The terms “Water War” and “Water Wars” are media darlings. The famous quote apocryphally attributed to US humorist Mark Twain “[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over” is so overused that many water professionals are pleading to ban its use. To get a feel as to when the hysteria over water wars began, we explored Google labs tool Books Ngram Viewer which revealed that geographers were using the terms to describe water situations in the US and Middle East as early as the late 1800s with an exponential increase in the use of these terms starting in 1988.

The experts they mention – Gleick, Yoffe, Giordano, Susskind – are the main sources earlier mentioned reviews draw on. They close with a very valid conclusion:

Much of the hype about water wars is good business for conflict beneficiaries and book sales, but in reality conflicts over transboundary waters are normal, and managing that conflict offers constant opportunities for dialogue and cooperation.

I have just reviewed such an attempt to cash in on the ‘water war’ hypothesis for DAWN.

Brahma Chellaney’s Water: Asia’s New Battleground sums up the arguments for why South Asia may go to war over water in the near future (and how that could be averted). It is representative of a number of recent publications along these lines — and serves as a good example of where they may be going lost in the thicket of hyperbole that lushly grows when policy experts muddle in sensitive engineering or natural science topics (or equally when engineers have an urge to develop political arguments on such).

The arguments for and against the threat of near future war over water resources are at loggerheads. For South Asia examples for a dire future situation are ample, and since many countries are extremely dependent on huge water courses originating in a neighbouring country (with which it often has other disputes ongoing), the argument for violent conflict seems close to come by. The counter argument observes that while there is and will be conflict over water resources, countries have not gone to war over it in the past, and because of effects explained with Pareto optimality, both parties would be loosers in an outbreak of such, and are therefore inclided to solve the problems via cooperation.

What makes the topic very interesting on the Subcontinent and in Asia in general, is the fact that the debate is being carried out very actively (3). For the case of the Indus Basin, conflict between India and Pakistan, one should read on the recent history of water resources in the two countries (4), what the current challenges are (5) and what kind of solutions may already be around and need not be introduced by ‘international experts’ – see MS Gopal’s great photographs of the Barefoot Geologists in Kutch.

For Central Asia, the research reaches from Climate Change, via the stand off between the rather poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have all power over the water sources Amu and Syr and are excerting it, and the richer downstream Uzbekistan, to the effects of water overuse on the common property Aral Sea (6).

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¹ Two good and rather recent overviews can be found here: Thomas Bernauer and Anna Kalbhenn. 2010. The Politics of International Freshwater Resources The International Studies Encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell.; Dinar, A., and Dinar, S. (2003) Recent Developments in the Literature on Conflict and Cooperation in International Shared Water. Natural Resources Journal (43) (4), 1217–87 (a revised form of this paper can be downloaded here)
² Most notably the Databases on the Transboundary Waters Website
³ See for example Briscoe’s comment in EPW India on the Indus and India-Pakistan and Iyer’s response.
⁴ John Briscoe et. al. on Pakistan (Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry) and India (India’s Water Economy – Bracing for a Turbulent Future)
⁵ On Pakistan the Wilson Centre’s Report Pani ki Kahani is excellent, for India, the papers from the IWMI’s NSRLP project are a take, as an introduction the first chapter from a series.
⁶ On Climate change, see Bernauer, T., Siegfried, T. Climate Change and International Water Conflict in Central Asia., on the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by the same authors (2007) Estimating the performance of international regulatory regimes: Methodology and empirical application to international water management in the Naryn/Syr Darya basin.

Some of the criticism by fellow Muslims brought against them is sure valid. Often it is though exactly the opposite of what the West fears them to be – their lack of want to participate in the public sphere. In a German state it is considered an organisation with a tendency for political Islamism, in Pakistan liberals would accuse them of not giving a damn what happens around them but just waste time in the mosque. Waseem Altaf in Viepointonline:

And finally as long as there is no consonance between our attitudes and our behavior or what we say and what we do, we cannot influence anybody.

But this is true for many in society – musicians who preach rebellion in their music but are conformist in real life, leftists who get heated up about inequality online but contribute nothing against it in their actions.

A Tablighi Group 'occupied' one of our school buildings while still under cosntruction in AJK.

Every time I took public transport from Lahore to AJK or the other way round, I was in the bus with Tablighis. And while working in the villages we had numerous encounters. Kashmir is probably deemed very reqarding after having been struck by desaster. I would be interested though if there is political interest behind it – not so much from the Tablighis themselves but from the officials who approve of their activities there. The locals would always accomomodate them somehow (like in our schools) but were mostly indifferent to their preaching and presence.

Yoginder Sikand has done some writing on them (The Origins and Development of the Tablighi-Jama’at (1920-2000): A Cross-Country Comparative Study), some of his arguments lined up here.

