The terms “Water War” and “Water Wars” are media darlings. The famous quote apocryphally attributed to US humorist Mark Twain “[w]hiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over” is so overused that many water professionals are pleading to ban its use. To get a feel as to when the hysteria over water wars began, we explored Google labs tool Books Ngram Viewer which revealed that geographers were using the terms to describe water situations in the US and Middle East as early as the late 1800s with an exponential increase in the use of these terms starting in 1988.

The experts they mention – Gleick, Yoffe, Giordano, Susskind – are the main sources earlier mentioned reviews draw on. They close with a very valid conclusion:

Much of the hype about water wars is good business for conflict beneficiaries and book sales, but in reality conflicts over transboundary waters are normal, and managing that conflict offers constant opportunities for dialogue and cooperation.

I have just reviewed such an attempt to cash in on the ‘water war’ hypothesis for DAWN.

Brahma Chellaney’s Water: Asia’s New Battleground sums up the arguments for why South Asia may go to war over water in the near future (and how that could be averted). It is representative of a number of recent publications along these lines — and serves as a good example of where they may be going lost in the thicket of hyperbole that lushly grows when policy experts muddle in sensitive engineering or natural science topics (or equally when engineers have an urge to develop political arguments on such).

The arguments for and against the threat of near future war over water resources are at loggerheads. For South Asia examples for a dire future situation are ample, and since many countries are extremely dependent on huge water courses originating in a neighbouring country (with which it often has other disputes ongoing), the argument for violent conflict seems close to come by. The counter argument observes that while there is and will be conflict over water resources, countries have not gone to war over it in the past, and because of effects explained with Pareto optimality, both parties would be loosers in an outbreak of such, and are therefore inclided to solve the problems via cooperation.

What makes the topic very interesting on the Subcontinent and in Asia in general, is the fact that the debate is being carried out very actively (3). For the case of the Indus Basin, conflict between India and Pakistan, one should read on the recent history of water resources in the two countries (4), what the current challenges are (5) and what kind of solutions may already be around and need not be introduced by ‘international experts’ – see MS Gopal’s great photographs of the Barefoot Geologists in Kutch.

For Central Asia, the research reaches from Climate Change, via the stand off between the rather poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, who have all power over the water sources Amu and Syr and are excerting it, and the richer downstream Uzbekistan, to the effects of water overuse on the common property Aral Sea (6).

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¹ Two good and rather recent overviews can be found here: Thomas Bernauer and Anna Kalbhenn. 2010. The Politics of International Freshwater Resources The International Studies Encyclopedia. Wiley-Blackwell.; Dinar, A., and Dinar, S. (2003) Recent Developments in the Literature on Conflict and Cooperation in International Shared Water. Natural Resources Journal (43) (4), 1217–87 (a revised form of this paper can be downloaded here)
² Most notably the Databases on the Transboundary Waters Website
³ See for example Briscoe’s comment in EPW India on the Indus and India-Pakistan and Iyer’s response.
⁴ John Briscoe et. al. on Pakistan (Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry) and India (India’s Water Economy – Bracing for a Turbulent Future)
⁵ On Pakistan the Wilson Centre’s Report Pani ki Kahani is excellent, for India, the papers from the IWMI’s NSRLP project are a take, as an introduction the first chapter from a series.
⁶ On Climate change, see Bernauer, T., Siegfried, T. Climate Change and International Water Conflict in Central Asia., on the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by the same authors (2007) Estimating the performance of international regulatory regimes: Methodology and empirical application to international water management in the Naryn/Syr Darya basin.

Gulping a refreshing fruit juice close to qainchi-Flyover on Ferozepur Road some years ago, a member of the Punjab Elite Force (a unit which is employed for Special Ops as well as VIP transfer, and rose to some fame abroad last year as well, when one of them killed Salman Taseer) enjoying the same refreshment asked me where I was from. My experience told me that telling him I was from Austria was not going to get us far. While in Central Asian countries, people, thanks to their Soviet past, would tell me how they know Rapid Wien (a formerly internationally succesful Austrian soccer club) and an Engineer immediately retorted Alpenglühenwhen I mentioned Austria and Switzerland, in Pakistan my homecountry mostly evokes images of Kangurus and Cricket. While I then try to explain the difference, interest has most often waned (I can not blame them). This Police man however, with a proud smile pointed at his chest, where the logo of the Elite Force, comprising of bullets and two Glock pistols, is prominently placed. He was well aware, that the Glock pistol is an Austrian product.

Army Trucks

A somewhat similar encounter happened in Rawalpindi, this time with an older man from the Upper Class, who I talked to at the SOS Children’s Village. He was perfectly aware where Austria was, I would have expected a different relation though. He would not go on about Classical Music or Salzburg and Schoenbrunn (what I normally get from people who know Austria as tourists) or the fact, that SOS was founded in Austria. Again with a proud smile, in his position as an Pakistan Army member, he told me how he had just finalized a deal on Steyr Army Trucks, which are especially suitable for offroad terrain (Steyr guns are apart from that in use in the Pakistan Army as well).

Austria, thus, is known for it’s weapons in Pakistan.

