4. Ausgabe der Sino-Pakistan Serie

Teil I

Teil II

Teil III

Single Most Important Friend

Die USA brauchen neben ihrem schwächlichen Freund Afghanistan, den sie mal fördern und mal zusammenstauchen einen Partner für’s Grobe – ein lokaler ‘watch dog’ über die terroritischen Gefahren, die von verschiedenen Gruppen aus der Region ausgehen und verlässlicher Partner für die Versorgung des internationalen Eingreifens in Afghanistan. Sowohl Pakistan als auch Usbekistan vereinen Eigenschaften, die sie für diese Rolle qualifizieren. Beide Staaten haben Elemente, die es ihnen relativ leicht macht, auf Geheis in einer bestimmten Region durchzugreifen ohne der eigenen Bevölkerung Rechenschaft abliefern zu müssen (in Pakistan die Armee und der Geheimdienst, in Uzbekistan ein autokratisches Regime) – beide sind in diesem Punkt aber nicht über alle Zweifel von Seiten des Westens erhaben. Pakistan spielt ein doppeltes Spiel und hält sich alle Möglichkeiten offen indem es Kontakte zu verschiedenen Organisationen (u.a. den Taliban) aufrecht erhält, die Rolle der Menschanrechte ist in der Beziehung zu Uzbekistan immer ein Streitpunkt (spätestens seit den Vorfällen in Andijan). Sowohl Pakistan als auch Uzbekistan stellen neben arabischen Ländern einen bedeutenden Anteil an Kämpfern in den Reihen der Taliban und al-Qaeda nahen Organisationen, und sind selbst Heimat von indigenen islamistischen Organisationen. Beide Länder stellen einen direkten Transportweg zu Afghanistan dar – Pakistan vom Arabischen Meer über den Hafen von Karachi, den Khyber oder den Bolan Pass und Chaman, Uzbekistan von den zentralasiatischen Flughäfen über Termez als Teil des NDN (Northern Distribution Network). Pakistan hatte bis jetzt die wichtigere Rolle in diesem Kampf um Aufmerksamkeit, verliert diese aber zusehends. Als singuläres Beispiel für eine beliebte Narrative argumentiert Joshua Foust auf Registan für Uzbekistan und einer Lösung von Pakistan, mit dem simplen Argument, dass Uzbekistan zwar keine gute Lösung ist, aber immerhin besser als Pakistan (vor allem in diesem ersten Post dazu, aber auch hier und hier. Während er mit dem Argument, ‘auf Pakistan sei einfach kein Verlass’ sicher Recht hat, ist das Festhalten auf der Vorgabe, einen ‘single most important (strong) friend’ zu fördern und alle anderen Nachbarstaaten als ‘adversaries’ anzusehen oder einfach zu ignorieren sehr einfach gestrickt und nicht nachhaltig. Gleichwertige bilaterale Partnerschaften zu allen Nachbarstaaten zu suchen, gleichzeitig aber auch die Bedeutung von Pakistan herabzusetzen und die einseitige Unterstützung des Landes (insbesondere seiner Armee) zu beenden wäre ein sinnvollerer Schritt.

Baumwolltransport aus Pakistan nach Afghanistan am Khyber Pass kurz vor der Grenze [2007, Photo vom Autor

New Silk Road

Die ‘most fancy’ Strategie der USA zur Zukunft Afghanistan’s und seiner Nachbarstaaten hat einen Namen – ‘the New Silk Road’. Es beruht unter anderem auf den Argumenten S. Frederick Starr’s (PDF, Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance, January 2011, mehr Unterlagen zu seinen Überlegungen finden sich auf der Seite seiner Silk Road Studies):