My basic argument is that the TJ, as a movement, is not involved in promoting ‘terrorism’ or militancy, although this does not rule out individuals using it for certain militant purposes in some isolated cases, probably without the knowledge of top TJ authorities. What this, therefore, means is that it would be grossly unfair, and also counterproductive, to target the TJ as such for the alleged misdeeds of some individuals who claim to be associated with it in some way or the other.

Barbara Metcalf looks at the Tablighi in comparison to other groups (Taliban and JI) in a longer essay and with a focus on women.

All of this is, however, speculation. What is clear is that the formally a-political missionary tours, gatherings in local mosques and homes, and annual gatherings continue to be the routine of the movement, one that clearly offers meaning and dignity to many who participate. In themany goals fostered by these movements – social, psychological, moral, and spiritual – as well as in the political strategies adopted with such virtuosity, movements, in the end, turn out to be less distinctive than either they or outsiders often assume they are.

Interestingly, in Kyrgyzstan it is rooting under a different name (davaati) – Nate Schenkkan at Eurasianet.

Part I looks at the disappearance of Uzbek presence in the city and how fault always lies with the other.

The violence and its aftermath have steadily erased most traces of the Uzbek presence in the city’s shared spaces, the Uzbek language has disappeared from shops signs, newsstands, the airwaves. While the mayor’s office supposedly promotes tolerance and ethnic harmony, over the past year vigilante groups of mostly older Kyrgyz women freely harass and sometimes even physically abuse ethnic Uzbeks who dare to appear in public, ride on city transport, attempt to interface with the city administration, or even show up to work in shops that still employ a multi-ethnic staff. Even the city’s much heralded new monument to victims of last year’s violence quickly became a site for screaming protests by these groups, denying the ethnic Uzbek half of the city access even to what was supposed to be a sacred space for common grief.

[...]

While the destruction of homes overwhelmingly occurred in ethnic Uzbek mahallas, the human and sexual violence itself and the destruction of commercial spaces, restaurants, and businesses was shared among all communities of Osh—although alarmingly, many on both ethnic sides seem to believe that only “we” were the true victims and “they” were wholly at fault. In the interviews I’ve conducted here so far, one of the most unsettling things that I’ve heard repeatedly (aside from the terrible stories of suffering and loss themselves) are statements that negate or dismiss suffering on the other side, the suffering of the “other.” Each ethnic group employs—with alarming frequency–narratives of homeland and defensive violence in order to cast the other group as usurpers or invaders.

Part II elaborates on the latter paragraph. Part III looks at how it may be too easy to just boil it down to ethnicity. Part IV looks at personal narratives of one man and the routinely disorder that causes frustration.

Twice this week I saw expensive SUVs driving the wrong way down Lenin street downtown, with no regard for the direction traffic moves both legally and practically on the crowded one-way street. Small incidents like these are used by Osh residents to punctuate and illustrate a story of disorder that—with people that I have gotten to know over a longer period—often becomes a long running narrative. A driver that ignores a traffic light suddenly becomes a symbol of the same unpredictability that comes from revolutions that occur “every five years,” of why banks cannot be trusted, why schools are perceived to be failing, why corruption is corroding the institutions of society, of why—for Uzbeks anyway—the next generation needs to leave.

I expect he will be providing more insights in near future. Currently reading Oskar Verkaaik’s Migrants and Militants (which I will review soon) which looks at violence in Southern Sindh and how that is embedded in narratives while being overlty and poorly explained with ethnicity (Muhajir vs. Pashtoon vs. Sindhi) in the general media and scholarly writing, Tucker’s explanations do make a lot of sense to me with reference to another urban-ethnic-violence example that is reported but little understood.

I have never been to Kyrgyzstan but to Tajikistan last year, just after the riots in Osh, and have experienced a trans-border effect with somewhat less personal but more geopolitical-decision implications. Not only did many travellers who planned a Europe-China(-South East Asia) tour by car, bike or public transport see themselves at a dead end in the High Pamirs (afraid of Afghanistan and with a closed border-crossing Tajikistan-China for foreigners going to Osh from Mughab would have been their only option). Also Chinese hauliers who, especially with the KKH to Pakistan currenly blocked (see below), use the Kashi-Osh-Dushanbe-East/South route to trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran were facing a serious problem. Many truckers detoured via the Pamir Highway, a road that is only tarmaced for a couple of kilometers once and gain. The extra burden of dozens of heavy weight freighters each day caused the road to deteriorate quickly – for locals who are used to travel in cheap (Chinese) Tangems this means a great extra number of stops because of technical failures between Khorog and Murghab.

As highlighted earlier, the Chinese acquired a piece of the Pamir Plateau – I do suspect that this move is at least somewhat linked to the worries about Kyrgyzstan and those about Pakistan. Rumours exist since years that China wants to build a direct connection to the Afghan and the Tajik Wakhan either via Sost (Pakistan) or maybe directly via their (now augmented?) border towards Afghanistan.

