It’s the expert – local relationship that Altaf portrays as a main cause for failure. Western consultants proclaim in their office among themselves: “Honestly speaking, we do not know much about it. We are learning as we go along. And anyway we shall find out in a couple of years if we are right or wrong …”
Especially the rural poor will often not give a damn what happens outside their brick kiln geo-politically and confronting them with opinions on radical islamist outlets may be of little benefit for assessing general support of these groups. On top of that, if they have an opinion, they may have a totally different conception of these groups’ connections (the authors offer four choices: Kashmiri tanzeem, al-Qa’ida, TTP, sectarian outfits). The understanding of Pakistani militant groups is very poorly developed in Political Science courses in the West and even less understood is how the am log perceives them (before they are even asked to judge them as good or bad).
The US – Pakistan relationship dubbed as a double game – little understanding is there for the fact that the flaws of this bond should be looked for on both sides and how they deal with each other.
Endorsement is fine, projects need such support. But it would help the aid discussion, if some projects would be less viewed through the glasses of aid-from-outside-with-a-backlash-intention but with Ali’s warning in mind (do question moral certainty and superiority!) and from a local standpoint.
For me this is most aptly portrayed by the extensive use of remote in the context of referring to anything virtually in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is just outside Kabul or Islamabad.
The United States needs to radically change the way it distributes aid to change nondemocracies’ calculations. In Pakistan, for example, the United States should stop providing ongoing aid, much of which is subsequently stolen. Instead, it could set up an international escrow account that would be accessible to Pakistan’s government only if problems remain fixed.
Ich stelle mir also die Frage, ob der “individual impact” oder der “global impact” meiner Spende wichtiger für mich (und mein zu beruhigendes Gewissen?) ist und wie wir unser Spendenverhalten überdenken könnten.
With the reconstruction in Kashmir having widely come to a halt (although far from complete in many areas) and the next reconstruction phase in the flood affected areas looming ahead, I want to direct attention to two very good studies that deal with the experiences in Kashmir – and are extremely valuable for the work coming up ahead in other parts of the country.
The presentation held in Vienna as a Talaash discussion round can be downloaded as a Powerpoint here (.ppt, 9.5 MB) in short form, or as JPG slides for the original slides (.jpeg, 2.4 MB) (I wasn’t able to downsize the original presentation to a convenient size).
Financial support to Pakistan by the US is extensive, discussions about the security of the state’s personel there ongoing (here and here) but all the foreigners I see on the ground are non-US citizens. In 4 years in Lahore, Kashmir, the Northern Areas, the Tribal Areas and Peshawar I have met 4 American Nationals. I do not count my visits to horrible expat paries in Isloo with tipsy girls and tough guys or my encounter with well-built guys on the airport, who had a special escort past the queue and were obviously not here to taste Daal or learn a foreign language but to look grim and foster a clicheed, conspirational Xe-image, US citizens based in Pakistan nowadays have.
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