The World Bank, in an important but neglected 2010 study, provides a concise and authoritative explanation: Afghanistan’s single greatest comparative advantage is its geostrategic location. [...] It was not always thus. Over two millennia Afghanistan was the place where trade routes to India, China, the Middle East and Europe all converged. This is why Marco Polo crossed the country en route to China, and why Arab travelers like Ibn Battuta crossed it on their way to India. Such trade along the misnamed “Silk Road” (in fact, every conceivable product was transported over it) produced immense wealth. Balkh, near Mazar-e-Sharif, was once among the largest and richest cities on earth. Medieval Arabs, who knew something about urban life, called it “the Mother of Cities.” Bagram, where the major U.S. base is situated, once maintained lucrative ties simultaneously with ancient Greece and India, enabling it to flourish in opulent splendor. All this occurred with nothing more than camels for transport. Imagine, then, what might be possible when camels are replaced by eighteen wheelers, railroads, modern pipelines, and hydroelectric lines? This prospect has already engaged the attention of every country along the continental routes that cross Afghanistan. With or without American support, they are all moving fast to claim the benefits which they consider their historical birthright.

Ein Fussballfeld in Langar (Teil unseres Fussballprojektes Canchas), dem letzten Ort im Tajikischen Wakhan - von hier aus geht es über den High Pamir nach China, einer der vielen Seidenstrassenarme. 'Langar' bedeutet 'Verpflegunsstation für Reisende' [2010, Photo vom Autor

The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millennium. [...] Because these processes are rooted in the self-interest of governments, business communities, and whole societies in each of the many countries involved, they will continue to unfold with or without the United States’ port or involvement. But because of the unique position of the U.S. vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and also the extent and depth of its relations with most of the other countries involved, decisions and actions in Washington will decisively influence the pace at which the process takes place, and also the character of the vast commercial network that is coming into being. For the time being, the U.S. possesses immense potential leverage over what is arguably the most transformative development taking place on the Eurasian land mass today.

Wie John Kucera meint, übertreibt Starr gerne und masslos. In vielen Punkten hat er aber sicher Recht. Ich glaube jedoch auch, dass das Konzept der ‘neuen Seidenstrasse’ sinnlos ist, allerdings aus ganz anderen Gründen wie Joshua Foust, der wieder einmal alles etwas einfach zeichnet.

Drei Gründe, warum die ‘neue Seidenstrasse’ ein Hirngespinnst ist:

Als die alte Seidenstrasse florierte, tat sie das ganz ohne zentralisierte Organisation. Es bestand Angebot und Nachfrage über unzählige Grenzen hinweg. Wenn heute Starr behauptet, lange Grenzkontrollen wären das grosse Hinderniss für zentralaiatischen Wirtschaftsaustausch hat er damit nur teilweise Recht. Sicher müssen Länder wie Uzbekistan und Tajikistan wie auch Kyrgyzstan, die sich auf wirtschaftlicher Ebene dauern bekriegen, zu definitiven Lösungen kommen. Korrupte Zollbeamte hat es aber an der Seidenstrasse sicher in gleichem Ausmass gegeben wie sie heute zu finden sind. Und jeder hat mehr oder wenioger gut daran verdient.

Die letzte Armee Baracke der Tajikischen Armee vor Afghanistan im High Pamir [2010, Photo vom Autor

Zuletzt betreibt China diese ‘neue Seidenstrassen-Politik’ schon lange, mehr oder weniger erfolgreich aber in erster Linie weitaus weniger ambitioniert, dafür um einiges effizienter.

Hasan H. Karrar beschreibt in seinem ‘The New Silk Road Diplomacy’ (2009, UBC Press) die Zentralasienpolitik Chinas seit dem kalten Krieg.

Zwar betrachtet Karrar das Handlen und Planen China’s in der Region nur anhand von Literatur und Medien (was es zu einer recht kurzen politikwissenschaftlichen Lektüre werden lässt), er bezieht sich aber sowohl auch westliche als auch chinesische Quellen und vermag die Intentionen und Strategien in einigen Aspekten sehr gut zu umreissen. In erster Linie geht es ihm um die Feststellung, dass China an bilateralen wie auch an multilateralen Netzwerken in der Region interessiert ist, diese aber nicht agressiv vorantreibt. Sein Buch ist auch eine schnelle Quelle für wirkliche Wirtschaftszahlen, und zeigt, dass der Handel in der Region, wenn auch zögerlich so doch kontinuierlich wächst.