(I had the idea to put that down today, when I stumbled over a project of two Austrian journalists, who attempt to track Austrian Weapon Deals/Stories around the world. We are officially a neutral country, but big in business …)

Money

There are similar exports from Switzerland (the country I live in when I am not in Austria or Pakistan), Oerlikon being the most prominent, but I have no such encounters to recount and apart from that Switzerland is more known. Kashmiri friends always ask me whether their country really deserves that ‘Kashmir is the Switzerland of Asia’ label (which I found for Northern Xinjiang as well and probably in a couple of other mountainous places in Asia). But while being at it, looking for links between the three countries the authors of this blog write from, it is interesting to make note of the topic that currently shakes the country and is top headline since nearly a week (it would be worth an analysis in itself, the essentials of the issue are not really grasped in the foreign media yet). Today, the president of the Swiss National Bank had to step down. Not because he covered Asif Zardari’s murky deals (which are also set in Zuerich), but because his wife made a small fortune with a foreign exchange dealing, while he was just stabilizing the Swiss Franc against the Euro last year. His wife, born Kashya Mehmood, is from Rawalpindi.

If you know German (Swiss German on top), watch today’s discussion on ‘Moral, Power and the Media’, it just finished. Both the media in Austria and Pakistan could learn from the quality of such TV debates (this strayed off the path somehwhere half, but is still worth watching, when you have read on the whole debacle of the last days).

Expats

I could, and should at some point, voice my expat concerns on my homecountry (how to lead a political debate is a great starter). But that is a complex topic. And I think this article by Franz Stefan Gady for the Huffington Post makes it a bit too easy too. As expats we could be a lot more interested (and that sincerely) in what goes on at home, and not just look down on it – easier said than done. But since he states, fittingly for our blog, I’ll have to include it:

Where are Austria’s grand strategists and statesmen? For example, it is a sheer impossibility to devise a daring new foreign policy for the Balkans or Eastern Europe (which was hijacked by the Austrian private sector more than 20 years ago) or dispatch the best and brightest of Austria to Brussels, the true ‘great uncle’ of small European powers, to push Austrian ‘interests’. (When did anyone ever hear any Austrian politician mention the word ‘Austrian interests’?) I am not even mentioning the rise of China, nuclear Iran, the war in Afghanistan, terrorism in Pakistan, the power transition in North Korea, or the current upheaval in Russia. “Such outward things dwell not in Austrian desires,” to paraphrase Shakespeare’s Henry V, and never seems to be a concern for any party.

Some months back I visited a rural support program in a Central Asian country, executed by one of the world’s biggest development organizations with an excellent repute here and in similar areas in Pakistan. A European consultant, with ample experience in the area and his field – sustainable construction solutions – had recently visited the project. The outcome of this visit, a number of manuals as guidelines for the local execution, had just been printed and handed over to the local engineers. Among them seismic proof housing, and split latrines. These toilets are currently a very fancy topic in sanitary engineering for developing countries when discussed among experts in the West. They are very easy to construct, turn human excrements safely and without special treatment into fertilizer and are hence theoretically a sustainable and environmentally friendly solution. But the link between smart and fancy ideas in the donors’ offices in Europe and sustainable solutions on the ground seem to be a hindrance that few want to deal with.

In default of pre-constructed toilet seats for this system in the respective country, the technical expert thought of a solution. Food bowls in two different sizes were acquired at cheap prices in the local market and assembled to a locally made split toilet. That sounds awfully convincing in a report, “using locally acquired material”, “supporting local merchants”, “easy to assemble”. The local program manager and a village engineer have already assembled the first sample. Sure, a smart idea from their friend the expert. They acknowledge his input and technical expertise, and are convinced that his intentions are the best. “But what will the people say when we propose to them to use food bowls to shit in?” They both laugh heartily. No, that won’t work, but they’ll do it anyway. Results need to be shown, reports are due and they are already behind schedule. It’s a comical situation, if it wouldn’t be frustrating to see so much effort, and money, brought to waste. A new book on similar encounters in Pakistan shows how this phenomenon may be an essential part of failures in international development initiatives.

Samia Waheed Altaf, former senior advisor of the Office of Health in the USAID Mission in Islamabad, has collected such comically frustrating episodes from her participation in the Social Action Plan (SAP) in the 90s in her So Much Aid, So Little Development – Stories from Pakistan (Wilson Woodrow Center Press, May 2011). The SAP was developed by the Pakistani Government and funded by the World Bank from 1993 to 2003 and targeted health supply services amongst others in Pakistan with a multi billion $ budget. It’s probably the most famous failure of aid and development in Pakistan. A number of papers have already been published on this issue, most notably from the CGDEV, which also Altaf refers to time and again. These papers are looking at why that could happen and how it could be avoided in future, providing mainly the dry figures of wasted inputs and unintended outcomes. They are essential reading to grasp how so much money could be invested in the country in recent decades with so little progress and conclude with definite policy recommendations. But they seldom go beyond the gross calculations of a development economist. Altaf portrays how these figures of failure are produced by the “human factor”.

“I speak the local languages and understand their cultures. […] I can speak the language of the international experts as well, so I form a bridge between these two groups.” Attached to the project as the local technical expert for the health and population sectors, standing in between, she is the perfect narrator for scenes that straddle between comedy and tragedy. Enter the foreign expert, who ‘didn’t even know where Pakistan was until she’d bought her tickets, […]. She had thought it was somewhere in India …”, who more than once finds that “[this] takes us nowhere.”, on which a government’s representative retorts: “Where would you like to go, madam?” Numerous accounts of meetings leave you laughing in disbelief, only to have your laugh choked by a story that portrays those suffering from a health system, which these projects fail to advance. By trying to find a basal flaw rather than a singular culprit, Altaf turns ridiculous meetings into stage play sketches and turns a dreadful issue in an enjoyable read, coming to a conclusion, which should receive attention and comprehension among the development community in Pakistan.

