Caroline Brothers has an article in the Guardian on Afghan boys who ended up in Paris after an Odysee over land. It’s not a story that is limited to Afghanistan, stranded in my hometown they hail just as likely from Pakistan, and of course African countries. And those stories are old – it is just that they have been ignored largely and are continued to be treated with far to little sincerity by European governments. Let me recount such a story, that takes Brothers’ line further – where such an Odysee can end, and after Paris and Calais London is often not where it ends up.

When I worked for an international humanitarian organisation in Pakistan, I was issued the responsibility of a young Afghan man (I’ll call him Farhad) who had suddenly emerged in Peshawar. He had been deported from Germany many days earlier, where he had earned his education at the same organisation where I was employed now. A decade earlier, in the early 90s, his uncle advised him to take the 5000$ trip in a truck’s container to Europe, where he ended up having scarse contact to other family members who were already in Germany, but largely made his own way. He was repeatedly granted the right to stay but never with a full permit. When the German province he lived in passed a stricter law on asylum seekers, prompting all above 18 who had no close family members in the country to be deported at earliest – his parents had been killed in conflict back home – he was put on a plane to Kabul with two police accompanying him – the salary for these he had to come up for himself at a later stage. In Kabul he was released on the tarmac with a fat ‘Deported’ stamped into his Afghan passport. Ground staff in Kabul devalidated his passport and he was a persona non grata – no family and being a returnee from Europe made him suspicious and an easy target to be exploited. Together with a boy with a similar fate he met in Kabul – he had just been deported from England where his family did live, on charges of marihuana posession – they made their way to Peshawar. Here the guy from England assured, the chances to find someone to get them immediately back to Europe would be bigger.

On Kabul River

At this point, the organisation in Germany, who was in constant contact with Farhad, contacted their branch in Pakistan to take care of him. They refused. They had a point, where would they get to if they had to take care of all Afghan men coming illegaly to Pakistan, wishing to go to Europe. The international head office warned us to take the matter up as well, an issue too politically sensitive with little chance to cut a tear wrenching story out of it. He was to be forgotten, were it not for his care takers in Germany who felt it their responsibility to get him back to Germany. I ended up shuttling between Peshawar, Islamabad and Lahore trying to get to a solution, at constant threat of being seized with an illegal Afghan. His care takers were portraying Pakistan as a dangerous place in hell back home from which Farhad needed to be saved, while he was living in a mosque in Peshawar begging in the street to be granted a place to sleep, being constantly harrased by Pakistanis for being an unwelcome foreigner. The antipathy was large from Pashtuns like him in Peshawar to Punjabi clerks in Islamabad to International Staff at the Embassy and the UNHCR. But the naivity concerning the situation in Afghanistan or Pakistan itself of the international donors who only want the best (which is what?) back home in Germany (is it his home?) was the most troubling aspect for me. In their eyes, Afghanistan and Pakistan are exciting, oriental, dangerous, dirty and unwelcoming places from where you can only flee or go to if you want to help people or dip you finger into a spice bowl in a bazaar.

Not enough such stories as by Brothers’ are written to bring this topic, which has been growing bigger and bigger in recent years, to the attention of the public. But these are not incredible stories one should be marveling with sorrow about, only to rush to the next book shop and buy Khaled Hosseini. Our responsibility is to make sure that our governments deal with the issue sensibly.

I figured it was not for me to judge whether he should be helped to get back to Germany, or try to figure out a future in Afghanistan. That was for him to do, I would help him to get to where he thought going fit his realistic dreams.

The Tractors

Conrad Schetter from the German Crossroads Asia Project, has an excellent short write up on patterns of migration in Afghnaistan out.

Waves of refugees and labour migrants determine the social reality of life in Afghanistan ‐ perhaps more so than anywhere else. The intervention which has been on‐going since 2001 has barely considered this high spatial mobility in its conceptual planning. Where it has been noted, it tends to be perceived as disruptive. This article intends to demonstrate the extent to which forms of migration affect the lives of Afghans and should be taken account of in plans for the future of the country that go beyond the dominant state‐building model.

