One does not need to read Ahmed Rashids recent book , to understand that the involvement of the US and the NATO in Afghanistan may be necessary but the way it is currently undertaken is flawed and may at worst have an even worsening effect to the whole situation. To get a grasp of what the ideal solution would be we need to stand back and listen to people who know the complexities of the area – at best experts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian states, China and the US each and others who are able to link this knowledge together to a coherent picture.

Why Europe needs to contribute more

Focusing on the geographical core of the problem, the Afghanistan- Pakistan region itself, unfortunately most of the material available comes from American sources – which is problematic in two aspects. Firstly, most of the US writers on AfPak focus foremost on the impact of the conflict on their homecountry, judging from Washington, often calling themselves „National Security Experts“ and often missing the gerater picture when imminent threats to the US are not given. Secondly when staying in the area itself the foreigners one meets in public space are non-American. Americans are mostly barred from moving around freely or don’t even come in the first place. Nationalities who are present in larger numbers (outside their respective embassies, travelling, researching or working in normal jobs and thus arguably being able to get the picture) are French, Chinese and Japanese, the latter’s views (via blogs or research papers) hardly accesible to Europeans and Americans who are not familiar with their language.

The material, based on which we and the governments in Europe and America (which are the two continents currently contributing to the US led actions in the area) form our opinion can thus hardly be called reliable. Americans who have insight in the area and travel the countries frequently like Barnett Rubin or Steve Coll are rare and not listened to enough, European viewpoints are rarely available at all and if, often not in English translation. Local contributors to the discussion (foremost the Pakistani intellectual and blogging scene) are available but to a big extent still not free of a continuous anti-India complex which is detrimental to unbiased work. Papers by Afghanis from inside the country are only slowly becoming more accesible.

Preferring the hedgehog approach

A recently published book review by Philip Tetlock addresses the different tactics in political forecasting and his terms may be just applied to the available forecasts on the AfPak situation – there are too many hedgehogs around and too few foxes. Tetlock calls experts, „who know one big thing from which likely future trends can be deduced“ hedgehogs, whereas experts, „who know many things and are not finicky about where they get good ideas“ are the foxes. Many writers try to make out the ultimate failure of US involvement less by arguing with different scenarios and arguments why this will be so (which would give good hints where to start to improve the approach), but rather – and that is the cheapest but most often applied argument – because they see Vietnam and the famous destruction of the Britsh Army under William Elphinstone by Akbar Khan in 1842 on the dooming horizon when new casualties of soldiers of their respective country are reported. What we and the governments, if they are willing to listen to people who have a clue, need are analysis that dissect the problem and give possible starting points to improve. Even if they are „audacious, naive, or impossible“ – but as Barnett Rubin and Rashid Ahmed rightly point out, „without such audacity, there is little hope“ . And thats what we hang on to in the end.

Where asking the wrong questions matters

In a recent edition of the Economist (16th of July 2009), one article was dedicated to a survey carried out in the US evaluating the views of the American people on the war in Afghanistan. The major question was whether „the US is winning the war in Afghanistan“. People are quick to answer this question – many have a firm opinion on it. But if you would keep asking and let each person define his idea of victory, most wouldn’t have a clue what to answer. Again borrowing from Rubin and Rashid, we need to let go of „“victory“ as the solution to all problems“ and first be clear about the objectives of the intervention and who exactly the enemy is . People in Europe (and I believe similarly in the US) are not aware of who Taliban and al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan and Pakistan really are and that people who are strongly opposing Karzai/Zardari and Americans may at the same time be strong opponents of the Taliban (even the major part of the population in both countries belongs to this group).

As long as the media and writers on this area are not able to give as the whol,e true picture, and decision makers are not prepared to draw knowledge from people who are based in the area and know ist people (to send just Richard Holebrooke there as an envoy on and off and excpect that one thinker and dealer will do is crazy) we will keep making wrong decisions and the ultimate chaos Rashid is picturing in his book will hardly be inevitable.

Further Reading:

Rashid, Ahmed; Descent into Chaos – The United States and the failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; Allan Lane 2009

Tetlock, Philip; Reading Tarot on K Street; The National Interest, September/October 2009 ( accessed 19th September 2009)

Rubin, Barnett R.; Rashid, Ahmed; From Great Game to Grand Bargain; Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Rubin, Barnett R.; Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments, The American Interest, May-June 2008 (accessed 19th September 2009)

While discussions over what European soldiers should be allowed to shoot at and what not are raging, another one that is linked to the attached petrol trucks is seldom present. The trucks originally came from Tajikistan. Especially since the term AfPak came up, Afghanistan is less and less seen linked to it’s northern neighbors. What are the threats coming from that side, what are the opportunities?