Tomatenernte im Yanqi Becken, Xinjiang. [2010, Bild vom Autor

Schlussendlich hat Aaron L. Friedberg in seinem neuen ‘A Contest for Supremacy’ (September 2011, Norton) ohne Fokus auf Zentralasien aus Sichtweise eines US Political Advisors mit umfassender Einsicht in chinesische Quellen noch einen Blick auf den Wettbewerb zwischen den USA und China um Asien geworfen. Er kommt was Zentralasien betrifft auf ähnliche Schlüsse wie Karrar und elaboriert das Konzept der ‘propensity of things’ des französischen Philosophen Francois Jullien auf politikwissenschaftlicher Ebene.

Pakistan-China Beziehung nur Teil einer regionalen Entwicklung

Während Annäherung auf Seiten Pakistan’s und China’s oft als ein rein bilaterales Vorgehen reduziert wird, stimmt viel eher, dass beide Projekten vernetzt sind, die sie aneinander binden und in denen sich unterscheidliche Interessen überschneiden. Pakistan wollte wiederholt in die von China dominierte SCO (wie Indien wurde ihm nur Beobachterstatus zugestanden), China will Teil von ASEA sein, bekommt aber auch hier nur einen teilweisen Zugang. Im neuen Silk Road Program des Westens spielen beide Länder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle (obwohl das Gebiet des heutigen China einst einen Grossteil der Seidenstrasse ausmachte). Zardari versucht ein bisschen Geschichte umzudichten (das heutige Pakistan war nie wirklich Bestandteil der Seidenstrasse, wenn auch über den Karakorum, nach Kabul und Durch Balochistan Lahore immer schon ein Angelpunkt war), ist inerster Linie aber an wirtschaftlichen Austausch und Kooperation im Falle Xinjiang interessiert. Gleiche Kooperationen bestehen mit allen zentralasiatischen Ländern zu im Westen unbedeutenden Themen (Passübergänge im Hindukush, Stromnetz, Studentenaustausch, Handel vor allem im Baubereich …), die aber Teil von ‘Seidenstrassen’ sind, die nie aufgehört haben zu existieren und daher auch nicht neu aufgebaut werden müssen.

Part I looks at the disappearance of Uzbek presence in the city and how fault always lies with the other.

The violence and its aftermath have steadily erased most traces of the Uzbek presence in the city’s shared spaces, the Uzbek language has disappeared from shops signs, newsstands, the airwaves. While the mayor’s office supposedly promotes tolerance and ethnic harmony, over the past year vigilante groups of mostly older Kyrgyz women freely harass and sometimes even physically abuse ethnic Uzbeks who dare to appear in public, ride on city transport, attempt to interface with the city administration, or even show up to work in shops that still employ a multi-ethnic staff. Even the city’s much heralded new monument to victims of last year’s violence quickly became a site for screaming protests by these groups, denying the ethnic Uzbek half of the city access even to what was supposed to be a sacred space for common grief.

[...]

While the destruction of homes overwhelmingly occurred in ethnic Uzbek mahallas, the human and sexual violence itself and the destruction of commercial spaces, restaurants, and businesses was shared among all communities of Osh—although alarmingly, many on both ethnic sides seem to believe that only “we” were the true victims and “they” were wholly at fault. In the interviews I’ve conducted here so far, one of the most unsettling things that I’ve heard repeatedly (aside from the terrible stories of suffering and loss themselves) are statements that negate or dismiss suffering on the other side, the suffering of the “other.” Each ethnic group employs—with alarming frequency–narratives of homeland and defensive violence in order to cast the other group as usurpers or invaders.

Part II elaborates on the latter paragraph. Part III looks at how it may be too easy to just boil it down to ethnicity. Part IV looks at personal narratives of one man and the routinely disorder that causes frustration.

Twice this week I saw expensive SUVs driving the wrong way down Lenin street downtown, with no regard for the direction traffic moves both legally and practically on the crowded one-way street. Small incidents like these are used by Osh residents to punctuate and illustrate a story of disorder that—with people that I have gotten to know over a longer period—often becomes a long running narrative. A driver that ignores a traffic light suddenly becomes a symbol of the same unpredictability that comes from revolutions that occur “every five years,” of why banks cannot be trusted, why schools are perceived to be failing, why corruption is corroding the institutions of society, of why—for Uzbeks anyway—the next generation needs to leave.