He shows how spatial mobility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a common nearly unrestricted fact and a central tenet of many families. His story of a family from Lower Dir is especially interesting, as it could have been told by Babur (Zahir ud din Muhammad, 1483 – 1530), who like his forefathers and other realtives, when danger loomed, always shifted the women from his family to the safe havens of Badakhshan.

Another example, that of a family from Lower Dir in north Pakistan, shows the migration strategy of a family that can be reckoned to the educated middle classes. Part of the family moved from Lower Dir to the neighbouring district of Bajaur at the beginning of the 20th century. Several members of the family subsequently moved from there to Kunar in east Afghanistan. In the late 1940s, part of the family moved to Archi, on the Afghan‐Tajik border, when they were offered land there. [...] All the women in this extended family live in Lower Dir. When violence escalated in the Swat valley in the spring 2009, the female members of the family were all brought to Kunduz, but they are now already back in Lower Dir; this shows, yet again, that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not seen as a barrier to spatial mobility. This case, moreover, illustrates nicely the concept of the competence network Crossroads Asia.

I have pointed at one phenomenon of the porous Durand Line earlier, stemming from my experience with patients from our hospital close to the refugee camp Shamshatoo. Here I want to briefly look at another aspect of migration of Afghans into Pakistan and beyond.

In Pakistan administered Kashmir

While it is popular to write of the alleged presence of the Chinese in Pakistani administered Kashmir, it is Afghans who really have a say in business there. After the earthquake in 2005, the complete tractor business (that is transport of building material) was in the hands of Afghans who had lived here since long ago – one can imagine why they originally came. Organised according to the places they hail from in Afghanistan, they today control many garments, carpets and utilities shops, linked up to warehouses all over the country in the hands of other family members (just as Schetter portrays). When the construction after the earthquake quickly subsided, they were a lot more flexible than local Kashmiris to adapt to new jobs. When demand decreased significantly in their field, they would move back to Afghanistan for a few weeks or months and drive tractors there or follow up on another job. In the Afghan’s carpet shops letters and photos of female Swedish NGO workers are passed around while a family member just returned from Waziristan talks about his experiences with a Mehsud lashkar which he left to take some days off in cooler Kashmir.

Just as Bernd Glatzer explains in his War and Boundaries in Afghanistan: Significance and Relativity of Local and Social Boundaries (which one should read in combination with Schetter’s article), the Afghans here ‘consider Pashtuns from beyond the Durand Line as first and foremost Pakistanis.’ Even though their counterparts in construction would often be Pashtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the daily wages construction business is in the hands of Pakistani Pashtuns who lived in tents for the weeks they would work, only to move on or return home when they had earned enough), they had little to do with them. The place in Afghanistan (sometimes down to the village) would matter most, after that Afghanistan. After that Pashtun identity, much later somewhere the fact that they are Muslims just like the Kashmiris.

While the debates on drones and talks to Taliban in Qatar may be important to lead and are essential to the area’s future, the fact that they are detached from the place (one up in thin air, the other on the other side of the street of Hormuz) they are symptomatic for what goes so wrong here. To be so far away from the Know and the stories that are happening just outside our doors as Brothers shows, and so in love with the grandiose speculative theories.

I am looking forward to this book.

Today Peter Bergen and friends discussed drones at NewAmerica. One important point raised is that the response to drones we have, mainly stems from people who are not directly exposed to their effects (that is Isloo’s/Lahore’s/Pesh’s population). The argument goes, that people from the Tribal Areas, exposed to the drones are more in favor of them than, say, the Punjabi population who knows nothing about their direct impact (Being highly skeptical of means where we have very little clue about their success, even its short range implications, relying on hear-say from some people who know the Tribals from friends in Peshawar, apart from the sovereignty infringement caused that is a damage caused even to people who are not killed as a consequence, leaves me a stout opposer of drones. But yes, that’s a different story for another time …). A similar finding was made by Jishnu Das and Tahir Andrabi on perceptions of foreigners in earthquake affected areas, a study Graeme Smith builds his story on and which I have pointed out earlier here. While for the drones, we are having discussions about impacts on people who are seldom (if ever) asked themselves, hence we are basically just guessing around without any real clue, Kashmir is a great chance to have people to ask and evaluate their beliefs. While it’s unfortunate that the we are doing guess work in the hearts and mind debate in terms of actual war (not “just” the cultural one) where we would have the opportunity to learn, it’s even more unfortunate that the Aid sector has given such important findings as Das/Andrabi’s little awareness, and is just starting the whole experience anew after the floods. I find the problem to be basic but simple.