The worry concerning Pakistan comes mainly because of the Attabad lake, a natural catastrophe that is hardly reported in the West – it’s more popular to churn out speculative writing on the Sino-Pak relations that no one really understands (see our Sino-Pak ‘Series’ on that – it’s in German, and currently only one post long).

Shujaat Ali at Pamir Times (which is generally following this issue extensively) looks at the implications of this disaster for locals’ transport.

Who dares to make a Pakistani movie that does not have to claim to be made “60 miles away from the Taliban” to gain attention? A movie that’s worth watching because it’s simply a good movie without having to associate Pakistan with Terror, Taliban or Totay. A movie that can be shown in Trannum cinema in Androon Sheher and people will leave being touched by the story rather than one that is just screened in a living room in DHA before it immediately leaves to European/US film festivals where people are moved because they associate veiled women with Videos from Swat and bearded men with Videos from as-Sahab.

While discussions over what European soldiers should be allowed to shoot at and what not are raging, another one that is linked to the attached petrol trucks is seldom present. The trucks originally came from Tajikistan. Especially since the term AfPak came up, Afghanistan is less and less seen linked to it’s northern neighbors. What are the threats coming from that side, what are the opportunities?

[Article] Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, World Policy Journal, Spring 2003

“Regional cooperation is likely only when states value the opportunities that openness can create more than the need for control.”

[Article] A Partnership for Central Asia, S. Frederick Starr, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

The article is based on situations that has since then changed considerably and have made his conclusions in some cases void.

[Article] The Afghanization of Central Asia, Examining the Implications of a Central Asian Supply Line for Afghanistan, Northern Distribution Network Grappels with Security Threat, EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight, different dates

Brief insights in how Afghanistan and the Central Asians states are linked and what that implies for future actions in Afghanistan.

[Article] The SCO: A regional organisation in the making, Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008

Matveeva and Gisutozzi give a brief insight in the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), on which issues it plans to focus and where it may be able and efficient to do so in future. They also put the Organisation’s dealings in perspective to Afghanistan which is neither a memeber nor an observer (like Pakistan, Iran and India).

Stabilisation of Afghanistan may be an issue in which all SCO member states could be interested, but where Russia could have an upper hand, while China could contribute economically, militarily (more in theory than in reality so far) and diplomatically through its close relationship with Pakistan. If neither country has been very active in Afghanistan after 2001 so far, it is probably because they are waiting for Washington’s position to weaken to the point where their diplomatic intervention would have a serious chance of success. Pakistan’s own ambiguous position also contributes to caution, especially for the Chinese.

They manage to highlight the major issue which drives my interest in Central Asia – the neighbor’s interest in the AfPak conflict and their contribution (to the conflict or its solution). Currently the West seems reluctant to involve other stakeholders into its meddling in Afghanistan. It’s the US and European countries involved in ISAF. Russia and China, the last bordering to Afghanistan are seemingly not involved in any decision making or contributions to COIN or diplomacy, although especially China is heavily involved in the private sector in Afghanistan and a patron with major influence on Pakistan.

The authors bring up the possible discrepancies in communication.

The Chinese foreign policy establishment is very cautious and risk-averse, and has difficulty handling unforeseen events and unconventional challenges. It feels more comfortable with everything planned and agreed in advance. This is almost diametrically opposed to the Russian foreign policy culture, which thrives on crisis, feels comfortable with assertive or controversial positions, and has a capacity and inclination to react quickly to unprecedented developments.
[...]
Moreover, the Russian establishment feels that culturally and socially it has more in common with the Americans than with the Chinese.
This perspective is shared by Central Asians. Proficiency in the Russian language and the legacy of Russian education and culture, upon which the Central Asian military and political establishment has been brought up, mean that when it comes to collective action in security sphere, Russian is a lingua franca for the rank-and-file cadre of five of the Shanghai Six. The language and cultural barrier is very real, and is an obstacle for interaction between the Chinese military and the rest.

They also emphasize that in terms of military involvement other organisations could play a more important role.

In the case of a large-scale security threat within Central Asia that requires a military response, the CSTO is most likely to be the one to respond, not least because it has Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. If instability in Afghanistan spins out of control and affects Central Asia, it is more likely that CSTO than SCO troops would be used to hold the border, with the Russian military leading the effort and contributing most troops.

[...]

The record of security engagement of all these [CSTO, CIS, NATO, ISAF] actors is far more prominent than that of the SCO.

Still, an inclusion of other stakeholders with a lot more imminent interest in the AfPak region, stakeholders who can feel the successes and failures in Afghanistan right away on their borders should be a seen as integral part of future decisions made in Afghanistan and also to some respect Pakistan.

[Blog] Registan, … is of course always a good source for discussions on these issues.