It’s the expert – local relationship that Altaf portrays as a main cause for failure. Western consultants proclaim in their office among themselves: “Honestly speaking, we do not know much about it. We are learning as we go along. And anyway we shall find out in a couple of years if we are right or wrong …” On the project they are understood to be the provider of solutions – for what other reason could they be paid such exorbitant salaries relative to their local counterparts and flown in to take all the most senior positions? “You give expert advice to national governments on a sensitive and crucial technical issue that has far reaching economic consequences. You know that your advice will be taken seriously, and you know very well that it is half-baked. You know you are “learning” as you go along. However the people in the country you are assisting do not know that you are only learning – at their expense – because you are sold as an expert.”
The tragic comedy is complete, when Lucymemsahib, a real figure posing as the proxy for the western expert in the book, exits the Pakistan stage after some weeks, now already being understood as an insider to this culture. With the newly acquired local dress and bangles, a dozen Urdu words she has mastered, she can now happily pass that ‘expertise’ on to her replacement in the post – ‘such a primitive place, I tell you’. Here, Altaf leaves little room for the illusion that the experts may acknowledge their problematic role themselves and hence bring a reasonable solution to the problem. If that is not happening – and from my own experience I see little progress in this regard – it may be up to local staff to shed some of the unquestioned belief in international expertise and press for accountability. It’s an unrewarding experience as Altaf shows – but if the failing international involvement in development in Pakistan has a potential for positive change, it is here where individuals can contribute to a change in mindset. This book is eye opening required reading for all who are about to join the development muddle in Pakistan, and an entertaining look at the scene for those who have already experienced it.

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Addendum:

There are other reviews out on the book.

In Dawn, by Sakuntala Narasimhan (you may go to the SouthAsianIdea to comment and discuss it with other critical minds) and in Regional Studies, Volume 45 by Claudia R. Williamson.

They are interesting to read together, since they are written from the two perspectives, the Western ‘Expert’ (in this case a researcher) and the Eastern Intellectual (in this case a journalist). Those two which Altaf manages to include in a single narrative. And they are more or less stuck in precast conceptions of the problem. Williamson wants to read more on where failure is to locate in the local institutions, Narasimhan criticises the Western Experts decadence and ignorance. They are both not wrong in their criticisms, their understanding of where failures may be located. But they are both looking for where they are convinced failure emanates from and seem not to be too receptive to an alternative explanation – a change in mindset and acknowledging responsibility. This is which I think both parties – the International (Western) Expert and the Local Expert – should take from the book. If everyone just understands it as a confirmation of ones own best intentions, brought to no avail because of the failure of the Other, we stay stuck in the dilemma. Question expertise – of others and your own – and be prepared to reassess opinions.

Manan Ahmed has been writing on the ‘Expert’ problem on a wider and more political/historical scale. I think his thesis in this aid example so well documented by Altaf is backed up on the local scale and just confirms how this is an issue that should be studied with more depth in future.

… reduced to an Army

What Pakistan is most often used for as a synonym in reporting and most importantely opinioning on the country is the Pakistan Army (often including the secret service ISI as well). Manan Ahmed, reviewing most recent books on Pakistan that have gathered wide attention, looked at this issue in a National article this August.

One cannot help but note that helicopters are of little use to a Pakistani civilian and not much help in what Riedel himself identifies as the three central problems facing Pakistan – rampant population growth, a diminishing water supply and a curtailed democracy. But they do solve a military problem – and the US-Pakistan relationship over the past 64 years is all about military solutions being offered as an answer to every problem. At least, that is the view from the mahogany conference tables in and around Washington.

Ahmed of course, has written a whole book going in the direction of this issue, and is a critical observer of the voices from within as well.

… reduced to a country without people

Myra MacDonald has recently penned very insightful observations of narratives on the country. She does so without playing the advocate for millions of inhabitants, which many commenters far away do, and is laudably wary of jumping to absolute statements but rather unravels these in the writing of others, while being well aware of local situations and their histories. One piece looked at how reporting on the country can be void of people.

Whether, and however much, we might disagree with them, we should however, know what they are. For me as a reader (and less as a journalist since there is always a value in telling a story from different perspectives and rarely room to fit them all into one piece), I personally am troubled most by one aspect of the New Yorker reconstruction. There appear to be no people in Pakistan.

Like Ahmed, she also critically reflects on the view from within, which can be very much from outside, within the same country – something foreign reporting of the country is still very far from grasping. It’s a critical reflection of how the educated urban upper class projects the voices of the people who are actually directly affected by the drone strikes in the border regions to Afghanistan. I would not call it the ‘Punjabi imagination’, but rather that of the urban class. There may be upper class citizens of Peshawar who write op eds about the WOT impact on Pakistan, very much unaware of what the rural Punjabi population really thinks, although it may be much more affected by price hikes and insufficent health and water supplies induced by the instability. Nevertheless, as MacDonald manages to point out, this is something the Pakistani opinionators and foreign correspondents who buy their comments as ‘local insight’ need to reflect critically on.

Now reread Hamid’s piece and consider the gap between the characters imagined in his short story, and a people with full citizenship rights and political representation. As Fazia S. Khan said, judge it as a work of fiction. But as a window into the Punjabi imagination, it may also have its uses as a political document.

… reduced to a religion

In a longer essay on Gender, Sexuality, and Islam under the Shadow of Empire, Saadia Toor, by elaborating the Saima Waheed case, portrays how the popular Western narrative of condensing of issues of freedom rights to religion in Muslim countries (in this case specifically women’s rights in Pakistan), is not only simplistic and flawed, but deliberately brushes aside other problematic issues (also caused by the colonial and neo-colonial involvement), which are really at the core of the issue here.

