and go. It’s no use.”

Backing what Florian has earlier brought up on Stanley McChrystal (”we should have better not gone there [Helmand] at all”(!)), he and his advisers do give extended comments and are criticized likewise by the minimalists although those are underrepresented (Andrew Bacevich).

On the other side the Holbrooke team has their say (himself, Vali Nasr). He really comes through as the dandyish (his sunglasses?), self-confident character George Packer has described him as.

Steve Coll gives probably the fairest assessment (”In the end the Taliban will be defeated strategically when the government of Pakistan makes a strategic decision that its future does not lie in partnership with Islamic extremists”), especially of the guys who completely suck in their interviews (Rehman Malik, Athar Abbas). Unfortunately Pakistan does not seem to have its best guys in the spots that are most likely to be questioned by Western Journalists.

On the other side, Amrullah Seh, head of Afghani intelligence sports a great appearance although he doesn’t even really open his mouth.

As always its well made by PBS although the content is nothing new. Some images although do tell stories that are only poorly portrayed in textual accounts and the back up material PBS provides is extensive.

For more recent stats see especially the status report 2009.

• These three articles in the Economist ask whether to “surge” or to go “surgical”, thereby presenting the two opposing parties when it comes to the future strategy in Afghanistan. While the one side, represented by Vice President Joe Biden, Obama’s security adviser James Jones and a growing number of Democrats, the US should get out of Afghanistan and leave the Taliban the field while concentrating on terrorist hunting by unmanned drones.The other side, represented in the first place by secretary of defence Gates, the higest ranking military leadership and the Republicans are arguing for more troops, following McChrystal’s plan of regaining the initiative and destroying both, the Taliban and Al Qaida.

Article 1, Article 2, Article 3

• This Economist article examines the practical situation to McChrystal’s central appeal: A dramatic change in strategy by concentrating on the population, providing protection and efficient help, while making sure the government gains credibility.

• Michael Scheuer (Foreign Policy) arguing for an increase of troops, thereby arguing that although Al Qaida and the Taliban are two different entities, they share a common goal and are currently working together to achieve it: “to drive out the United States and NATO, destroy Karzai’s corrupt and incompetent regime, and re-establish their Islamist emirate”. If the ISAF leaves Afghanistan, it is just a matter of time until the Taliban regain power and will once again provide a “save haven” for Al Qaida and others.

• an article (Washington Post) on how McChrystal’s strategy of providing security to the population is already implemented: “As a Marine patrol walked through the bazaar on a recent morning, its presence prompted a group of men sipping tea in front of a motorcycle repair shop to voice concern — not that the Americans had arrived but that they might depart before the Taliban had been vanquished. ‘If you leave, everything will be the same,’ a middle-aged man who called himself Sayed Gul told McCollough. ‘If you guys stay for a long time, everything will be fine.”

• This Washington Post article describes a Marines Captain’s daily efforts to stay away being seen as an occupator.

Short summary

McChrystal stresses a fundental new approach to strategy in Afghanistan, as he identifies two main threats: the insurgency and the crisis of popular confidence. Therefore the main aim is to improve effectiveness, gain a wider understanding of the needs and choice of the Afghan people and effectively protect them. McChrystal is calling for a “properly resourced” mission to regain the momentum and to achieve a stage of consolidated stability from where Afghan government institutions slowly take over sole responsibility. The main task is to prevent the Taliban to return to Afghanistan and providing a safe haven forterrorism.

The Report – Extended summary

Written on behalf of Central Command and the NATO General Secretary McChrystal sets out to answer three initial questions:

1. Can ISAF achieve the mission?

2. If so, how should ISAF go about achieving the mission?

3. What is required to achieve the mission?

The situation

The situation in Afghanistan is critical, in McChrystal’s words “deteriorating” and a crisis of confidence among the Afghans imminent. The Taliban have the advantage and the momentum of their campaign leaves the US led coalition troops on the fallback. But (!), McChrystal says, there should be no doubt that this war can be won, the Taliban will be erradicated from the face of the Earth and with them Al Qaida. This, according to the general, is the main task: to prevent Afghanistan becoming a base for international terrorism ever again, and therefor the Taliban must be destroyed.