Post-Earthquake Construction - the "good old times" haven't changed for most people

The frames are made by men, the mud filling is often women’s work.

The frames are still often loosely attached to ground, fixed by stones and later filled with mud. The structures are what people were used to before the earthquake, only tin-sheets are now more widely available.

While for one, mobile phones and earthquake proof houses are not a consequence of foreign involvement in Kashmir (SCOM was forced to open the market after the earthquake to other Pakistani providers, the housing standards are from ERRA) and people in the area are well aware of that, they are hardly opposed to values as democracy or human rights nor do they understand them to be something Western or foreign. They understand and fight for such rights, they have done so before the earthquake and are doing so still. The biggest masses of people in one place in Kashmir I have experienced where never demonstrations against women issues in NGOs, but political events that concerned upcoming elections (see pictures below from the elections in June 2006). The discussions about all aspects, from the crazy mullah trying to influence voters, to involvement of the Pakistani government in election rigging went on every night. If there was criticism of foreign involvement in those matters, than that it was none of our business, they know themselves what they want and they hold their political leaders accountable. NGO workers trying to sell values are hardly taken serious. Women issues are of course more sensitive. The victims of the local’s anger were seldom foreigners though. The NGO workers from other areas of Pakistan (many national NGOs) were seen as the bringers of vice. The problem with the answers Smith gets lies, I suspect, in his questions. He does not let the people speak what’s on their mind, but specifically addresses the issue of foreigners. And for a villager from a remote village in Kaghan, a foreigner, just like everything else coming from outside his perimeter of a couple of villages in whistle-blowing distance, is an example for the other that destroys his good old times. He (the foreigner) is not the seen as the bringer of that destruction, that potential already is inside the country, inside the younger people even without foreigners around but simply with increased electricity and media coverage. While talking, it may seem (especially if we want him to say it) that Saber conflates foreigners and foreign aid with his fading culture, but he very well understands that it is not just that simple. I find that Kashmiris in general (apart from populistic Mullahs and politicians trying to gain attention with short sighted stories) very well understand that that is not the only direct link. That is why such Mullah’s and politicians have very little respect among the population.

Pre-Election Demonstration - no hate Speech, no gory posters, just political discourse. Sorry.

A PPP Supporter (Qamar Zaman)

Cheering changes in suppressing traditions especially for women after disasters and understanding it as a cultural byproduct of their work as Smith puts it rightly is problematic in two ways. For every success story seemingly a result from aid for e.g. women empowerment, I can find you a fail. Women suffered extremely after the earthquake from increased workloads because men refused to move a finger on account of their psychological distress. They and their daughters had to leave their villages after their only male family members died because they were completely exposed to the will of male family members of other households. The Earthquake undoubtedly opened opportunities, but it still has to be up to the population to take these. We have shown that they are willing to do this, and if you let them decide themselves, support them in their work were you are able and willing to, they create changes themselves, some of which we think are part of “our values” (see our study on a Women Training Centre in Kashmir). Kashmiris find it laughable when all we accept as success are increased rights for women – is that all your western society is based upon?

More often we should just be prepared to listen to people and try to understand their hearts and minds from what they have to say, and not discuss it among ourselves in countless seminars with people who have little insight themselves (and, yes, blogs as well) to shape our perception, craft it into stone and only then approach the subjects we talk about. I do wish that people in FATA do get a voice soon, and those in Kashmir manage to get something coherent like PamirTimes up at some point. But I also hope that we are prepared to listen to those views, and do not only acknowledge them once the NYT picks them up. I will try again to move friends in Kashmir to write their views in near future, starting with this issue (if they feel that’s what they want to talk about).