Ultimately, the Saima case was not simply about ‘secular liberals’ versus ‘religious conservatives,’ or even ‘fundamentalists.’ [...] Saima’s case was argued, and ultimately judged, not within the terms of existing Muslim family laws in the Pakistan Penal Code [...] but on the undesirability of filial disobedience [...]. [...] Daughters of the Ropri family were also not denied access to other accoutrements of wealth [...] associated with the Westernized upper classes. [...T]hey wore jeans and t-shirts at home and, even when outside, continued to wear them under the hijab. Thus the ‘fundamentalist’ (if there is such a monolithic figure) does not unequivocally despise the West or ‘modernity,’ understood as commodities—cultural and otherwise. But all these accoutrements were given to Saima to enhance her father’s social status [...].

These narratives become exercises like Chaudhry Rahmat Ali’s attempt to explain the acronym of Pakistan through it’s letters. It misses out on a lot deliberately suitable to the viewpoint of the writer and creates fiction for people who are not given a voice as Hamid did. To use Ahmed’s argument, ‘the country [is more than] all its military [religious/ethnic...] parts’. And it’s Now, not Never you should follow @salmaan_H, @myramacdonald and @sepoy to make sure you don’t miss out.

4. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Single Most Important Friend

Die USA brauchen neben ihrem schwächlichen Freund Afghanistan, den sie mal fördern und mal zusammenstauchen einen Partner für’s Grobe – ein lokaler ‘watch dog’ über die terroritischen Gefahren, die von verschiedenen Gruppen aus der Region ausgehen und verlässlicher Partner für die Versorgung des internationalen Eingreifens in Afghanistan. Sowohl Pakistan als auch Usbekistan vereinen Eigenschaften, die sie für diese Rolle qualifizieren. Beide Staaten haben Elemente, die es ihnen relativ leicht macht, auf Geheis in einer bestimmten Region durchzugreifen ohne der eigenen Bevölkerung Rechenschaft abliefern zu müssen (in Pakistan die Armee und der Geheimdienst, in Uzbekistan ein autokratisches Regime) – beide sind in diesem Punkt aber nicht über alle Zweifel von Seiten des Westens erhaben. Pakistan spielt ein doppeltes Spiel und hält sich alle Möglichkeiten offen indem es Kontakte zu verschiedenen Organisationen (u.a. den Taliban) aufrecht erhält, die Rolle der Menschanrechte ist in der Beziehung zu Uzbekistan immer ein Streitpunkt (spätestens seit den Vorfällen in Andijan). Sowohl Pakistan als auch Uzbekistan stellen neben arabischen Ländern einen bedeutenden Anteil an Kämpfern in den Reihen der Taliban und al-Qaeda nahen Organisationen, und sind selbst Heimat von indigenen islamistischen Organisationen. Beide Länder stellen einen direkten Transportweg zu Afghanistan dar – Pakistan vom Arabischen Meer über den Hafen von Karachi, den Khyber oder den Bolan Pass und Chaman, Uzbekistan von den zentralasiatischen Flughäfen über Termez als Teil des NDN (Northern Distribution Network). Pakistan hatte bis jetzt die wichtigere Rolle in diesem Kampf um Aufmerksamkeit, verliert diese aber zusehends. Als singuläres Beispiel für eine beliebte Narrative argumentiert Joshua Foust auf Registan für Uzbekistan und einer Lösung von Pakistan, mit dem simplen Argument, dass Uzbekistan zwar keine gute Lösung ist, aber immerhin besser als Pakistan (vor allem in diesem ersten Post dazu, aber auch hier und hier. Während er mit dem Argument, ‘auf Pakistan sei einfach kein Verlass’ sicher Recht hat, ist das Festhalten auf der Vorgabe, einen ‘single most important (strong) friend’ zu fördern und alle anderen Nachbarstaaten als ‘adversaries’ anzusehen oder einfach zu ignorieren sehr einfach gestrickt und nicht nachhaltig. Gleichwertige bilaterale Partnerschaften zu allen Nachbarstaaten zu suchen, gleichzeitig aber auch die Bedeutung von Pakistan herabzusetzen und die einseitige Unterstützung des Landes (insbesondere seiner Armee) zu beenden wäre ein sinnvollerer Schritt.

Baumwolltransport aus Pakistan nach Afghanistan am Khyber Pass kurz vor der Grenze [2007, Photo vom Autor

New Silk Road

Die ‘most fancy’ Strategie der USA zur Zukunft Afghanistan’s und seiner Nachbarstaaten hat einen Namen – ‘the New Silk Road’. Es beruht unter anderem auf den Argumenten S. Frederick Starr’s (PDF, Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance, January 2011, mehr Unterlagen zu seinen Überlegungen finden sich auf der Seite seiner Silk Road Studies):

The World Bank, in an important but neglected 2010 study, provides a concise and authoritative explanation: Afghanistan’s single greatest comparative advantage is its geostrategic location. [...] It was not always thus. Over two millennia Afghanistan was the place where trade routes to India, China, the Middle East and Europe all converged. This is why Marco Polo crossed the country en route to China, and why Arab travelers like Ibn Battuta crossed it on their way to India. Such trade along the misnamed “Silk Road” (in fact, every conceivable product was transported over it) produced immense wealth. Balkh, near Mazar-e-Sharif, was once among the largest and richest cities on earth. Medieval Arabs, who knew something about urban life, called it “the Mother of Cities.” Bagram, where the major U.S. base is situated, once maintained lucrative ties simultaneously with ancient Greece and India, enabling it to flourish in opulent splendor. All this occurred with nothing more than camels for transport. Imagine, then, what might be possible when camels are replaced by eighteen wheelers, railroads, modern pipelines, and hydroelectric lines? This prospect has already engaged the attention of every country along the continental routes that cross Afghanistan. With or without American support, they are all moving fast to claim the benefits which they consider their historical birthright.