I expect he will be providing more insights in near future. Currently reading Oskar Verkaaik’s Migrants and Militants (which I will review soon) which looks at violence in Southern Sindh and how that is embedded in narratives while being overlty and poorly explained with ethnicity (Muhajir vs. Pashtoon vs. Sindhi) in the general media and scholarly writing, Tucker’s explanations do make a lot of sense to me with reference to another urban-ethnic-violence example that is reported but little understood.

I have never been to Kyrgyzstan but to Tajikistan last year, just after the riots in Osh, and have experienced a trans-border effect with somewhat less personal but more geopolitical-decision implications. Not only did many travellers who planned a Europe-China(-South East Asia) tour by car, bike or public transport see themselves at a dead end in the High Pamirs (afraid of Afghanistan and with a closed border-crossing Tajikistan-China for foreigners going to Osh from Mughab would have been their only option). Also Chinese hauliers who, especially with the KKH to Pakistan currenly blocked (see below), use the Kashi-Osh-Dushanbe-East/South route to trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran were facing a serious problem. Many truckers detoured via the Pamir Highway, a road that is only tarmaced for a couple of kilometers once and gain. The extra burden of dozens of heavy weight freighters each day caused the road to deteriorate quickly – for locals who are used to travel in cheap (Chinese) Tangems this means a great extra number of stops because of technical failures between Khorog and Murghab.

As highlighted earlier, the Chinese acquired a piece of the Pamir Plateau – I do suspect that this move is at least somewhat linked to the worries about Kyrgyzstan and those about Pakistan. Rumours exist since years that China wants to build a direct connection to the Afghan and the Tajik Wakhan either via Sost (Pakistan) or maybe directly via their (now augmented?) border towards Afghanistan.

The worry concerning Pakistan comes mainly because of the Attabad lake, a natural catastrophe that is hardly reported in the West – it’s more popular to churn out speculative writing on the Sino-Pak relations that no one really understands (see our Sino-Pak ‘Series’ on that – it’s in German, and currently only one post long).

Shujaat Ali at Pamir Times (which is generally following this issue extensively) looks at the implications of this disaster for locals’ transport.

First off I assume these are pastures and some locals will be pissed (something similar happened on the Pakistan-China over a strip of land between Shimshal and the K2, here China claims land but has removed it’s outposts). Second China for sure had some reason to get this batch of land, otherwise they would have done away with it (I also assume their old claims on the whole Pamir are still upright in their minds and such a tiny deal won’t do away with the history of the place). Third it’s another obvious sign how they are pushing in this region with the West oblivious or uninterested.

When I was travelling on the Pamir Highway last fall it was a mess – the Chinese trucks coming from Kashi, travelling all the way into Tajikistan to a station before Khorog where they unload and goods are picked up by local trucks to be transported to low lying areas are too heavy for the track that disintegrated visibly and had tarmac only on some strips.

Chinese trucks on the Pamir Highway in GBAO, September 2010

The increased traffic was due to the unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which made drivers avoid the area around Osh and Ferghana and forced them up the Pamir. But China, with a probable increased interest in an Afghanistan to invest into has an interest in securing that route in general, additional to the Osh/Ferghana route and the KKH (the latter being equally hard to cross since a year due to a heavy landslide that resulted in a lake with the road submerged in deep waters). With full access up to Murghab, China is nearly in settled Afghan areas.

Remnants of the great game near Murghab, September 2010

A link of Tajikistan and Pakistan via the Baroghil pass and Langar through the Afghan Wakhan is also in some shelves although the discussion on it has stalled recently, although I am not sure whather Chinese are directly involved. They have already started the planning for the new KKH.

Apart from the road links, this corner of the Pamir is the source of another lifeline – the Amu Darya. It’s spring is just South of Murghab, after which it splits into Panj and Vaksh, two rivers encircling the Pamir and meets again to flow all the way to the Aral Lake (or what’s left of it). The source is disputed just like the whole area itself, a recent book was reviewed in the last SteppeMagazine, Halfway House to Heaven, there is a blog on an expedition of the Royal Geographical Society too. The Chinese interest in these waters is definitely given, although I doubt they are interested too keep a check on the upper part of the Oxus here, since it’s still a minor water mass at this stage.