By passing on skills through some women trained, it was possible to reach 17% of all women between 15 and 25 years in the area within 7 courses over 6 months each, directly affecting 7% of the total population. The average income of trained women after only some months to a year after the training already reached half the average wage of skilled women in Pakistan. 10% were offered a job after the training. Coupled with their increased confidence, about 70% felt that their family and community now respected them more. Nevertheless there were cases were communities or family members would initially support the training, but then hinder the woman from offering her skills on a commercial basis. Some women assured that just offering their skills to family already meant a great economic relief, but many attempted to establish a commercial venture and of these most successfully did so.

Most women openly complained how they were marginalized by society, even though the earthquake has brought some positive change in the mindset of many people. The success of such a training centre will always be dependent on community acceptance, and assistance to women and communities should always be provided along.

An unexpected positive side effect was, that many women were motivated to rejoin school after the training. Initially abandoning education because of a lack of perspectives with increased education, they were encouraged by their abilities in the handicrafts sector and with their own income were also able to afford higher education themselves. Keeping this in mind, highly effective vocational training is possible in such remote areas, granting positive economical as well as societal trade offs. Observing the success of women in village based training centers over future years, especially the acceptance among the local community, will prove whether this option could be a role model for the area.

I came up with two basic assumptions, loosely taken from a speech by Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah as a basis for the paper:

The defensive viewpoint states, that economic perspectives for women are only possible within the societal framework.
The offensive viewpoint acknowledges, that economic success will result in a loosening of the societal restrictions for women.

While the societal restrictions were obvious and need to be taken into account at all times, the loosening of societal restrictions was twofold. On the one hand, many women claimed, that already after the earthquake a liberal jolt also hit the area, concerning women’s rights. Many women were allowed to travel in local buses alone and the opportunity to join higher education suddenly appeared. The economic success of some women managed to back this development somehow – communities could see a measurable impact of restrictions being loosened.

The two most important outcomes were the fact that women who joined the vocational training were motivated to rejoin higher education after having found perspectives for their future again and that illiterate women, once they started a commercial venture were just equally succesful as literate women.

The earlier adresses an important point in development activities at the moment – building schools (especially girls schools) without evaluating perspectives women gain with a school education is flawed. A number of women in the project area did not join school, because they had to work at home or their fathers and brothers would not allow them. Most however had left school because they saw no point in getting an education. And statistics for Pakistan prove them right. The average salary of skilled women increases only marginally over the average wage of unskilled women and labour participation rates for unskilled women are higher than those for skilled. Vocational Training targetting school drop outs may be an ideal measure to reinvoke perspectives by giving them a way of earning their own money with their own skills.

The latter proves, that illiterate women should equally be considered for government training centres but should be especially encouraged to start a commercial venture. Often they are shying away from following up on such an activity, having a very low self esteem owing to their inability to read. Additionally they are often from extremely poor families who welcome an additional income and encourage their daughter to contribute finances.

Interesting background literature can be found in the Literature List, although most of the studies are purely statistical (even and especially those written by Pakistanis) which I find to be not very helpful in getting a dynamic and realistic picture.

Perceptions of the Pakistan Earthquake Response - Humanitarian Agenda 2015 Pakistan Country Study, Andrew Wilder, February 2008

In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das , 1st draft September 2010

In the light of the recent floods, a renewed influx of international aid organizations into Pakistan and a widespread national response to the disaster, a study published already more than 2 years ago on the Pakistan Earthquake becomes especially important (Andrew Wilder, Perceptions of the Pakistan Earthquake response). Through a number of interviews and group discussions and an extraordinary ability to judge objectively on a topic that is so laden with pre-assumptions and stereotypes, Andrew Wilder has put together a comprehensive overview over obstacles and successes during the emergency relief and the reconstruction effort in Pakistani Kashmir and the affected parts of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa). Having worked myself in the area since just after the earthquake until this year, I find many topics just the way I experienced them, others are new to me but they sound perfectly reasonable. While such reports are often written from somewhere far away, with interviews carried out only with big stakeholders who often themselves have little idea what’s moving people in the field, this document is highly successful in representing the situation as it was experienced by people who have obviously actively engaged in the process of relief and reconstruction.