Ein Fussballfeld in Langar (Teil unseres Fussballprojektes Canchas), dem letzten Ort im Tajikischen Wakhan - von hier aus geht es über den High Pamir nach China, einer der vielen Seidenstrassenarme. 'Langar' bedeutet 'Verpflegunsstation für Reisende' [2010, Photo vom Autor

The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium. [...] Because these processes are rooted in the self-interest of governments, business communities, and whole societies in each of the many countries involved, they will continue to unfold with or without the United States’ port or involvement. But because of the unique position of the U.S. vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and also the extent and depth of its relations with most of the other countries involved, decisions and actions in Washington will decisively influence the pace at which the process takes place, and also the character of the vast commercial network that is coming into being. For the time being, the U.S. possesses immense potential leverage over what is arguably the most transformative development taking place on the Eurasian land mass today.

Wie John Kucera meint, übertreibt Starr gerne und masslos. In vielen Punkten hat er aber sicher Recht. Ich glaube jedoch auch, dass das Konzept der ‘neuen Seidenstrasse’ sinnlos ist, allerdings aus ganz anderen Gründen wie Joshua Foust, der wieder einmal alles etwas einfach zeichnet.

Drei Gründe, warum die ‘neue Seidenstrasse’ ein Hirngespinnst ist:

Als die alte Seidenstrasse florierte, tat sie das ganz ohne zentralisierte Organisation. Es bestand Angebot und Nachfrage über unzählige Grenzen hinweg. Wenn heute Starr behauptet, lange Grenzkontrollen wären das grosse Hinderniss für zentralaiatischen Wirtschaftsaustausch hat er damit nur teilweise Recht. Sicher müssen Länder wie Uzbekistan und Tajikistan wie auch Kyrgyzstan, die sich auf wirtschaftlicher Ebene dauern bekriegen, zu definitiven Lösungen kommen. Korrupte Zollbeamte hat es aber an der Seidenstrasse sicher in gleichem Ausmass gegeben wie sie heute zu finden sind. Und jeder hat mehr oder wenioger gut daran verdient.

Die letzte Armee Baracke der Tajikischen Armee vor Afghanistan im High Pamir [2010, Photo vom Autor

Zuletzt betreibt China diese ‘neue Seidenstrassen-Politik’ schon lange, mehr oder weniger erfolgreich aber in erster Linie weitaus weniger ambitioniert, dafür um einiges effizienter.

Hasan H. Karrar beschreibt in seinem ‘The New Silk Road Diplomacy’ (2009, UBC Press) die Zentralasienpolitik Chinas seit dem kalten Krieg.

Zwar betrachtet Karrar das Handlen und Planen China’s in der Region nur anhand von Literatur und Medien (was es zu einer recht kurzen politikwissenschaftlichen Lektüre werden lässt), er bezieht sich aber sowohl auch westliche als auch chinesische Quellen und vermag die Intentionen und Strategien in einigen Aspekten sehr gut zu umreissen. In erster Linie geht es ihm um die Feststellung, dass China an bilateralen wie auch an multilateralen Netzwerken in der Region interessiert ist, diese aber nicht agressiv vorantreibt. Sein Buch ist auch eine schnelle Quelle für wirkliche Wirtschaftszahlen, und zeigt, dass der Handel in der Region, wenn auch zögerlich so doch kontinuierlich wächst.

Tomatenernte im Yanqi Becken, Xinjiang. [2010, Bild vom Autor

Schlussendlich hat Aaron L. Friedberg in seinem neuen ‘A Contest for Supremacy’ (September 2011, Norton) ohne Fokus auf Zentralasien aus Sichtweise eines US Political Advisors mit umfassender Einsicht in chinesische Quellen noch einen Blick auf den Wettbewerb zwischen den USA und China um Asien geworfen. Er kommt was Zentralasien betrifft auf ähnliche Schlüsse wie Karrar und elaboriert das Konzept der ‘propensity of things’ des französischen Philosophen Francois Jullien auf politikwissenschaftlicher Ebene.

Pakistan-China Beziehung nur Teil einer regionalen Entwicklung

Während Annäherung auf Seiten Pakistan’s und China’s oft als ein rein bilaterales Vorgehen reduziert wird, stimmt viel eher, dass beide Projekten vernetzt sind, die sie aneinander binden und in denen sich unterscheidliche Interessen überschneiden. Pakistan wollte wiederholt in die von China dominierte SCO (wie Indien wurde ihm nur Beobachterstatus zugestanden), China will Teil von ASEA sein, bekommt aber auch hier nur einen teilweisen Zugang. Im neuen Silk Road Program des Westens spielen beide Länder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle (obwohl das Gebiet des heutigen China einst einen Grossteil der Seidenstrasse ausmachte). Zardari versucht ein bisschen Geschichte umzudichten (das heutige Pakistan war nie wirklich Bestandteil der Seidenstrasse, wenn auch über den Karakorum, nach Kabul und Durch Balochistan Lahore immer schon ein Angelpunkt war), ist inerster Linie aber an wirtschaftlichen Austausch und Kooperation im Falle Xinjiang interessiert. Gleiche Kooperationen bestehen mit allen zentralasiatischen Ländern zu im Westen unbedeutenden Themen (Passübergänge im Hindukush, Stromnetz, Studentenaustausch, Handel vor allem im Baubereich …), die aber Teil von ‘Seidenstrassen’ sind, die nie aufgehört haben zu existieren und daher auch nicht neu aufgebaut werden müssen.