[Article] Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, World Policy Journal, Spring 2003

“Regional cooperation is likely only when states value the opportunities that openness can create more than the need for control.”

[Article] A Partnership for Central Asia, S. Frederick Starr, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

The article is based on situations that has since then changed considerably and have made his conclusions in some cases void.

[Article] The Afghanization of Central Asia, Examining the Implications of a Central Asian Supply Line for Afghanistan, Northern Distribution Network Grappels with Security Threat, EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight, different dates

Brief insights in how Afghanistan and the Central Asians states are linked and what that implies for future actions in Afghanistan.

[Article] The SCO: A regional organisation in the making, Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008

Matveeva and Gisutozzi give a brief insight in the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), on which issues it plans to focus and where it may be able and efficient to do so in future. They also put the Organisation’s dealings in perspective to Afghanistan which is neither a memeber nor an observer (like Pakistan, Iran and India).

Stabilisation of Afghanistan may be an issue in which all SCO member states could be interested, but where Russia could have an upper hand, while China could contribute economically, militarily (more in theory than in reality so far) and diplomatically through its close relationship with Pakistan. If neither country has been very active in Afghanistan after 2001 so far, it is probably because they are waiting for Washington’s position to weaken to the point where their diplomatic intervention would have a serious chance of success. Pakistan’s own ambiguous position also contributes to caution, especially for the Chinese.

They manage to highlight the major issue which drives my interest in Central Asia – the neighbor’s interest in the AfPak conflict and their contribution (to the conflict or its solution). Currently the West seems reluctant to involve other stakeholders into its meddling in Afghanistan. It’s the US and European countries involved in ISAF. Russia and China, the last bordering to Afghanistan are seemingly not involved in any decision making or contributions to COIN or diplomacy, although especially China is heavily involved in the private sector in Afghanistan and a patron with major influence on Pakistan.

The authors bring up the possible discrepancies in communication.

The Chinese foreign policy establishment is very cautious and risk-averse, and has difficulty handling unforeseen events and unconventional challenges. It feels more comfortable with everything planned and agreed in advance. This is almost diametrically opposed to the Russian foreign policy culture, which thrives on crisis, feels comfortable with assertive or controversial positions, and has a capacity and inclination to react quickly to unprecedented developments.
[...]
Moreover, the Russian establishment feels that culturally and socially it has more in common with the Americans than with the Chinese.
This perspective is shared by Central Asians. Proficiency in the Russian language and the legacy of Russian education and culture, upon which the Central Asian military and political establishment has been brought up, mean that when it comes to collective action in security sphere, Russian is a lingua franca for the rank-and-file cadre of five of the Shanghai Six. The language and cultural barrier is very real, and is an obstacle for interaction between the Chinese military and the rest.

They also emphasize that in terms of military involvement other organisations could play a more important role.

In the case of a large-scale security threat within Central Asia that requires a military response, the CSTO is most likely to be the one to respond, not least because it has Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. If instability in Afghanistan spins out of control and affects Central Asia, it is more likely that CSTO than SCO troops would be used to hold the border, with the Russian military leading the effort and contributing most troops.

[...]

The record of security engagement of all these [CSTO, CIS, NATO, ISAF] actors is far more prominent than that of the SCO.

Still, an inclusion of other stakeholders with a lot more imminent interest in the AfPak region, stakeholders who can feel the successes and failures in Afghanistan right away on their borders should be a seen as integral part of future decisions made in Afghanistan and also to some respect Pakistan.

[Blog] Registan, … is of course always a good source for discussions on these issues.

The presentation of the report was recorded on video and included a discussion by Rubin, Paddy Ashdown, Francesc Vendrell and Steve Coll.

A document he refers to extensively is the Afghanistan National Development Strategy by the Afghan government, a document I haven’t read yet (it includes 234 pages) but which has been acclaimed by international experts as outstanding for the standards of developing countries.

The outcome from the conference, including all projected targets is also available at CFR.

Also PBS covered the Bonn conference, albeit without video material as far as I could grasp.

Richard Holbrooke

In a recent New Yorker issue, George Packer published an insightful article (to date only available with subscription). It deals briefly with Holbrooke’s earlier assignments (Vietnam, Serbia/Bosnia), his character and how that enables him or hinders him to accomplish his present task.

According to this article, Holbrooke visits the area once a month.