Issues covered include

• The universality of humanitarianism

• The implications of terrorism and counter-terrorism for humanitarian action
• The search for greater coherence and integration between humanitarian and political/security agendas

• The security of humanitarian personnel and the beneficiaries of humanitarian action

Important issues he addresses have already surfaced in the current aid efforts – acceptance of foreign staff, and the instrumentalization of humanitarian action in the light of strategic interests in the region.

While international aid workers were more likely to blame internationals for being culturally insensitive, most Pakistani respondents blamed non-local national staff for the majority of problems caused due to cultural insensitivity.

While local communities seemed to be willing to view the behavior of foreigners as simply being “foreign,” all Pakistani staff – especially female staff – were expected to behave as “locals.” This issue of “locals within locals” highlights the need in culturally diverse contexts to be aware of the potential pitfalls of making overly simplistic distinctions between “national and internationals,” “locals and foreigners” or “insiders and outsiders.”

In times were international NGOs are working in different provinces with extremely different ethnicities (Baloch, Punjabi, Pakhtoon, Sindhi etc.), this observation should be taken seriously. A Pakistani is not a local everywhere in his country.

The instrumentalization of humanitarian action to achieve counter-terrorism objectives by rewarding strategic allies and “winning hearts and minds” raises serious questions about the future of principled humanitarian assistance.

Kashmir not being an area of significant strategic interest to the West, this problem turned out to be mostly irrelevant. The US government did not even pursue terrorist organisations, which were delivering aid. In the most heavily affected area by the floods this will be a different scenario. Adding to it is the increased involvement of foreign troops in Pakistan as well and increased Army operations since the earthquake all over the country.

Stories like the following may be singular and not representative of how different state actors behaved in the region, but do portray one aspect of how politics interferes with humanitarian heavily.

The diverse range of aid actors in the earthquake response created some awkward moments. An aid worker based in an IDP camp described a request he received prior to a visit to the camp by US Senator John Kerry:  “USAID wanted the Cuban flag taken down and wanted al-Rashid Trust banners taken down. We refused to get involved in this issue. In the end the army got Al-Rashid to take down their banner but the Cuban flag remained. USAID made sure to take pictures from angles that didn’t show the Cuban flag.”

From my own experience in Kashmir and other areas in Pakistan, I feel “winning hearts and minds” by simply delivering aid is a ridiculous approach. As stated by Wilder it questions our humanitarian motives, but people’s ideology cannot be bought. Friends in Kashmir who till this date receive food aid from radical Islamist organisations are grateful for that support, but at the same time emphasize that they heavily disagree with their religious and political agenda. Similarly they react towards aid from Western organisations – they accept my values, we may discuss them again and again, but they would not adopt my views because I have supported them after their house collapsed. A recent study (Tahir Andrabi and Jishnu Das, In Aid We Trust) examines this dilemma and although this study may not be very comprehensive, it is the first time that I find this topic covered from such a scholarly approach and I hope it will be taken up in future in other areas as well.

As a Pakistani journalist notes:

“The notion that this was a golden opportunity for jihadi groups to win support doesn’t hold true – appreciation for their work doesn’t translate into political support. Jamaat Islami from day one was the most effective and efficient social welfare organization, but this hasn’t led to an increase in its popular support. People don’t vote on that account – it doesn’t translate into popular support. The same for the US – their role won’t “win hearts and minds.” In South Asia charity and charitable work has little to do with political work. The best known social workers don’t win elections. Edhi [one of Pakistan’s leading philanthropists] stood twice and couldn’t win more than five percent of the vote. Imran Khan with all his charitable hospital work struggled to win. People don’t want to waste their vote.”

An issue that became very obvious again during my recent visit in Tajikistan and has been an issue in Kashmir – overtly strict security policies. Since Pakistan’s image has plummeted even further since 2005, this is an issue on top of all NGOs’ agendas. It is linked closely to understanding the country as multi ethnic – Punjab is not Sindh, Kashmir not Waziristan. Each area should be addressed individually with all its characteristics. To say that “In Pakistan it is this way” is too simple.