When one talks about the Left in Pakistan (also when it talks about itself) one is pretty quick quite far on the left, with comrades and worker’s struggle. (To follow what the very active Leftists are currently up to, the SPN Network is a great source). That is a bit bewildering to a Central European who understands the Political Left to be more heterogenuous than just Socialist. There could be the Greens, the Liberals, and other swaths of the population who would be left leaning but has little understanding of peasant’s uprsie in the rural areas or reminescences of a Socialist state.

Farooq Sulehria provides a brief history in a global context.

Masood Ashraf Raja even has to emphasize, that he is not talking about the Communist Party when talking about the left:

When I invoke the term left, I do not mean left in the classical sense: a centralized communist party. I rather mean a loose coalition of like-minded Pakistanis with a socialistic outlook who believe in a secular public sphere and do not treat class, gender, and other identities as fixed but as fluid constructs within a national space. Most of all, the left signifies for me a strong commitment to a liberatory and redemptive politics that builds lateral solidarities—within and without the nation—against the forces of neoliberal capital.

Pervez Hoodbhoy has last year looked at the potential of the Left in Pakistan – he drifts away into a lot of repetitive stuff that has really little to do with the Left and is just what he writes about again and again, but gets to a final point:

To become relevant to the real needs of Pakistan’s peoples, Pakistan’s leftists need to reaffirm their allegiance to what truly matters. Instead of chasing demons and indulging in meaningless sloganeering, they must squarely face religious militancy as the most immediate problem. Left-wing ideals lie in the great ideals of economic justice, secularism, universalistic ideas of human rights, good governance, women’s rights, and rationality in human affairs. Washington must be firmly resisted, but only when it seeks to drag Pakistan away from these goals. It is futile to frame every debate in pro- or anti-America terms; the key point is to be pro-people.

A recent short article on where the Pakistani Left could go, which sees a lot of positive potential, was recently published by Qalandar Bux Memon and Ali Mohsin. Like the other articles it dwells a lot in the past, but gives current examples where the Left is active and achieving.

From these foundations, the Left desires to push on to economic and social transformation. It’s a difficult, perilous task. But the Pakistani Left has never been more prepared.

This rooting in the present gives this piece some more realistic outlook what the Pakistani Left could be about today (no doubt, the different organisations are very active and do achieve a lot good – it would be laudable if interantional ‘nation builders’/'failed state theorizers’ would acknowledge these aspects of the Pakistani landscape). Nevertheless I think the Left would be well advised if they would further their spectrum from staunch comrades, anti-imperialists and the working class to for example the neo-liberals in Raja’s definition. Memon and others are reaching out to bring different people together via great initiatives in locations like Cafe Bol – I guess there could be more of it, also outside of the universities’ domain.

3. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Im zweiten Teil bin ich kurz auf die Tatsache eingegangen, dass die pakistanisch-chinesische Beziehung in erster Linie überhaupt nicht verstanden wird. Nicht nur nicht von Aussenstehenden, auch Pakistan und China, sowohl die Regierungen als auch die Bevölkerung, haben keine klare und kohärente Vorstellung wenn es um diese bilaterale Beziehung geht. Die zunehmende Krise in der US-Pakistan Allianz, von bin Laden’s Exekution in Pakistan durch US SEALS bis zur derzeitigen Auseinandersetzung über das Haqqani Netzwerk, hat auch Pakistan’s Verbindung mit China wieder in den Fokus gerückt. In den USA (und Europa) gefürchtet, in Pakistan selbst immer wieder beschworen, lautet das einfache Szenario, überall wo sich die USA aus einer Kooperation mit Pakistan zurückziehen oder ganz einfach scheitern, übernimmt China dankend. Bei den einen nährt das die zunehmende Besorgnis vor einem rising China, für die anderen ist es die Sicherheit, dass man auch ohne die USA einen starken Partner im Rücken hat – noch dazu einen der keine moralischen Fragen stellt. Während die USA ihr Bündnis mit Pakistan immer mehr vom Untergang bedroht sieht, versucht man zumindest noch vom sinkenden Schiff jeden Bericht gescheiterter chinesischer Vorstösse als Indiz darzustellen, dass China nicht anstelle der USA vor Karachi (Gwadar oder am Kabul Fluss) Anker legen wird. Pakistanische Medien nehmen ähnlich singuläre Vorkomnisse der erfolgreichen Sorte zum Anlass, genau das zu bewiesen.

Sparta’s Angst

Diese Darstellung ist einerseits schon problematisch, weil sie suggeriert, dass Pakistan als Staat in jedem Fall auf amerikanische oder chinesische finanzielle Unterstützung angewiesen ist. Wright und Page verstehen das als given fact:

But China’s response has been lukewarm so far, suggesting that Islamabad may remain dependent on billions of dollars in military and civilian aid from Washington for some time to come.

Auch Rodriguez und Demick in der LATimes sieht die ganze Thematik nur als Rechenbeispiel an:

Analysts say such a move is highly unlikely. With nearly $9 billion in annual trade with Pakistan, China is Islamabad’s biggest trading partner, as well as its leading arms supplier. But it could never replace the billions of dollars in economic and military aid that Pakistan gets from the United States, experts say, as well as billions more in loans from international lenders heavily influenced by the U.S., including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Ein Grossteil der Investments beider Staaten, ganz besonders von Seiten der USA, kommt in erster Linie der pakistanischen Armee und damit nicht dem Staat oder der Zivilbevölkerung zu Gute – im Gegenteil, die leidet eher unter der zunehmenden Förderung des Militärs. Die Annahme, dass Pakistan seine aussenpolitischen Partner allein über die Buchhaltung entscheidet ist naiv und unterschätzt ideologische und politische Faktoren.