So how does McChrystal wants to win the war? More troops? Yes, but (!) this is not the crux. More troops will not make any difference if a troop surge is not coming with a fundamental change in strategy. The US have to leave there well protected bases, from where they set out to hunt Al Qaida terrorists and start to protect the population. More than that, the war can only be won if the coalition is able to win the hearts of the Afghan people.

All of this can be read on the very first page of the report, and this seems to be the content media around the world founds “headline-worthy”. Reading further really makes sense, because McChrystal’s report shows the fundamental way the US are likely to view the war in Afghanistan over the next 3 years and for the first time in 8 years there really seems to be a revolutionary spirit in the air of Army headquarters.

New strategy

The main target of the US campaign is not fighting terrorism any longer, from now on the new task is winning over the population, which “represents a powerful actor that can and must be leveraged in this complex system.” And further, “gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs.” Progress to achieve this goal is hindered on two froniers: First a resilient insurgency which treatens the people with violence and intimidation. Second a crisis in confidency in both the Afghan government and the coalition force.

McChrystal admits. “ISAF is a conventional force [...], inexperienced in local languages and culture, [...] and preoccupied with protection of its own forces. We have operated in a manner that distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect.” The coalition needs to improve effectiveness through greater partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which means that more Afghan troops should be incorporated into ISAF troop units. Responsive and accountable governance is to be prioritized by improving formal and traditional mechanisms. According to McChrystal, the way the coalition operates must be dramatically different, even “uncomfortably” different. GIs will move into the villages and maintain a presence that keeps the Taliban away. ISAF troops so gain an understand of the Afghan people and their needs and can be of assistence in delivering basic services and the provision of justice. The ISAF personnel, McChrystal writes, “must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not as an occupying army.”

The main advantage McChrystal identifies on the side of ISAF troops, is the possibility to aid local economy by creating economic opportunity and jobs for the population. Along comes a program that offers “eligible unsurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection.” Also local commanders need more flexibility to allocate resources where they are needed, which should lay the groundwork for a later government run maintenance.

Military campaign and exit strategy

The military campaign accompanying is focused on gaining the initiative and concentrating resources where they are needed the most. In an initial stage the ISAF will take a new approach and integrate fully with the ANSF through extensive partnering. Over the next 12-24 months the insurgency diminishes in critical areas, while at the same time a second stages, strategic consolidation, becomes the main focus. With more civilian and military capacitiy available, security operations will expand to a wider area and increase the space in which the population feels protected and served by their government. When finally the insurgent groups no longer pose a vital threat to Afghanistan, a third stage of sustained security will ensure durable success. While ISAF troops begin to draw down and transition to train, advise and assist, the ANSF will eventually become solely responsible.

Resources

The term “properly resourced” ,McChrystal uses, remains the big questionmark. In the meanwhile he has publicly said that 40.ooo more troops is a required minimum, but policy makers already feel the dilema between enough troops to get the job done and an army overstretched in times of financial crisis when it takes 250.000 US-Dollar to keep a soldier in Afghanistan for one year. The generals new strategy requires not only more troops to show presence but also comes with much higher risk. On few occasions  in the report McChrystal points out, that the US public will be confrontated with more images and reports of dead US soldiers.

But this is not everyting Afghanistan’s commander wants. The ANA, the Afghan army, is to be stocked up significantly toward a new target ceiling of 240.000, almost double as much as the current strength of 137.000 troops. While the strength of the ANP, the Afghan National Police must be raised to 160.000.

Still, the main effort, McChrystal formulates, has to be made on a governance base, with a built-up of fundamental services such as electricity, water supply, infrastructure, education and the creation of jobs, while at the same time fighting corruption, providing fair jurisdiction and integrating traditional government structures.

Else:

There are a few very interesting parts in McChrystal’s report which have been widely neglegted by the media. For example, McChrystal identifies three main networks of Taliban insurgency: the Quetta Shura, mainly working in Kandahar province, the Haqqani Network in Kwost, Paktia and Paktika neighbouring the Tribal Areas in Pakistan, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin. All of these networks maintain operational bases in Pakistan, allthough McChrystal admits that the insurgency is “clearly supported from Pakistan, its senior leaders are based there and are linked with both, Al Qaida and elements of the ISI”, McChrystal insists that most fighters are Afghans.