The cultural sensitivity question highlighted that Pakistani culture is not monolithic. As in most countries there are major cultural differences between urban and rural areas, and along lines such as ethnicity, class, ideology, and sectarian affiliation. This diversity highlights the imprecision of terms used by aid agencies like “national” and “international” staff, or “locals” and “foreigners.” ²⁵ One INGO manager described his problem of having to manage “locals within locals: ” “Ninety-eight percent of our staff are from other areas of Pakistan. Our national staff are not viewed by locals as “local staff,” and the national staff distinguish themselves from what they refer to as the “local staff.” Most national staff don’t speak Pashto – it’s a case of having locals within locals.”

The question of who is a foreigner and who is not was most pronounced in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Most Pakistanis view Kashmir as part of Pakistan, and Kashmiris as Pakistanis. This was also how many national and international agencies perceived their Kashmir operations, with PaK essentially treated as being another province of Pakistan. Many Kashmiris, however, viewed themselves as Kashmiris and not as Pakistanis. Several Pakistanis reported being quite surprised and shocked at the realization that after all their childhood education and indoctrination that Kashmir was part of Pakistan, that the Kashmiris they were interacting with did not perceive themselves to be Pakistanis. According to one Pakistani aid agency official, “I was very surprised to discover that Kashmiris view themselves as Kashmiris, and the rest of us, including Pakistanis, as foreigners.” According to another NGO manager:

Pakistani staff assume and say that we are all the same, whereas Kashmiris view themselves as different. Many Pakistani staff were not aware of these tensions and sentiments. We need to educate both national staff and not just expats about these issues.

The ignorance of many Pakistanis to internal, national issues is also problematic. Pakistani national media, especially English and even the ones who call themselves dynamic and liberal are completely unaware of what large parts of the country look like – Kashmir, the Tribals and Balochistan are rarely covered, the Northern areas are purely seen as a tourism resort. NGO staff from Karachi or Lahore may know less about these areas than some expatriates who have travelled there at least for leisure. Adding to it is the constant conflict between different Pakistani ethnicities – Punjabis are looked down upon as thiefes in the Khyber Pakhtookhwa, Pakhtoons are regarded as crazy fanatics in the North.

The relatively benign operating environment led several aid workers to question the appropriateness of what they perceived to be overly strict and inflexible security policies of many aid organizations. Some field staff in particular expressed concern that humanitarian imperatives were being trumped by staff security considerations that were based on poor security analysis resulting in inappropriate and unnecessarily rigid security policies.

Especially for NGO staff, the development of the Cluster Approach, closely linked to the Kashmir earthquake will be of interest. Wilder mentions to other studies in this regard. But also for lay people this chapter gives an insight into how NGOs work on the ground and how they coordinate. An issue widely present in Western media the recent weeks was the presence of humanitarian arms of Islamist groups. Mainly present in cluster meetings during the reconstruction phase, I have mainly felt they were not present because they were not interested – apparently they were often also not invited. For us as a very small organisation, the cluster meetings were extremely valuable. Once committed people were participating even slow government institutions could be moved to get things done on time.

There was a widespread perception that NGO participation in the clusters was weak. A number of reasons were cited for this including a lack of knowledge and understanding by NGOs of the Cluster Approach, as well as skepticism about the value added of committing valuable staff time to attend the large number of cluster meetings. According to the director of one international non-governmental organization (INGO), one of the only reasons to attend cluster meetings was that “if you didn’t go to meetings or provide information you weren’t on the radar screen.” There was also reluctance on the part of some NGOs to participate in what was a UN-led – and perceived by some to be “UN-centric” – coordination mechanism. Many local NGOs reportedly did not participate because they were either not aware of the meetings, often not invited, or because they could not understand or speak English sufficiently well to participate in or benefit from the discussions. As discussed in the ‘War on Terror’ section of this paper, the fact that there were few efforts to invite Islamic organizations to cluster meetings as well as to involve them in other coordination efforts was viewed by some interviewees as a “missed opportunity.” Many were big stakeholders, but as one interviewee noted, “there was a reluctance to invite them.”

USAID wanted to kill [the Cluster Approach] as they don’t want the UN to have a role. DFID also didn’t like it. In general donor coordination was secretive, not representative, Western, and unaccountable to the clusters. The donors don’t want “good humanitarian donorship” to work – they don’t want to lose sovereignty.