Andererseits ist diese Angst vor der rising power ein altes Phänomen, auf das Aaron L. Friedberg im US-China Kontext eingeht:

As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

Pakistan’s Wunschdenken

Dass sich Pakistan womöglich eine ganz andere Beziehung vorstellt als tatsächlich im Entstehen ist und China zulassen wird, beleuchtet Myra Macdonald in der wohl soweit besten Darstellung dieses Themas. Sie argumentiert, dass Pakistan die mögliche Unterstützung von Seiten China’s heillos überschätzt, gleichzeitig aber im Westen die Bedeutung dieser Beziehung unverhältnismässig dargestellt wird:

First of all Pakistan is not the centre of the world even though those of us who cover it tend to think it is. And China is a big country, setting itself on a trajectory to outstrip the United States. It pays far less attention to India than India does to China, let alone becoming as obsessed with Pakistan’s problems as Pakistan is with casting China in the role of saviour.

[...]

The visit by China’s Meng probably told us more than we realise. It did not tell us very much about what China will do – if past history is anything to go by it will do very little and try to keep itself out of the fray. But it did tell us rather a lot about Pakistan – and the likelihood of the country’s civilian and military leaders closing ranks in the face of American pressure.

In den USA und Europa wird zu oft angenommen, dass China’s Rolle in Pakistan ähnlichen Interessen und Motiven folgen müsste wie es die des Westens sind – das ist höchstwahrscheinlich nicht zutreffend. Wie Macdonald anmerkt, wird sich China in politischen täglichen Agenden weitesgehend heraushalten, dagegen sind sie an wirtschaftlichen und ideologischen Verknüpfungen sehr wohl interessiert. Damit ist ihr Intersse an Pakistan genau gegenläufig zu dem des Westens, der Pakistan in erster Linie als gefährlichen geopolitischen Spielball sieht aber relativ wenig Interesse an wirtschaftlichem und kulturellem Austausch zeigt. Dazu noch einmal Friedberg – er versteht es, im Gegensatz zu den meisten Autoren westlicher Artikel zum Thema (der WSJ Artikel bezieht sich auf eine einzige chinesische Quelle, die aus Hongkong kommt und bei einem Think Tank in Kooperation mit einer amerikanischen Uni arbeitet), die chinesische Seite zumindest teilweise zu beleuchten:

As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; […]

[...]

Even as it grows stronger and, in certain respects, more self-confident, the CCP continues to dread ideological contamination. Pliant, like-minded states along its borders are far more likely to help Beijing deal with this danger than flourishing liberal democracies with strong ties to the West. The desire to forestall “peaceful evolution” at home gives the regime another compelling reason to want to shape the political development of its neighbors.

Wie so oft wird in dieser Problematik die Stimme einer der wichtigsten Parteien – in dem Fall China – im Westen gar nicht beleuchtet, in erster Linie in Ermangelung der Bereitschaft Chinesisch zu lesen und zu interviewen. Es ist daher nicht sehr überraschend, dass die beiden englischsprachigen Parteien – Pakistan und die USA – planlos Thesen erstellen und von allen drei Stakeholdern am wenigsten abschätzen können wohin sich diese Dreiecksbeziehung entwickeln wird.

Alpine Narrative

Unverständlich ist sie nicht. Besonders Deutschland und Österreich haben, ganz ohne Empire, eine lange Präsenz im nördlichen Hindukush, der mehrere heutige afghanische Provinzen umfasst und die pakistanischen Khyber Pakhtunkhwa und Gilgit Baltistan streift. Eine Unzahl von Expeditionen von den Anfängen des 3. Reichs bis zum Beginn des sowjetischen Afghanistan Krieges beschäftigte sich mit der lokalen Flora und Fauna, Ackerbau, Viehwirschaft und Sprache, aber vor allem auch mit alpinistischen Zielen wie im benachbarten Karakoram und Himalaya wo Namen wie Buhl und Harrer zu Berühmtheit gelangten. Dieses Interesse für eine montane Region rührt natürlich auch von der Heimat her – gerade ältere (ehemalig) aktive Bergsteiger haben ganz andere Vorstellungen von Pakistan, als dies heute von Medien vermittelt wird. Hochgebirge wie man es in den Alpen nicht findet zieht auch heute noch jährlich profesionelle Bergsteiger wie Amateure über Islamabad in den Karakoram und die mediale Aufmerksamkeit kommt im Falle der letzten Wettrennen (wie das der ‘ersten Frau auf allen 14 Achttausendern’) auch nicht zu kurz. Eine Aufmerksamkeit für die Region besteht also – nur deckt sich diese mit der politischen Hindukush-Narrative, und trägt damit nicht zu einem weiteren Verständnis bei. Ganz im Gegenteil – während Mortenson mit seiner K2 Abstiegsgeschichte in Mitteleuropa wohl eher aufgedeckt worden wäre als in den USA, für alles ausserhalb des Alpinsports warten deutschsprachige Medien meist auf Input aus den USA (NYTimes) oder England (Guardian).