It’s far from being a story that can be attributed with that trash title ‘New Great Game’, it’s rather a silent game. I will keep track of new findings of ongoings or indications for intents and appreciate informed comment.

While discussions over what European soldiers should be allowed to shoot at and what not are raging, another one that is linked to the attached petrol trucks is seldom present. The trucks originally came from Tajikistan. Especially since the term AfPak came up, Afghanistan is less and less seen linked to it’s northern neighbors. What are the threats coming from that side, what are the opportunities?

[Article] Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, World Policy Journal, Spring 2003

“Regional cooperation is likely only when states value the opportunities that openness can create more than the need for control.”

[Article] A Partnership for Central Asia, S. Frederick Starr, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

The article is based on situations that has since then changed considerably and have made his conclusions in some cases void.

[Article] The Afghanization of Central Asia, Examining the Implications of a Central Asian Supply Line for Afghanistan, Northern Distribution Network Grappels with Security Threat, EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight, different dates

Brief insights in how Afghanistan and the Central Asians states are linked and what that implies for future actions in Afghanistan.

[Article] The SCO: A regional organisation in the making, Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008

Matveeva and Gisutozzi give a brief insight in the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), on which issues it plans to focus and where it may be able and efficient to do so in future. They also put the Organisation’s dealings in perspective to Afghanistan which is neither a memeber nor an observer (like Pakistan, Iran and India).

Stabilisation of Afghanistan may be an issue in which all SCO member states could be interested, but where Russia could have an upper hand, while China could contribute economically, militarily (more in theory than in reality so far) and diplomatically through its close relationship with Pakistan. If neither country has been very active in Afghanistan after 2001 so far, it is probably because they are waiting for Washington’s position to weaken to the point where their diplomatic intervention would have a serious chance of success. Pakistan’s own ambiguous position also contributes to caution, especially for the Chinese.

They manage to highlight the major issue which drives my interest in Central Asia – the neighbor’s interest in the AfPak conflict and their contribution (to the conflict or its solution). Currently the West seems reluctant to involve other stakeholders into its meddling in Afghanistan. It’s the US and European countries involved in ISAF. Russia and China, the last bordering to Afghanistan are seemingly not involved in any decision making or contributions to COIN or diplomacy, although especially China is heavily involved in the private sector in Afghanistan and a patron with major influence on Pakistan.

The authors bring up the possible discrepancies in communication.

The Chinese foreign policy establishment is very cautious and risk-averse, and has difficulty handling unforeseen events and unconventional challenges. It feels more comfortable with everything planned and agreed in advance. This is almost diametrically opposed to the Russian foreign policy culture, which thrives on crisis, feels comfortable with assertive or controversial positions, and has a capacity and inclination to react quickly to unprecedented developments.
[...]
Moreover, the Russian establishment feels that culturally and socially it has more in common with the Americans than with the Chinese.
This perspective is shared by Central Asians. Proficiency in the Russian language and the legacy of Russian education and culture, upon which the Central Asian military and political establishment has been brought up, mean that when it comes to collective action in security sphere, Russian is a lingua franca for the rank-and-file cadre of five of the Shanghai Six. The language and cultural barrier is very real, and is an obstacle for interaction between the Chinese military and the rest.

They also emphasize that in terms of military involvement other organisations could play a more important role.

In the case of a large-scale security threat within Central Asia that requires a military response, the CSTO is most likely to be the one to respond, not least because it has Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. If instability in Afghanistan spins out of control and affects Central Asia, it is more likely that CSTO than SCO troops would be used to hold the border, with the Russian military leading the effort and contributing most troops.

[...]

The record of security engagement of all these [CSTO, CIS, NATO, ISAF] actors is far more prominent than that of the SCO.

Still, an inclusion of other stakeholders with a lot more imminent interest in the AfPak region, stakeholders who can feel the successes and failures in Afghanistan right away on their borders should be a seen as integral part of future decisions made in Afghanistan and also to some respect Pakistan.

[Blog] Registan, … is of course always a good source for discussions on these issues.