Another interesting point is McChrystal’s suggestion to hand over responsibility for prisoners of war to the Afghan government to “evolve to a more holistic model centered on an Afghan-run system.” Allthough McChrystal insists that information obtained from prisoners are critical to effective protection, he admits that it is important to create a legal framework and support the rule of law.

Overall McChrystal displays a greater understanding of the complex relations between the different players in Afghanistan and acknowledges the diverging interests of the surrounding areas. While Iran, Russia and India are all of some importance China’s possible interests and its role in the conflict is entirly left out. McChrystal’s imperative is to learn to understand the “bigger picture” and that ISAF becomes a player itself rathern than trying enforce a new order.

The presentation of the report was recorded on video and included a discussion by Rubin, Paddy Ashdown, Francesc Vendrell and Steve Coll.

(a) have a profound insight and
(b) are publishing on a platform that is accessible via the net or newspapers/magazines.

Germany has some ranging from a good insight and knowledge of the region and its past (Scholl-Latour; a great thinker who traveled the area as well and still provides valuable ideas, but his times as a journalist in the area are over) to a good insight and knowledge with frequent visits to the area (Ladurner; I just don’t agree with most of what he says) to people with insight producing a lot of crap.

Austria has Gudrun Harrer. Her output is limited to the newspaper DerStandard.
Switzerland has none that I would be aware of.

France definitely has some but I didn’t have the time to go through their papers and interviews – apart from that my french is unfortunately quite poor.

UPDATE:

A response to Michael Flynn’s “Making Intelligence relevant in Afghanistan” by Michel Masson.

Christophe Jaffrelot’s profile.

Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Scandinavian countries and the Benelux are for that matter countries I don’t know. Input appreciated. Same applies to Eastern European Countries. I don’ speak or read Russian, so unfortunately I can’t access their insights which are for sure vast, considering their long engagement in the region that lasts until now.

The first convincing contribution I have stumbled across now is from England.

Rory Stewart, a professor at Harvard who is also actively engaging in an interesting project in the old city of Kabul (Turquoise Mountain) has written relatively few comments on AfPak so far, but those struck me as very to the point. Check “The Irresistible Solution” on the London Review of Books which has been published in a short form in the Daily Telegraph. I would like you to note the titles – the media expects titles about “winning” or “loosing”, whereas Stewart prefers to elaborate on more detailed thoughts and the “irresistible illusion” created by exactly that catchy media jargon (“It conjures nightmares of “failed states” and “global extremism”, offers the remedies of “state-building” and “counter-insurgency”, and promises a final dream of “legitimate, accountable governance”. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy.”). That is taken to a further level in an even shorter piece for Time which is not satisfied with an evaluation but wants outright solutions, and not just humble ones – “How to save Afghanistan”. It’s written in easier language with explanations were I had to laugh (”…opium (used to make heroin)” and “… the majority are educated only one grade level above their students (if they are teaching second grade, they have a third-grade education)“).

Apart from his first argument (papering over weaknesses with fancy words, something apparent with many experts who do not travel the region but are content with their observations from afar) I also can identify with many points he makes on the way ahead. Although a pacifist by legal terms (I voted not to join the army and agreed to not carry a gun for 15 years and stated that I have a pacifist world view) and to some extent by heart, I was in favor of the increased troop deployment to Afghanistan in recent months and am not sure whether I agree with Stewart’s call for a decrease to 20 000 troops max. I do definitely oppose the “All out” ambitions of some American and many Europeans politicians. His arguments are simple and point again and again at local development and capacity building – something he himself does have experience at. Letting a hypothetical British policy maker speak in the ideas of Sir John Lawrence (19th century British viceroy in India) he states: “The presence of Nato special forces, the challenging logistical and political conditions in Afghanistan and lack of technological capacity, are likely to impede al-Qaeda from posing a significant threat to UK or US national security. Instead development in South Asia should remain the key strategic priority for the UK government.” Something I feel is desperately needed at the moment, not only from Britain but other countries who wish to meddle in this area as well. A commitment to non-military-infrastructure development, seen as a strategic initiative.

Pointing at other pundits who churn out opinions, suggestions and solutions day by day he states, “To suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.”

The fact that there are so many pundits around who merely produce new solutions nobody will or can implement without the necessary insight coming from patience, should be the guideline for “The Other View” – we want to collect valuable views to shed light on a possible way ahead, not create just another dead-end of “irresistible solutions”.