Negierte Beiträge

Nicht einmal die deutsche Koriphäe der Islamforschung und enge Freundin des Landes Pakistan, Annemarie Schimmel, scheint es geschafft zu haben, das Bild in den Subkontinent zu erweitern. Zwar liegt die höchste Erhebung des Hindukusch, der Tirich Mir, in Pakistan, verglichen mit der gesamten Landesfläche ist sein Einfluss auf das Land aber gering. Nicht einmal militante Organisationen haben im pakistanischen Teil (von Peshawar nördlich bis zum Wakhan) einen nennenswerten Rückzugsraum. Aber das Bild eines kargen Gebirges passt gut in die Erklärung warum hier alles so kompliziert ist, und eine ordentliche Recherche leider schwer möglich. Das zu einem Verständnis des Landes und seiner Verstrickung im Hauptaugenmerk der Medien, islamistischem Extremismus, die Megastädte Lahore und Karachi wie auch der ländliche Punjab und Sindh genauso wichtig, wenn nicht sogar unumgänglich ist – also genau die Räume, die von Annemarie Schimmel aber auch heute noch von Wasim Frembgen oder Ruth Pfau, einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit vermittelt werden – wird so lange nicht wahrgenommen, bis es die amerikanischen Medien nach und nach selbst erkennen und damit auch im deutschsprachigen Raum mehrheitsfähig machen. Inwieweit die amerikanische Narrative (‘Imagination’) von der pakistanischen Realität abweicht zeigt schon seit Jahren Manan Ahmed, der derzeit als JuniorProfessor an der FU Berlin liest, auf seinem Blog chapatimystery.com – eine edidierte Auswahl hat er nun als Buch vorgelegt, ‘Where the Wild Frontiers are: Pakistan and the American Imagination‘. Und auch wenn die Empire-Beziehung zum Subkontinent, welche Ahmed immer wieder aufgreift für das deutsschsprachige Mitteleuropa weniger Relevanz besitzt als für das old-empire England und das new-empire USA, werden seine Beobachtungen durch seine mediale Abhängigkeit von diesen Empires auch zunehmend für Europa relevant.

Geschichte von der anderen Seite betrachtet

Amitava Kumar schreibt in der Einleitung:

‘Not where I was at such-and-such time, but what are the other histories that where unfolding at that moment, in a universe whose centre isn’t so close to mine. [... ...] What does history look like from the other side? Well, one way to think of the situation is to recognize that there is no other side.‘

Manan Ahmed verbindet sein Verständnis seines Heimatlandes Pakistan, mit der Möglichkeit es aus den USA (und in Zukunft vielleicht auch vom europäischen Standpunkt) zu betrachten, mit seinem wissenschaftlichen Gebiet (Islamgeschichte am Subkontinent) und einem Schreibstil, der manchmal sogar den von Kumar erreicht. In Einträgen aus den letzten 7 Jahren seziert er den imaginären und realen Aufbau des American Empire, auf welcher Grundlage es fundiert (Terra In/cognito), welche medialen Narrativen dazu führen (Support, Deny, Ignore), wie man sich dieser erwehrt (Observe, Resist, Debate) und schreibt darüber hinaus noch prägnant und erheiternd bis erschütternd zu lesende Einblicke in die pakistanische Politik und Geschichte (Friend, Wrong) – dabei fällt er jedoch nie in die Falle, Dinge der Kürze wegen zu vereinfachen. What kind of historian would I be if I didn’t endorse complexity?

Was in Europe ‘am Hindukusch’ ist, ist in Amerika die ‘afghanisch-pakistanische’ Grenzregion. Die Intention, die Region als topographisch-vegetativ karg zu präsentieren um damit sogleich auf Kultur und Gesellschaft schliessen zu können findet da wie dort mit dem jeweiligen Haupteinsatzgebiet der Truppen in Afghanistan statt. Für Briten ist es ein Land wie eine Wüste (nach Helmand), für die USA unzugänglich (Korengal), für die Deutschen der trockene Hindukusch. Ahmed dazu, bezugnehmend auf John Kerry’s Rede vor dem Foreign Relations Commitee und Hillary Clinton: There are mega-cities like Karachi, with populations of more than 19 million. We are not dealing with hamlets and pockets. Es ist genau diese wild frontier of imagination, die er von ihrem Mantel der säuberlich konstruierten Narrativen zu befreien. It is human nature to omit parts of our past or to relegate them behind carefully constructed narrative frameworks that avoid excessive scrutiny.

Selbst Pakistani, der wohl mehr in Englisch als einer seiner endemischen Landessprachen kommuniziert und Pakistan oft nur zu Besuchen und Recherchen wiedersieht, lässt er auch die Kritik an der pakistanischen Elite nicht aus, die zu dieser Narrative beiträgt: I should add that, as a reader, it is disheartening to see the Pakistani English-sprache elite contribute so wholeheartedly to the construction of only that reality.

Abzug der Aufmerksamkeit?

Für einflussreiche Printmedien aus dem deutschsprachigen Raum ist aus Pakistan mit Hasnain Kazim (Spiegel) derzeit nur ein einziger ständiger Reporter vor Ort. Möglicherweise wird mit dem nahenden Abzug deutscher Truppen auch die Aufmerksamkeit für die Region noch weiter schwinden, und der Einfluss amerikanischer Narrativen noch größeres Gewicht erlangen. Bevor dieser Fall eintritt, und solange niemand diese Betrachtung für europäische Berichterstattung anstellt, ist Ahmed’s Buch ein ausgezeichneter Leitfaden wie Pakistan (als eines und als multiple Identitäten) zu verstehen ist wenn es in der täglichen Berichterstattung auftaucht. Mit in seiner edidierten, geordneten und kommentierten Form ist es für neue Leser ein notwendiger Einstieg in seinen schon sehr umfangreichen Blog, der auch in Zukunft ‘Hindukusch’ in ein realistisches Bild einer Nation mit 180 mio. Einwohnern, 130 Sprachen und mehreren Klimazonen übersetzen wird.

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Rezension deutscher Literatur zu Pakistan:

Berichterstattung am Prüfstand

Die unkonventionelle Betrachtung