This is the first scholarly study where I read about camps of Indian Kashmiris living in Pakistan. The fate of these people, although incorporating those who Pakistan wants to ‘liberate’ living somehow stateless in a limbo is widely ignored in Pakistan.

Humanitarian assistance should be impartial and provided according to need…. After the earthquake, however, distinctions were made between the types of camps, which led to differing standards of services and support to people who had suffered the same catastrophe…. Many of those involved in the emergency response now believe that this distinction between camps was regrettable.

Finally one of the most problematic practices of international (less so national) NGOs is also addressed for the earthquake reconstruction phase – bypassing local civil institutions. With the argument, that local structures are corrupt and inefficient work is carried out without them, creating a(nother) parallel infrastructure state in the state for which in the long run no one will feel accountable for.

During the relief phase, and more problematically during the reconstruction phase, the civil administration in general and local government in particular has largely been bypassed.

There is still unfinished business in AJK and NWFP. The GoP has generously allowed the international community to come in and help provide relief to save people, but not to do long-term development. Now that the relief phase is over unfinished business will rise to the top of the agenda.

Pankaj Mishra has earlier, nearly 10 years back written an article-triptychon in the Review on Kashmir.

The first in the series (Death in Kashmir, September 2000) dealt with then recent lethal encounters between Muslim separatists, Indian army and civilians. A long, sad insight into the Indian misconception of happenings there and the burden lying on the Kashmiri’s shoulders.

The second part (The Birth of a Nation, October 2000) deals with the history from Partition to the 90s, from Iqbal’s ideas for a Muslim state and Nehru’s assertion that Kashmir needed to be with India (both have Kashmiri roots) to Sheikh Abdullah and the creation of Islamic Groups on the Pakistani side infiltrating over the LoC.

On where the disillusioned Kashmiris could turn Mishra writes:

Pakistan was a natural choice. It had tried to liberate Kashmir by force twice by sending in armed infiltrators—first in 1948 and then in 1965—and on both occasions had failed to muster enough support among the local population, which, though not entirely happy with Indian rule, was also wary of Pakistan. But the fast-growing disillusionment with Indian rule through the 1980s made many Kashmiris look toward Pakistan for assistance: it was the only country in the world that consistently affirmed, at least rhetorically, the Kashmiri “right to self-determination.”

Looking at the Pakistani Kashmir today, especially the situation of Kashmiris from the Indian part who live in AJK without a legal status, often in tin sheds since years is dire (ironically these people suffered less in the Earthquake of 2005, since they didn’t have houses that could collapse over their heads). The Mohajrs from Indian Kashmir I know mock the Pakistani term Azad Kashmir and call it “Azab (azab-al-qabr being the hellfire) Kashmir” themselves.

What is missing from the Pakistani side in any case, is an assessment of the Pakistani Kashmir in the style of Mishra’s articles on the Indian part. While DAWN regularly writes about incidents on the Indian side of Kashmir, apart from AJK Cabinet reshufflings one never reads about the Pakistani part. While I respect figures like Yasin Malik who is given ample air time on Pakistani Talk shows, coverage of Kashmiri figures from this side of the fence is restricted to sad post-zalzala stories and I guess it would just be fair to hear their side of the story as well. The job would not be too hard, it’s not a case for self-criticism or pouring oil into a nationalist debate. Mishra has managed to give an unbiased account from “his” side – so could a Pakistani in Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Neelum.

The last part (Kashmir: The Unending War, November 2000) looks at the 90s and offers an outlook and some more insight into the plight of the local people.

The cycle of violence and destruction has been so swift and severe in Kashmir; the insurgency has poisoned and destroyed so many lives. Yet the insurgents’ political cause remains as lonely and hopeless as before. Independence, which a majority of Kashmiris seem to want, or integration with Pakistan, which for many Kashmiris is the second-best option after independence, are not possibilities that any Indian government can ever consider without immediately losing the support of the Hindu middle classes. The European Union and the US are unlikely to risk antagonizing India, with its lucrative markets and resources and the trappings of a democracy, by taking up the Kashmiri cause.