George Packer on Richard Holbrooke, New Yorker Sept. 2009

To get a second view you may read the equally long article from the NYMag written by Meryl Gordon. It’s from the last year of the Clinton era when Holbrooke was US ambassador to the UN and focuses more on his private life, his Jewish ancestors from Germany, and his then recent activity in Bosnia. It is perhaps less enjoyable to read but does leave away the (superfluous) nostalgia of being in an exciting place where danger looms ’round the corner – something that comes through in Packer’s piece.

>> I am drifting off here to the point where brackets close again … When he describes driving through Islamabad in Holbrooke’s convoy, all streets cleared for them, “Islamabad felt like a capital under siege. We were driven at night from the airport to a barricaded hotel in a convoy of SUV that wove in and out of single file in evasive maneuvers … blablabla”. Yes Mr. Packer, your friends will be impressed by these stories and happy that you arrived home safely. But first you could have taken a taxi and it would all have been less siege-like – thus you (or “the Americans”) are creating that feeling of being in a dangerous place yourself. Secondly those maneuvers are just because of those god-damn check posts placed everywhere. Add that and it all sounds less adventure-like. That you are riding around in SUVs is equally unnecessary, you could as well take normal (if you feel you really need it, fully armored) cars. I don’t want to ride too much criticism against George Packer here, since I understand that he traveled as Holbrooke’s company and thus extra security is advisable. But since other Americans who recently travelled the country (see e.g.William Harvey’s blog) who came with aims like to “foster cross-cultural dialogue that improves relations between the U.S. and the rest of the world” have equally seen the country mainly from behind bullet proof glass and are then the ones who bring that feeling of danger back to the US, I believe that to visit the country in this way, and then present it to a wider public distorts our perception of the area and the wider problems we are dealing with. And based on this distorted perspectives, our public opinion (in democratic countries) decides on how to proceed in AfPak.

But Holbrooke himself brings it to the point, writing on Vietnam: “The terrible truth that people don’t like to admit was that the war was fun for young men, at least it was fun if they were civilians or journalists.” <<

Barnett Rubin

His recent articles definitely give important insights into the current problems.

According to Packer, Rubin acts as an independent contributor to Holbrookes team. He also has his own blog.

Rubin, Barnett R.; Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments, The American Interest, May-June 2008 (accessed 19th September 2009)

Rubin, Barnett R.; Rashid, Ahmed; From Great Game to Grand Bargain; Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008

Rubin, Barnett R.; A Tribe apart; Boston Review

Vali Nasr

Nasr recently appeared on the Daily Show, unfortunately the interviews on the Show are seldom worth watching. Apart from that, the stuff he said wasn’t very convincing. He is equally bad, or probably even worse, at Colbert in April 2007, who is at least better in interviewing than Stewart.

A better insight is provided in an Interview from October 2002 at UCal. Forward to 28:00 for his insights on Pakistan, of which Nasr is considered to be an expert (oddly enough he is Iranian).

He was interviewed as an expert for a Frontline documentary on Iran (October 2007). As always a worthwhile watching PBS work. He gave an interview to them about Saudi influence on AfPakand one on the Shias and Karbala, both of which I haven’t read yet.

So far I haven’t read anything from him, so I am not entitled to voice further criticism. He is author of numerous books (Pakistan, Shiism)

Steve Berk

He is an agriculture expert from Florida with experience in Afghanistan. These guys have a nice website including a movie I wasn’t yet able to open.

Rina Amiri

Afghani by birth, she seems to be focusing on women’s issues. A statement in front of the the House Comittee on Foreign Affairs is available here.

Vikram Singh

He gives some opinion on WorldFocus, rather shallow common talk if you are already familiar with issue. He is one of many scholars with insight who misses the chance to give a good explanation on the Kashmir issue, many pundits seem reluctant to even try to give an explanation on that while leaning out the window in other issues that are equally tricky. Of course standing in Kashmir at the moment promises a lot less exciting stories with gun fire and crying children than the AfPak border. It would be of great help though if some pundits would try to get on with that issue. Political pressure should especially be put on the Pakistani government in that respect to get their involvement in the Mumbai attacks resolved and unravel the links between LeT, JuD and continuous border crossings of Pakistani fighters in Poonch/Southern Kashmir. Steve Coll has given some great insight on the Back Channel talks. Sorry for getting carried away.

Burton M. Field

An Air Force General who, I assume, writes little. Find his bio here.

Jared Cohen

Him, I would just throw in a bucket with Nicholas Schmidle, for whom I have little respect as a journalist or pundit. But that’s probably unjust, so I will need to read his book first.